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ABSTRACT 
MILITARY RECRUITMENT IN NEW STATES 
Max Z. Margulies 
Michael C. Horowitz 
This dissertation examines why some states develop conscript militaries while 
others rely solely on volunteers. I argue that two variables determine what recruitment 
decisions states make when initially designing their military. First, either domestic or 
foreign policymakers can dominate the decision-making process. These actors often have 
different perceptions about the military’s most important goals and how to achieve them. 
When foreign powers view new states as sufficiently important enough to their interests, 
recruitment policies reflect their preferences, rather than those of domestic policymakers. 
Second, the threat perception of the actor making recruitment policies affects how they 
approach military design. Major external threats to the new state’s territory constrain 
recruitment options in the interest of immediate defense, leading to conscription, while 
lower threat environments permit more freedom to adopt different practices. 
I test this argument using an original dataset of 224 cases of state creation and 
major regime change from 1918–2011, including original variables that measure different 
types of foreign military influence. I also use qualitative evidence—including archival 
documents and interviews—to conduct a series of case studies focusing on the Middle 
East and Europe that are designed to control for alternative hypotheses and establish the 
causal processes. The results support my initial hypothesis, demonstrating that military 
design is often affected by hierarchy in international relations. This research suggests 
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important lessons for policymakers interested in effecting military reform by highlighting 
a role for foreign security assistance in processes of military design. 
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An army raised without proper regard to the choice of its recruits was never yet made 
good by length of time.1 
 Vegetius, De Re Militari 
 
 
 
Troops are raised by enlistment with a fixed term, without a fixed term, by compulsion 
some times, and most frequently by tricky devices.2 
 Maurice de Saxe, Mes Réveries 
  
                                                        
1 As quoted in Trevor Royle, A Dictionary of Military Quotations (New York, NY: Simon and 
Schuster, 1989). 
2 Ibid. 
 2 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND FRAMING OF THE DISSERTATION 
I. The Question: What Explains Military Recruitment in the Context of Military 
Design? 
The Republic of Korea is well known today for its system of universal male 
conscription. The origins of this system can be traced to the Korean War, when the 
sudden disintegration of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) in the face of the North 
Korean invasion in June 1950 created an immediate demand for replacements. President 
Syngman Rhee’s government passed the Emergency Defense Law on July 22, 1950, 
making all men aged 14 years or older eligible for conscription.3 While a previous 
conscription law had been passed in September 1949, it was only implemented for a few 
months, as volunteers met the military manpower requirements.4 In fact, the organization 
responsible for conscription had been disbanded in March 1950.5  
 The theory advanced in this dissertation can explain why South Korea was so 
unprepared in terms of military manpower when the North Korean invasion came in June 
1950. At the time, it relied on a military patron, the United States, which also preferred to 
use volunteers.6 In fact, South Korea’s Emergency Defense Law was implemented only 
                                                        
3 Brian R Gibby, The Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1946–1953 (The 
University of Alabama Press, 2012): 321. 
4 Chum-kon Kim, The Korean War: The First Comprehensive Account of the Historical 
Background and Development of the Korean War (1950–3) (Seoul, South Korea: Kwangmyong 
Publishing Company, 1973): 286; Alan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–50: A House 
Burning (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2005): 213. 
5 Kim, The Korean War, 286. 
6 The United States effectively had a volunteer military itself, and was far from convinced of the 
utility of peacetime mass armies at this time. While the United States had technically reinstated 
conscription domestically in the summer of 1948, this was intended as a temporary measure; 
inductions lasted only three months, and ended in February 1949. No conscripts were called up 
again until the Korean War, nor were inductions expected to be renewed until the conflict broke 
out. The United States was still thoroughly in a post-World War II mindset of demobilization 
during the years in which it helped create the South Korean army. Aaron Friedberg (2000, p.177) 
argues that “But for Korea, it is quite likely that by the beginning of the 1950s, the US would 
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after the United States Congress voted to reinstate draft inductions and to extend military 
conscription, which it did three days after the war broke out.7 Conscription in these 
circumstances is not necessarily surprising. The immense demands of the highly 
threatening military situation likely would have led South Korea to implement 
conscription even without the influence of a patron state. Nonetheless, the United States 
played an important role in this process. Ultimately, the United States molded the ROKA 
in its own image, reducing the ROKA’s readiness and likely contributing to the need for 
drastic conscription policies after war broke out.  
 The United States played a major role in the formation of the ROKA, particularly 
through the provision of a large American advisory mission, the Korean Military 
Advisory Group (KMAG). KMAG’s role was so great that it has been described as “the 
midwife to a new Korean army.”8 The first military advisory mission, the Provisional 
Military Advisory Group, was established by General MacArthur on the date of South 
Korea’s independence, August 15, 1948, and amounted to 100 military advisors.9 PMAG 
grew to 241 members by the end of the year, and increased further to 472 when it became 
KMAG with the withdrawal of the last American troops on July 1, 1949.10 In addition, 
the United States furnished arms and equipment to the South Korean army. However, the 
                                                        
have completed the transition to an entirely volunteer military format.” See Bernard Rostker, I 
Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2006): 27; Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and 
Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000): 173–177;  
7 Rostker, I Want You!, 2006. 
8 Gibby, The Will to Win, 13. 
9 James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First 
Year (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1992): 34. 
10 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 34; Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in 
Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Dept. of the Army, 1962): 49–50.  
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ROKA consistently recruited greater numbers of soldiers than the United States was 
willing to support. For example, the ROKA was nearly 100,000 strong in August 1949, 
although the United States had only agreed to support an army of 65,000.11 This 
discrepancy between supply and demand was a key reason why the Korean experiment 
with conscription before the war failed.12 It indicates that the United States attempted to 
limit South Korea efforts to recruit a conscript army.    
Indeed, while some South Korean leaders wanted a mass conscript army as a 
source of “population and territorial control” to guard against communism, General 
Roberts, commander of KMAG, believed that “the Korean military establishment should 
mirror the American system” and include a relatively small but highly trained army.13 
Even after the war started and the United States implemented conscription domestically, 
Americans seemed uneasy about conscription in South Korea. During the war, South 
Korean requests to expand the ROKA were rejected because American decision-makers, 
including Generals MacArthur and Ridgeway, were reluctant to increase manpower and 
thought South Korea should focus on “qualitative improvement in its organizational 
capacity, especially training and leadership.”14 Even at the darkest period of the war, 
American Ambassador Stephen Muccio reported on September 4, 1950 that President 
Rhee had ordered all conscription to stop, while Muccio himself bemoaned the use of 
“forceful impressment.”15 This shows that there was still a strong American tradition of 
                                                        
11 Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 34; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 58. 
12 Kim, The Korean War, 286. 
13 Millett, The War for Korea, 172. 
14 Taik-Young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power (London, UK: 
Routledge, 1999): 65. 
15 United States Dept. of State, Office of the Historian, “The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to 
the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII. 
Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d489. 
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limiting the use of conscription, and that these recruitment preferences may have been 
transmitted, at least in part, to South Korea. Thus, like the United States, which heavily 
influenced its military development, South Korea went into the Korean War with a 
primarily volunteer army, and would only use conscription under the most extreme 
circumstances. 
The creation of South Korea’s armed forces demonstrates the importance of 
foreign powers in influencing patterns of military design, particularly when it comes to 
military recruitment decisions. More broadly, it points to the role of foreign actors and 
military recruitment in the process and outcomes of statebuilding efforts. Military 
recruitment policies are a particularly important example of the many decisions states 
must make when designing their militaries. These decisions, in turn, are often at the 
forefront of statebuilding efforts. The world’s most recent new state, South Sudan, has 
struggled since achieving independence in 2011 to find the best way to transition the 
former rebel army and militias into a unified military. Similar questions shaped the 
American Articles of Confederation and later the Constitution, as nationalists and 
military reformists clashed with more conservative forces over the existence of a standing 
national army, the method of its recruitment and relationship to state militias, and the 
length of military service.16 While the former group thought the only way to protect the 
country against external challengers was to maximize the authority of the federal 
government to create a professional peacetime army, others feared that the existence of 
                                                        
16 Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the 
War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 75–121; John Whiteclay 
Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: The Free 
Press, 1982), 23–28. 
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such a permanent force would constitute an unacceptable threat to individual liberties and 
democratic governance. 
These cases highlight the significance states attach to questions of military design. 
They also underscore the constraints many countries face when designing their militaries. 
Each country’s statebuilders had to take into consideration how best to protect against 
external and internal threats while staying true to the ideological principles that 
legitimated their rule. This is one of the first and most important decisions confronting 
any newly independent state. While the international condition of anarchy compels all 
states to consider this question continuously, it is particularly pressing after moments of 
independence, revolution, or major regime change. The reconfiguration of domestic 
power in such contexts ushers in new threat perceptions and new ideas about how to 
address them. However, policymakers working in these conditions may also lack the 
prior experience or autonomy to make decisions about what existing institutions or 
models are appropriate in their local context. These factors can make the process of 
designing a military in new states particularly contentious, but they also constitute a 
unique opportunity to adopt new military forms and shape the state’s security for years to 
come.  
This dissertation examines why states choose different policies in response to the 
statebuilding imperatives described above. In particular, it addresses the question of why 
states design militaries in different ways. While previous scholarship emphasized the 
modern state’s convergence on the centralized and capital-intensive standing army, recent 
research has identified considerable and significant variation in military design.17 States 
                                                        
17 Deborah Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of 
War,” International Organization 54 (2000): 41–72; Alexander Wendt and Michael M. Barnett, 
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often adopt different forms of military organization, despite the need for militaries to 
achieve similar security goals in new states. Military isomorphism is hardly the norm in 
the developing world, where many states prefer to decentralize command and control to 
militias or warlords.18 Recent studies have also shown how authoritarian leaders 
manipulate personnel, training, and chain of command to deter or fend off domestic 
threats to their control.19 Even among developed countries and democracies, local 
economies and organizational cultural lead to different military practices.20 In short, 
militaries are complex institutions that can be designed in different ways to meet a variety 
of goals. What explains the wide variation we see in how states design their militaries? 
The focus in this dissertation is specifically on variation in the reliance on 
different recruitment methods: why do some states decide to employ only volunteers, 
while others choose to draft troops, often in the face of widespread resistance from their 
population? Military recruitment is an understudied aspect of military organization, 
despite the fact that scholarship has long argued that it can be especially important for 
                                                        
“Dependent State Formation and Third World militarization,” Review of International Studies 19 
(1993): 321–347; Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-building and 
Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994). 
18 Kimberly Marten, Warlords: Strong-arm Brokers in Weak States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2010); Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored 
Militias (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Paul Staniland, “Militias, Ideology, and 
the State.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (2015): 770–793. 
19 Aaron Belkin, United We Stand: Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International 
Hostility. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2006); Sheena Greitens, 
“Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Authoritarianism” (PhD diss. Harvard 
University, 2013); Caitlin Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance: Iraqi Battlefield 
Effectiveness in the Iran-Iraq War,” Security Studies 22 (2013): 180–221.  
20 Lindsay P. Cohn, “Who Will Serve? Education, Labor Markets, and Military Personnel Policy” 
(PhD diss., Duke University, 2007); Todd S. Sechser and Elizabeth N. Saunders, “The Army You 
Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001,” International Studies Quarterly 
54 (2010): 481–511; Austin Long, The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military 
Culture in the US and UK, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016). 
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domestic politics and security, especially regarding a country’s civil-military relations 
and identity. Thus, understanding the determinants of military recruitment can provide 
important insights for an array of other characteristics of states’ political institutions and 
behaviors, as described below. Given this, it us unsurprising that many existing studies 
characterize military recruitment policies as intimately related to and determined by 
specific social and cultural features within a country.  
Contrary to this account, I argue that new states rarely have full control over how 
they recruit for their militaries. Rather, more powerful states often influence their 
decisions—either directly, by ensuring sympathetic people are in charge of decisions 
related to military design, or indirectly, by making necessary assistance contingent on the 
adoption of specific military policies. In still other cases, more powerful states may 
simply use military-to-military ties to model appropriate and effective forms of military 
organization that new states then learn to emulate. New states are unlikely to have 
developed the resources and skills that would enable them to guarantee their own security 
or to ward off unwelcome external interference. More powerful states, in turn, are all too 
eager to take advantage of this dependence, when it is in their interest, to ensure that the 
weaker state’s military can do what they need it to. Furthermore, these decisions by 
foreign states often overpower local evaluations of external threat environments. The 
result can best be described as the development of a patron-client relationship, in which 
new states that are dependent on military assistance from a patron end up complying with 
many of the patron’s preferences, including on issues of military design.21 
                                                        
21 For early and significant applications of patron-client relations to the realm of interstate 
politics, see Christopher P. Carney, “International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual 
Framework,” Studies in Comparative International Development 24 (1989): 42–55, and 
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This argument highlights a significant disconnect between research on security 
sector reform, post-conflict development, and statebuilding, on the one hand, and existing 
literature on military organization and recruitment. While the former often stresses the 
importance of external stakeholders who can incentivize development and provide 
enforcement mechanisms, the latter tends to focus on more developed states and domestic 
or organizational factors that enable reform. As a result, it is difficult to judge the relative 
importance of external and internal factors in determining military design, or how similar 
developed and developing countries are when it comes to these issues. By integrating a 
better understanding of the contexts in which militaries are designed and develop with the 
statebuilding literature’s emphasis on the importance of international actors in weak 
states, my theory provides a more accurate and generalizable explanation for observed 
variation in recruitment patterns across states. 
The remainder of this chapter frames my dissertation, focusing particularly on the 
necessity and added-value of a systemic study exclusively of military recruitment 
policies. I begin by describing military recruitment policies, specifically conscription, and 
their consequences for an array of military, political, and social outcomes. I elaborate on 
the theoretical and methodological advantages of studying recruitment, as opposed to 
other aspects of military design. From there, I discuss other methodological decisions that 
were necessary for this study, and justify the tradeoffs these decisions entailed. The 
chapter concludes with a preview of the dissertation, a discussion of case selection, and 
its potential policy contributions. 
 
                                                        
Christopher C. Shoemaker and John Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral 
Crises in the Nuclear Age (New York, NY: Praeger, 1984): 13. 
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II. Why Study Military Recruitment? 
Recruitment and personnel policies are among the most important and diverse 
tools at a state’s disposal for manipulating the character and role of its armed forces. 
Although recruitment policies include all the formal and informal guidelines states 
employ to affect what groups of people join the military, I am specifically interested in 
cross-national variation in the use of conscription versus all-volunteer armies. There are 
other aspects of military organization worth studying. However, the decision to use 
conscription or not is arguably the most fundamental distinction between different 
recruitment policies, and has immediate and drastic effects on other aspects of military 
organization. 
A. What is Conscription? 
 Whereas volunteer armies rely on incentives such as salaries, employment 
benefits, and appeals to patriotism to attract individuals who agree to serve according to 
contractually-specific provisions, conscript armies are characterized by the use of 
compulsion—ultimately backed by legal or extralegal punishment and the threat of 
violence—to enlist individuals who would not otherwise have volunteered. At the most 
basic level, states that use volunteer recruitment cannot choose who joins their armed 
forces. They can filter undesirable entrants through various criteria, often based on 
criminal records, educational attainment and gender. However, they cannot choose who 
enlists among those that meet their criteria. They must do their best to attract the types of 
recruits they prefer or need, but can do little if they are not forthcoming—besides attempt 
to improve the terms of service or try a new marketing strategy. Conscription can allow 
states to circumvent this problem. If a state is willing to tell people they have no choice 
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but to serve, it can quickly recruit large numbers of personnel and sort them into their 
optimal roles. Whereas effective conscript armies must focus on building sufficient 
administrative infrastructure to ensure compliance, continually train new classes of 
recruits, and build unit cohesion, volunteer armies must be able to get enough qualified 
recruits not only to achieve their missions, but also to do so at a reasonable cost.  
For most states, this becomes a tradeoff between quantity and quality. Volunteer 
armies tend to be smaller because recruits must be paid wages that are competitive with 
private sector civilian jobs, but modern conscripts are not as specialized or professional, 
because they typically do not serve long enough to learn the necessary skills. 
Furthermore, while conscript armies can acquire troops more easily, they also require 
larger civil and military staffs to administer the greater number of recruits and the large 
reserve force they turn into. These downsides can be overcome to an extent if volunteer 
armies can improve terms of service to attract more recruits or if conscript armies can 
enhance training and administrative resources, allowing either type of army to be equally 
effective. However, this is beyond the resources of most states. Consequently, the choice 
between conscription and volunteers has repercussions throughout their military system, 
forcing them ultimately to sacrifice some degree of size, cost, or effectiveness. States 
must then implement different policies to compensate for these tradeoffs. As Jeremy 
Black writes, “systems reliant on conscription face different problems in terms of 
incorporation, in particular with reference to training and discipline, to those confronting 
militaries reliant on voluntary service.”22 Conscript armies, for example, may be more 
likely to suffer from unit cohesion problems, requiring efforts to create cohesion that 
                                                        
22 Jeremy Black, “Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective,” The 
Journal of Military History 62 (1998): 886. 
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would not be necessary among volunteers.23 This is not intended to imply that the first 
decision a state makes is whether to use conscription, but does suggest that that decision 
is intimately connected to other important defense decisions.  
One might question the utility of examining conscription as a homogeneous 
category. In reality, recruitment policies resemble more of a continuum than a dichotomy. 
Conscription policies can vary along factors including the length of service terms, the use 
of press-ganging versus institutionalized selective service, the proportion of the enlistees 
who are conscripts, and the proportion or segments of society to which conscription 
applies. It can be centrally implemented, through formal procedures that are legally 
codified and equally applied throughout the national territory, or it can be decentralized, 
with different provinces, local draft boards, or regional commanders having their own 
procedures for selecting draftees. Many states also allow conscripts to perform their 
service in alternative civilian positions instead of in the military. These different policies 
mean that the experience of conscription can be starkly different from state to state, with 
appropriately distinct sociopolitical consequences. 
While this has led many scholars to call for studying the disaggregation of 
recruitment policies, the dichotomous distinction between the use of volunteers or 
conscripts is still an important one.24 This is true even for states that conscript in very 
small numbers. For many states, the advantage of conscription is chiefly in its ability to 
persuade people to volunteer before they are conscripted—an option that often affords 
                                                        
23 Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World 
War II. Public Opinion Quarterly 12:2 (1948): 280-315; Dara Kay Cohen, Explaining Rape 
during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009),” American Political Science Review 
107:3 (2013): 461–477. 
24 Black, “Military Organisations”; Karl W. Haltiner, “The Definite End of the Mass Army in 
Western Europe?” Armed Forces and Society 25 (1998): 17. 
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enhanced occupational benefits. During the period of Selective Service in the United 
States, for example, the main rationalizations for the draft were based on the numbers it 
induced to volunteer or re-enlist. Among combat personnel alone, the number of draft-
induced enlistees for the year 1970—the year the Gates Commission issued its 
recommendation to end conscription—was equivalent to the total number of volunteers, 
constituting 16 percent of enlistees.25 This suggests that the consequences or necessity of 
a conscript policy would be difficult to deduce by a simple bean count of draftees. While 
conscription can take many forms and affect either a large or small proportion of the 
population, it is still worth studying its determinants more generally.   
Furthermore, there are data limitations that prevent deeper cross-national 
comparisons of different types of conscript systems. Understandably, many authoritarian 
states do not publicize information about the composition of the military or nature of 
military recruitment. Such disclosures could undermine official narratives about military 
service and risk fomenting public unrest, or could reveal private information about 
military capabilities. Some states may also lack the administrative capacity to institute 
consistent recruitment policies throughout their territory, or to publicize these policies at 
all. Additional research on different ways conscription is implemented would provide 
valuable information on the role of the military in external defense and internal security, 
but would require substantial investments in time and money to have even a chance of 
                                                        
25 Gus C. Lee and Geoffrey Y. Parker, The Ending of the Draft: The Story of the All Volunteer 
Force (Washington, DC: Human Resources Research Organization, 1977): 338; For rationale 
regarding conscription in this and other periods, see also Lee and Parker, The Ending of the Draft, 
22–23; Bernard Rostker, I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2006); Chambers, To Raise an Army; Meyer Kestnbaum, “Citizenship 
and Compulsory Military Service: The Revolutionary Origins of Conscription the United States,” 
Armed Forces and Society 27 (2000): 7–36.”   
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feasibility. Nonetheless, there is substantial room in which to enhance existing theories 
about recruitment without distinguishing between conscript systems. As I discuss more in 
Chapter 2, few scholars have offered explanations for cross-national variation in the use 
of conscription and volunteer recruitment. And, as I discuss more below, this distinction 
remains an important one.  
B. Consequences of Conscription 
Recent research has argued that method of recruitment affects many military, 
political, and social outcomes. In the realm of international conflict, scholars have linked 
recruitment to the frequency with which states initiate conflict.26 Recruitment method 
may also affect military effectiveness in several ways. For one, it may affect how 
governments use their armies in campaign and battles, and may alter how those armies 
behave in combat. Eliot Cohen attributes this to the differing abilities of short-term 
conscripts versus long-term professionals.27 Long-term professionals, he argued, are 
better able to address the requirements of counterinsurgency, including the length of 
enlistment required by longer campaigns and technical expertise. The shorter service 
periods of most conscripts, on the other hand, are better suited to situations of major 
conventional warfare where replacements are needed en masse and quickly; they rarely 
serve long enough to be effective in counterinsurgencies. Alternatively, others have 
argued that differences in combat effectiveness come down to the relationship between 
                                                        
26 Seung-Wan Choi and Patrick James. “No Professional Soldiers, No Militarized Interstate 
Disputes? A New Question for Neo-Kantianism.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (2003): 
796–816. Jonathan Pickering, “Dangerous Drafts? A Time-Series, Cross-National Analysis of 
Conscription and the Use of Military Force, 1946–2001.” Armed Forces & Society 37 (2010), 
119–140; Jonathan D. Caverley, Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
27 Eliot Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1985). 
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conscription and casualty-sensitivity, particularly in democracies: states are more likely 
to take risks with conscripts because they are a less-costly investment than volunteers.28 
However, because conscription also implies that many recruits may be serving against 
their will and with people with whom they have little in common—except a desire to be 
somewhere else—it creates challenges for achieving unit cohesion and discipline, which 
have an important influence on military effectiveness, among other behaviors.29  
Aside from its direct effect on the battlefield, conscription may improve a state’s 
chances in war by contributing to state capacity. States that conscript often do so as a 
self-conscious effort to expand the central government’s ability to extract vital 
resources—manpower, and often, in substitution, revenue—thereby increasing their 
ability to mobilize for warfare.30 Finally, conscription affects states’ ability to win wars 
through its impact on public opinion.31 As the United States learned in Vietnam, or 
Russia learned in World War I, popular support is not only a helpful ingredient for 
initiating conflict, but is also necessary to continue to wage war when success does not 
arrive quickly and costlessly. 
                                                        
28 For a debate, see Joseph. P. Vasquez III. “Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, 
Conscription, and Military Casualties.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (2005), 849-873; 
Joseph. P. Vasquez III. (2014). “A Job to Die For: Volunteer Militaries and Casualty-prone 
Democracies.” Paper presented at the 2014 International Security Studies Section of the 
International Studies Association. Available at 
http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/ISSS%20Austin%202014/Archive/0f0ae20e-4aa3-4ecd-
89a2-e529b1541a26.pdf; Michael C. Horowitz, Erin M. Simpson, and Allan C. Stam. “Domestic 
Institutions and Wartime Casualties.” International Studies Quarterly 55 (2011): 909–936. 
29 Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration”; Cohen, “Explaining Rape,” 
30 Michael N. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt 
and Israel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992; Hillel David Soifer, State Building in 
Latin America. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
31 Michael C. Horowitz and Matthew S.  Levendusky “Drafting Support for War: Conscription 
and Mass Support for Warfare.” Journal of Politics 73 (2011): 524–534; Douglas Kriner and 
Francis X. Shen. “Conscription, Inequality, and Partisan Support for War.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 59 (2015): 1–27. 
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Conscription can also have many unanticipated consequences for domestic 
society. While little research has examined the long-term effects of conscription on 
regime stability, there are several mechanisms through which such effects could occur. 
First, it is not uncommon for the leaders of states to institute conscription in an effort to 
unify the population and expand their support basis by treating the army as a “school for 
the nation.”32 Although the effectiveness of the army as a tool for socialization is open to 
question, this theory suggests that conscription, when applied widely enough, can 
cultivate a national identity and eliminate competing ethnic or regional loyalties. This is 
consistent with popular accounts that cite conscription as creating a true “citizen’s army,” 
which can be an important factor limiting the army’s ability to use violence against its 
own citizens—a theory several news agencies suggested during the rapid failure of the 
2016 Turkish coup attempt.33 Similarly, Margaret Levi has shown that unfair conscription 
can lead to mass demonstrations and unrest—a threat not only to regime stability, but 
also to any concurrent war effort.34 Antonis Adam, on the other hand, suggests that 
conscription may prevent coups if it creates a large, short-service military, which would 
disrupt connections among recruits and between the military and political power.35 
Finally, conscription can encourage loyalty by acting as a form of patronage: it can tie a 
larger portion of the population to the regime by treating the army as a source of 
                                                        
32 Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers; Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron, editors, The People in Arms: 
Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution (Cambridge University 
Press, 2003); Stephanie Cronin, Armies and State-building in the Modern Middle East: Politics, 
Nationalism and Military Reform. New York, NY: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2014. 
33 Toksabay, T., and Taylor, P. “Turkey’s Bungled Putsch: A Stranegely 20th Century Coup.” 
Reuters. July 16, 2016. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-coup-
analysis-idUSKCN0ZW0V0. 
34 Margaret Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism (Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
35 Antonis Adam, “Military Conscription as a Means of Stabilizing Democratic Regimes,” Public 
Choice 150 (2012): 715-730.  
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employment (assuming that recruits are paid a reasonable wage), by providing people 
who complete their term of service with certain societal advantages, and by providing 
cheap labor and other rents to staff officers.36 
The rotation of more people through the military inevitably creates more veterans. 
Many scholars have shown that veterans have different policy preferences and can play 
important roles in social movements, suggesting that conscription is important to the 
extent that it tends to result in higher rates of military participation in society.37 When 
conscription exposes a larger portion of the population to military life and values, it 
decreases the distance between the military and society, which may improve civil-
military relations.38 Socialization processes and opportunities may differ in conscript and 
volunteer armies, with at least one study finding differences in racial attitudes among 
white civilians and veterans, depending on the era in which they served in the U.S. 
                                                        
36 Nina Graeger and Halvard Leira, “Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II: From a 
Local to a Global Perspective.” Cooperation and Conflict 40:1 (2005): 45–66. 2005; Rod 
Thornton, “’There No One Left to Draft’: The Strategic and Political Consequences of Russian 
Attempts to End Conscription.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26 (2014): 219–241. 
37 Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations 
and the Use of Force, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Richard Bensel, 
“Politics is Thicker than Blood; Union and Confederate Veterans in the US House of 
Representatives in the late Nineteenth Century,” in Irregular Armed Forces and the Role in 
Politics and State Formation, edited by Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira, 253–280 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008); Saumitra Jha and Steven Wilkinson, “Does Combat 
Experience Foster Organizational Skill? Evidence from Ethnic Cleansing during the Partittion of 
South Asia, American Political Science Review 106 (2012): 883–907. Guy Grossman, Devorah 
Manekin, and Dan Miodownik, “The Political Legacies of Combat: Attitudes towards War and 
Peace among Israeli Ex-Combatants,” International Organization 69 (2015): 981–1009; Michael 
C. Horowitz, and Allan C. Stam, “How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future 
Militarized Behavior of Leaders,” International Organization 68 (2014): 527–559. 
38 Diane H. Mazur, A More Perfect Military: How the Constitution Can Make Our Military 
Stronger (Oxford University Press, 2010); Everett Carl Dolman, The Warrior State: How 
Military Organization Structures Politics (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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army.39 Similarly, there are micro-level effects for individuals who perform conscript 
service, which in addition to having important personal consequences, can produce 
drastic societal consequences when aggregated across large portions of a state’s 
population. These studies have analyzed the effects on veterans of lost wages or 
education due to military service, as well as enhanced skills or opportunities afforded to 
veterans.40 Recent feminist critiques of conscription have also examined the extent to 
which the state uses recruitment policies and the benefits associated with them to 
manipulate and reinforce dominant conceptions of the family and a woman’s place in 
society, as well as race relations.41 
Finally, the use of conscription may have an impact on state development over an 
even longer duration. The advent of conscription has often been viewed as part of a larger 
military revolution that not only shaped how states fight wars, but the very organization 
of the state. The rise of large, standing armies and the enhanced demands of states upon 
their citizens—as well as how states compensated for and imposed these demands—
                                                        
39 Tatishe M. Nteta and Melinda R. Tarsi, “Self-selection versus Socialization Revisted: Military 
Service, Racial Resentment, and Generational Membership,” Armed Forces and Society 42 
(2016): 362–385.  
40 Joshua D. Angrist, “Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam-era Draft Lottery: Evidence from 
Social Security Administrative Records,” American Economic Review 80 (1990): 313–336. 
Joshua D. Angrist and Stacey H. Chen 2010, “Schooling and the Vietnam-Era GI Bill: Evidence 
from the Draft Lottery. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(2010): 96–118; 
Joshua D. Angrist, Stacey H. Chen, and Jae Song, “Long Term Consequences of Vietnam-Era 
Conscription: New Estimates Using Social Security Data.” American Economic Review 101 
(2011): 334–38; Dalton Conley and  Jennifer Heerwig, “The Long-Term Effects of Military 
Conscription on Mortality: Estimates From the Vietnam-Era Draft Lottery.” Demography 49 
(2012): 841–855. 
41 Dorit Geva, Conscription, Family, and the Modern State: A Comparative Study of France and 
the United States (Cambridge University Press: 2013); Maya Eichler, “Citizenship and the 
Contracting out of Military Work: From National Conscription to Globalized Recruitment,” 
Citizenship Studies 18 (2014): 600–614; Megan Mackenzie, Beyong the Band of Brothers: The 
US Military and the Myth that Women Can’t Fight (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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influenced whether states developed along liberal or illiberal lines.42 Frequently, this 
process entailed a new bargain between state and society, in which the state provided new 
benefits in exchange for military service.43 Consequently, extensive social reforms often 
followed the end of wars and the demobilization of the masses. Such reforms are 
necessary to reflect the new social roles and awareness that accompany mass 
mobilization, as people from diverse social backgrounds and classes mingle for the first 
time in the armed forces, as well as to provide socio-economic safety nets for individuals 
and their families who were affected by conflict.  
To paraphrase Lindsay Cohn, if we believe that who serves in the military is 
important for operational, political, and social outcomes, then the processes by which 
people are recruited matters, too.44 While conscription is not the only important aspect of 
military organization, the decision to recruit using conscripts or volunteers should not be 
overlooked. I do not suggest that conscription is necessarily more important than other 
aspects of military structure, such as the size of the principal unit of operation or the 
inclusivity of the armed forces. However, because it has not traditionally been 
emphasized in studies of military innovation and reform, its determinants are less well-
understood. Thus, this dissertation builds on a substantial literature on military design, 
                                                        
42 Samuel Finer, “State- and nation-building in Europe: the role of the military,” in Charles Tilly, 
editor, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton University Press, 1975); 
Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and 
Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton University Press, 1992). 
43 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, Inc, 1990); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of 
Social Policy in United States (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1992); Alon Peled, A 
Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States. Ithaca, NY (Cornell 
University Press, 1998). 
44 Cohn, “Who Will Serve?” 3 
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innovation, and reform, that not only privileges other military policies, but different 
explanatory variables.  
C. Conscription in the Context of Military Design  
There are of course numerous other aspects of military organization with 
important implications for social development and military effectiveness. A large 
literature examines how various military innovations have significantly changed the way 
militaries fight and win, often with significant consequences for society more generally.45 
The decision to organize the military around corps, divisions, or smaller units, the use of 
meritocratic rather than personal or ethnic criterion for service and promotion, and the 
nature of military doctrine constitute just a few of the most prominent examples of 
military policies cited in this literature. However, studies of military design frequently 
single out the use of conscription as distinct from these other organizational decisions.46 
As I show below, it is often described as more isolated from threat considerations, or 
more reflective of broader domestic ideologies, civilian culture, and societal concerns.  
 The choice of specific operational doctrines and the development of 
professionalization are two prominent examples of more typically studied military 
characteristics. Numerous studies attribute these outcomes to either threat environments, 
military culture, or some combination of the two.47 Elizabeth Kier, for example, argues 
                                                        
45 Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986); Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies.” The 
Journal of Strategic Studies 29 (2006): 905–934. 
46 John Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800–2000,” The International 
History Review 18 (1996): 513; Maury D. Feld, The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as 
Social Systems (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1977): 18. 
47 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the 
World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: 
French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997); Theo Farrell, “World Culture and the Irish Army, 1922-1942.” In The Sources of 
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that military doctrines in interwar France and the United Kingdom were influenced by the 
strategic culture of their respective militaries—notably, in response to predetermined 
state recruitment policies. These arguments describe militaries as insular organizations, 
with cultures that are often distinct from that of the rest of society, as well as with the 
ability to more or less oversee their own institutional design and internal policies.   
However, scholars who focus on recruitment argue that it is dependent on the 
culture within the broader civilian population. John Lynn, for example, argues that 
recruitment “is more tightly bound up with a state’s basic values and institutions” than 
other military structures, such as unit organization.48 Any decisions about which 
individuals should serve in the armed forces inherently invokes questions about ideology 
and nationality: it entails “broader questions about what should be protected by whom 
and in which context.”49 These questions may be widely debated, as in the early United 
States or in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, or they may not be addressed explicitly 
during debates or policymaking processes because their answers are so obvious to 
domestic policymakers that addressing them explicitly is unnecessary.  
In contrast to these studies, which view recruitment choices as arising out of 
internal debates and pressures, I argue that new states’ recruitment practices are largely 
driven by external preferences, especially of stronger foreign powers. The above 
                                                        
Military Change, edited by Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, 69–90 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2002); Joao Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007); Long, The Soul of Armies. A notable exception is Nathan 
Toronto, Why War is Not Enough: Military Defeat, the Division of Labor, and Military 
Professionalization. PhD. Diss, The Ohio State University, 2007. 
48 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800–2000,” 513. 
49 Pertti Joenniemi, “Introduction: Unpacking Conscription,” in The Changing Face of European 
Conscription, edited by Pertti Joenniemi, 1–12 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006): 5; Avant, “From 
Mercenary to Citizen Armies.” 
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literature suggests strong reasons to study recruitment separately from other aspects of 
military organization. My dissertation allows for an examination of whether recruitment 
should continue to be viewed so differently. Rather, my theory suggests that the 
determinants of military recruitment and conscription resemble other aspects of military 
structure much more closely than has commonly been assumed. By showing how 
external influences can explain the decision to use conscription, which has often been 
viewed as a military structure most likely to be immune to such factors, my dissertation 
suggests that my theory is also likely to be able to explain many other aspects of military 
organization as well. While the broader literature on military design and reform—with 
the exception of the subfield of security sector reform—has largely neglected the role of 
external actors—my dissertation shows that such actors can have important explanatory 
value.   
 
III. Methodology 
To this point I have justified my exclusive focus on conscription over other 
aspects of military design. However, my dissertation also applies a new methodological 
approach to the study of conscription. Rather than attempt to explain why any state uses 
conscripts or volunteers in any given year, I examine what factors determine this decision 
during processes of state and military formation. Thus, I build and test my theory in 
contexts that might be best described as “new states.” 
New states are those that, having previously been under the administrative control 
of another polity, have gained responsibility for administering their own security forces 
and defense policies for the first time. The most common way for this to happen is 
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through processes of decolonization or independence. However, similar outcomes can 
also arise through certain types of regime change. Social revolutions, for example, 
transform societal structures and bring new groups to domestic political power, without 
necessarily previously being under the control of another polity.50 The termination of 
major conflicts can also disrupt domestic power relationships, whether due to externally 
imposed regime change or successful internal rebellions.51 The important condition these 
scenarios have in common is a unique opportunity to design or restructure the state’s 
armed forces. Because new states are relatively unconstrained by existing institutions—
which are often weak, if they exist at all—they are more free to adopt a different 
recruitment system than the actor that previously governed their territory. Moreover, they 
are also likely to have dramatically different preferences from their predecessors, and 
thus have motivations to pursue major institutional reform—especially in the military, 
which may otherwise be a threat to their new regime. In fact, states change their 
recruitment system more frequently after social revolutions and post-conflict 
reconstruction than do more stable states. Whereas recruitment systems only change in 
1.39 percent of country years between 1918 and 2016, they change 11 percent of the time 
within two years after the year of a social revolution or situation of post-conflict 
reconstruction (8 out of 68 cases).  
Thus, independence, social revolution, and post-conflict reconstruction are 
opportunities to design new security institutions and constitute a critical juncture, or a 
                                                        
50 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
51 Elizabeth Kier and Ronald Krebs, editors, In War’s Wake: International Conflict and the Fate 
of Liberal Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010). The idea of conflict 
termination as a major opportunity for institutional change is also evident in the recent rise of 
post-conflict security sector reform. 
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period in time during which major institutional changes are possible.52 The choices 
become self-reinforcing and continue to have outsized effects, long after the 
circumstances that shaped their initial adoption have passed.53 This means military 
recruitment systems tend to be best analyzed as a path-dependent outcome. Once in 
place, initial decisions about recruitment systems are self-reinforcing for several reasons. 
First, as described earlier, other decisions about the intensity and frequency of training 
and induction, length of service, and other manpower and organizational policies follow 
directly from the decision to use either conscription or volunteer systems. This means that 
changing recruitment systems requires changing many other aspects of military 
organization as well. Second, recruitment systems can empower certain actors and give 
them a stake in the existing system. For example, conscription can produce bloated but 
influential military staffs and cheap surplus labor in the form of enlisted personnel. This 
has contributed to the inability of the Russian military to successfully transform to an all-
volunteer force, despite repeated civilian-led efforts to instigate such change.54  
Recruitment can also influence cultural or organizational understandings about 
what type of manpower systems are appropriate or effective. While a policy elite’s 
ideological preferences and beliefs regarding the optimal relationship between the 
military and society can influence initial military design, once implemented these beliefs 
become embedded not only within military culture, but also within domestic society more 
                                                        
52 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Keleman, “The Study of Critical Junctures; Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59 (2007): 341–369. 
53 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936–957.  
54 Thornton, “’There No One Left to Draft’”; Nadja Douglas, “Civil-Military Relations in Russia: 
Conscript vs. Contract Army, or How Ideas Prevail against Functional Demands,” The Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies 27 (2014): 511–532. 
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broadly, regardless of their initial or continued efficacy. Thus certain myths about the 
utility of conscription often allow the system to continue in the face of increasing 
evidence that it does not have the desired social or military effects.55 Societies that 
conscript can come to believe that universal military service is a vital element in young 
men’s (and, more rarely, women’s) socialization and work force preparation—that 
without it, the population’s sense of civic responsibility and national identity would 
decline. Conversely, scholars attribute the traditional British reliance on volunteers, even 
during periods of heightened British intervention on the continent amongst European 
states that had all accepted conscription as the most preferable recruitment system, to a 
widespread ideology, traced back to the English Civil War, that distrusted large standing 
armies.56 Finally, any uncertainty regarding a different system’s ability to “do better,” 
combined with the inherent costs and learning curve associated with any transition, can 
create reluctance to try a new recruitment system. 
This is supported by existing cross-national statistical analyses of the 
determinants of conscription. States rarely change their method of recruitment, even 
when they expect to fight a major war.57 Asal et al. identified only 59 instances of states 
                                                        
55 Anna Leander, “Drafting Community: Understanding the Fate of Conscription,” Armed Forces 
and Society 30 (2004): 571–599; See also Kerry Longhurst and Bastien Irondelle for explicit 
arguments about path dependence in German and French acceptance of conscription: Kerry 
Longhurst, “Why Aren’t the Germans Debating the Draft? Path Dependency and the Persistence 
of Conscription” German Politics 12 (2003): 147–165; Bastien Irondelle, “Civil-Military 
Relations and the End of Conscription in France,” Security Studies 12 (2003): 157–187. 
56 Victor Asal, Justin Conrad, and Nathan Toronto., “I Want You! The Determinants of Military 
Conscription” Journal of Conflict Resolution (2015); Richard H Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The 
Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802 (New York, 
NY: The Free Press, 1975); Cress, Citizens in Arms; Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers.  
57 Horowitz et al, “Domestic Institutions,” See also, Yael Hadass, “On the Causes of Military 
Conscription,” June 21, 2004. Available at SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=564062. 
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switching systems in 6759 country years between 1969 and 2008.58 My data analysis is 
consistent with this previous work. Collectively, there were only 71 recruitment system 
changes for the 205 cases of new states and major regime change for which I found 
available recruitment data between 1918 and 2005, with some of these new states 
changing recruitment multiple times. Furthermore, only 53 of those changes occurred 
more than five years after independence, indicating that a notable proportion of 
changes—roughly 25 percent—might be associated with early processes of institutional 
consolidation and strategic defense assessments. In short, the conditions in which many 
new states must make decisions about their militaries is fundamentally different from the 
conditions for effecting military reform in more established militaries. Other types of 
regime change may also offer relatively unconstrained opportunities for redesigning 
military institutions. By adopting a stricter definition for the unit of analysis, I increase 
my ability to isolate the immediate factors affecting military design from the inertia of 
existing military practices. 
This focus on new states allows me to isolate the factors that lead states to adopt 
their initial recruitment systems, which then sets them down a path that makes them more 
likely to maintain certain military practices. I studied what factors affect these initial 
military recruitment decisions in two ways. First, I created a dataset of these new states to 
test existing arguments about military recruitment determinants against my theory of 
patron-client relations using statistical analysis, which allows me to establish 
correlational relationships and the generalizability of my argument. These tests can be 
seen in Chapter 3. Second, I tested the causal mechanisms described in my theory 
                                                        
58 Horowitz et al. 2011, “Domestic Institutions”; Asal et al, “I Want You!” 
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through several process-tracing case study chapters. Each case study chapter examines a 
new state from the quantitative analysis that represents a different causal pathway by 
which states determine their military recruitment systems. While many states have 
patrons, other states must design their military on their own, either in contexts of high or 
low international threat. My qualitative analysis in each of these chapters allows me to 
identify who they key actors in each case of military design were, what their preferences 
were, and why some actors’ preferences became policy. This allows me to verify that the 
theorized mechanism is actually behind the correlations established in Chapter 3.  
A. Scope 
Since even before the innovation of the professional standing army by the Dutch 
in the seventeenth century—and its subsequent spread across Europe, and later, the 
world—rulers have in theory had the option of raising their armies through market 
incentives or physical coercion.59 Indeed, some people have identified evidence of 
practices resembling compulsory military service in the Old Testament.60 However, I do 
not suggest I can explain the use of conscription at all times and by all actors. I focus 
specifically on two scope conditions: the actors whose behavior I attempt to explain are 
states as opposed to non-state actors, and they are relatively modern. 
  First, many rebel groups can equally practice forced military service—indeed, 
many scholars and humanitarian groups have written on the use of child soldiers by states 
and rebels alike. Yet rebel groups face unique circumstances influencing their military 
                                                        
59 Farrell, “World Culture”; William H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed 
Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (The University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
60 Bjorn Møller, “Conscription and its Alternatives,” in Lars Mjøset and Stephen van Holde, 
editors, The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces, Comparative Social 
Research 20 (Emerald Group Publishing Limited): 277–305.  
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practices that may not apply to states, most notably, an enhanced collective action 
problem, absence of international legitimacy, and fewer resources. Even rebel groups 
with patrons may be less likely to emulate their patrons due to an enhanced principal-
agent problem and greater obstacles to high levels of patronage. Not only are there good 
reasons to expect rebel military practices to be motivated by different factors than state 
militaries, but it is worth also worth studying recruitment as an important and 
understudied component of state policies in its own right. 
The second important caveat is about the time period in which my argument 
should be applicable. Contemporary conscription practices are generally traced back only 
to the levée en masse of the French Revolution. Indeed, Andrew Krepinevich identifies 
the levée en masse as a vital component of the military innovation that he terms the 
Napoleonic Revolution.61 Furthermore, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that 
technological and social conditions enabled rulers to compel large portions of their 
population into prolonged military service.62 This study truncates the period under 
analysis even further, focusing on how states design their militaries since the end of 
World War I.  
While many of the dynamics I describe are likely applicable to earlier periods of 
state creation as well, focusing on military recruitment in the last hundred years offers 
certain advantages. Most importantly, it is difficult to get reliable data on a wide set of 
cases before this period. In addition, cases after this period are comparable for several 
reasons. For one, the end of World War I produced a major shift toward norms of respect 
                                                        
61 Andrew Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: the pattern of military revolutions.” The National 
Interest no. 37, 30-42.   
62 Massimiliano G. Onorato, Kenneth Scheve, and David Stasavage, “Technology and the Era of 
the Mass Army,” Journal of Economic History 74 (2014): 449–481. 
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for self-determination and territorial sovereignty, with corresponding changes in the 
relationship between citizens and the state. Thus, state creation before and after World 
War I took place in distinct contexts that limit the nature of insights that can be drawn 
from comparing cases across the two time periods. It is no coincidence that the majority 
of independent states today gained independence after 1918. Second, beginning my 
analysis in 1918 allows me to better hold the technological context constant. Although 
the innovation of conscription was developed a century earlier and truly demonstrated by 
Prussia in the mid-1860s, World War I was in many ways the culmination of warfighting 
principles associated with the mass army and conscription more generally. By the end of 
World War I, much of the world had been exposed to a system of compulsory military 
service, and thus was able to observe its consequences both in combat and for society 
more generally. Thus, limiting my analysis to post-1918 state creation increases the 
similarities across instances of military design to allow for comparison, while still 
providing a large enough sample size to make those comparisons generalizable.  
 
IV. Preview of Dissertation 
In this chapter I have established the importance of reexamining the factors that 
lead states to adopt either volunteer or conscript recruitment systems, and have situated 
this study within the broader process of designing militaries in new states. In the next 
chapter, I review existing explanations for why some states rely on conscription, 
including those based on individual case studies, systematic cross-national study, and 
untested but hypothesized relationships. I argue that this literature fails to account for 
observed variation in recruitment, and moreover makes certain unfounded assumptions 
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that are inappropriate with respect to the actual process of military design in new states. 
More specifically, the most widely accepted arguments downplay the functional 
advantages of conscription even in the age of modern warfare, and assume too much 
domestic autonomy over military affairs. Instead, I argue that foreign powers often 
intervene in new state military design to implement or encourage the use of a recruitment 
system that suits their security interests.  
I argue that military recruitment decisions result from one of three causal 
pathways. First, when there is a foreign military patron to guide recruitment decisions, 
states pursue the preferences of the patron, leading to emulation. When there is no patron, 
one of two things happens, depending on the external threat environment. In the second 
pathway, a low external threat environment and absence of a patron leaves states 
unconstrained in the recruitment options they can pursue. In these circumstances, the 
idiosyncrasies of historical experience, domestic politics, or leadership preference will 
dominate the policymaking process. In the third pathway, if there is a major external 
threat to the new state’s territorial integrity, it will usually conscript in order to ensure it 
can defend its borders, especially in consideration of the inability of new states to build 
effective volunteer forces.  
Chapter 3 uses quantitative methods to systematically test the arguments I 
advance in Chapter 2. I collected original data on foreign intervention in new states, 
including the presence of military training and advisory missions, foreign contract 
officers, and troop deployments. Logistic regression shows that indicators of foreign state 
intervention have a strong effect on military design. In addition, they show that external 
territorial threats exert a strong functional pressure on new states to adopt conscription, at 
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least when states have no patron. This is true even when tests control for the cultural 
legacy or nature of foreign influence in new states. The findings in this chapter contrast 
with the expectations of many popular alternative hypotheses, and provide broad support 
for my argument.  
Demonstrating my primary proposed mechanism, though—that foreign states 
actively intervene to enforce their preferences—requires further, in-depth analysis. The 
next three chapters examine the process of military design in specific cases, focusing on 
the debates—implicit or explicit—surrounding the use of conscription. Each one of these 
chapters process-traces the creation of the military in a different one of my causal 
pathways. Chapter 4 describes the process of military recruitment policy development in 
a state with a powerful patron, Jordan. Chapter 5 demonstrates what happens when there 
is neither a foreign patron nor major external threat to constrain decision making, as was 
the case in Iraq during the inter-war period. Furthermore, these chapters offer a 
comparison of Jordan and Iraq that can establish the causal role of British patronage 
through a most-similar cases research design. Both were strongly influenced by British 
military culture in the years after World War I, though they both had previously been 
under Ottoman control and had experience with conscription during that period. 
Additionally, both Jordan and Iraq envisaged the same types of threats—mainly, those 
arising out of weak domestic legitimacy and cleavages within society. However, whereas 
Iraqi domestic leaders strongly preferred to use conscription and implemented this system 
almost as soon as they were independent, Jordan continued to use a volunteer system. 
These chapters examine the reasons why despite these ostensibly similar contexts, British 
influence and a volunteer system prevailed in Jordan but not in Iraq. I argue and show 
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that the reason is largely due to the difference in a British desire to intervene in military 
design across the two cases, and hence in the level of British intervention and patronage. 
Chapter 6 illustrates the third causal pathway: no patronage in the context of high 
external threats. It also tests this theory in a more contemporary case of state formation 
and military design: Bosnia and Herzegovina during its post-independence statebuilding 
effort that began in 1995. The end of the Bosnian Civil War and the Dayton Accords 
resulted in a fractured Bosnian state under an international administration. However, the 
historic experience of Bosnia with conscription seemed to lead to institutional inertia, 
with all armed actors continuing to conscript despite international intervention and 
security guarantees. Beginning in 2002, though, the international community essentially 
enforced several rounds of defense reform on Bosnia. This defense reform concluded 
with the sudden and complete abolition of conscription at the end of 2005, despite similar 
levels of international presence and a largely unchanged international environment. I 
conducted interviews with American and Bosnian officials involved in the defense 
reform process to determine what changed between 1995 and 2005. This allows me to 
better understand whether local or international actors matter most for determining 
military design. It also demonstrates the applicability of my argument that international 
patrons matter most in different cultural and temporal contexts, including in modern 
instances of state creation and military design.  
My final chapter concludes by discussing the implications of the dissertation’s 
findings for contemporary international relations theory and for policy practitioners. This 
research highlights the role of hierarchy and patron-client relations in international 
relations. It also provides insight for policymakers in government or elsewhere who work 
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with other countries to support these security goals. It provides insight into how states 
define their security interests. For example, it is often assumed that militaries are 
designed to be experts in violence, so that states emulate best practices in military 
effectiveness. My research indicates that states may sacrifice military effectiveness for 
other goals, such as social integration, or because they lack the capacity to make an 
effective defense. By addressing the circumstances in which states prefer these goals, my 
research illuminates how states understand and respond to their strategic environments 
using military design. In turn, this provides advice for policymakers seeking to help states 
design their militaries. 
This is especially relevant for new states or those restructuring their military after 
major regime change or civil war. These are unique opportunities to change military 
design and organizational culture, and consequently military effectiveness and regime 
stability. Thus, military training and power-sharing were integral to the peace process in 
Bosnia, and a failure to adequately rebuild Iraq’s army is often blamed for the rise of the 
Islamic State. My dissertation contributes to efforts to understand how to better design 
such post-conflict militaries to support peace, reconstruction, and broader security 
policies. By highlighting when and why states are likely to view conscripts as 
contributing to security, I suggest what tools policymakers should focus on to achieve 
desired security goals.  
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CHAPTER 2: A NEW THEORY OF MILITARY DESIGN 
In December 2002, high ranking members of the international community met at 
the Hotel Petersberg in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the future of Afghanistan’s armed 
forces. A general agreement had already been reached on the importance of developing 
the Afghan armed forces at the previous year’s Bonn conference, which set in motion the 
transitional process that would result in Afghanistan’s new constitution. It was at 
Petersberg in 2002, however, that the specific processes to establish a new Afghan 
National Army (ANA) were decided. Of particular note was the decision to recruit on a 
solely volunteer basis, with training to be “jointly designed by Afghanistan and the 
United States or other designated lead nations” and with American responsibility for 
reviewing the progress of ANA recruitment and training.63 
In 2010, amidst heightened security demands that had recently led the United 
States to commit 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, Afghan President Hamid Karzai 
considered adopting conscription.64 Such a change would have been consistent with 
historical practices, as the army had previously used conscription for decades before the 
civil war of the 1990s and the rise of the Taliban. However, there was no change in 
recruitment practices. Despite changing security environments, the Afghan army 
continues to be recruited on a volunteer basis more than sixteen years after its modern re-
founding.  
This chapter offers a new theory to explain why countries like Afghanistan and 
Iraq, which have undergone major changes in domestic regimes and constitute examples 
                                                        
63 “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Stability,” December 2, 2002. Accessed July 25, 2017. 
Available at https://www.unric.org/html/german/afghanistan/talks2002/decree.pdf/  
64 BBC News. “Karzai Considers Introducing Afghan Conscription,” February 7, 2010. Available 
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of “new states,” use volunteers instead of conscription by examining the sources of 
recruitment policies. The recruitment policies used in these cases are particularly 
puzzling given the contrast to their historically dominant recruitment practices. The 
fundamental problem addressed by this study is that of military design: how do states 
determine the form that their military will take, particularly with respect to volunteer or 
conscript forces? There are many factors that affect what a state’s military will look like. 
Which ones are most important? To what extent are these factors that states control as 
opposed to external forces or circumstances? I argue that any effort to understand what 
recruitment policies a state adopts must account for variation in the identity of the actors 
who make recruitment decisions and what factors motivate their military goals.  
More specifically, two variables define the environment that structures 
recruitment decisions. First, either domestic or foreign policymakers can dominate the 
decision-making process. In other words, states can be constrained by a patron-client 
relationship, in which a stronger outside actor influences their policy choices. This 
matters because these actors often have different perceptions about the military’s most 
important goals and the appropriate organizational practices for achieving them. When 
foreign powers view new or weak states as important enough to their interests to engage 
them with an extensive military presence or security assistance, recruitment policies 
reflect their preferences, rather than those of domestic policymakers. Second, if there is 
no foreign state influence to guide emulation, threat perceptions affect military 
recruitment. Major external threats to the new state’s territory constrain recruitment 
options in the interest of immediate defense, while lower threat environments permit 
more freedom to adopt different practices. 
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The effects of both variables can be seen in the description of military design in 
Afghanistan. Several agreements reinforced the United States’ role as a foundational 
patron of the ANA’s development. At a meeting of the Group of Eight (G8) in Geneva in 
Spring 2003 it was determined that the United States would take the lead on Afghan 
military reform.65 The United States government also appointed American brigadier 
general John Eikenberry to be U.S. Security Coordinator, a position responsible for, 
among other things, the “synchronization of the Afghan National Army building program 
and DDR plans to ensure they were politically and logistically feasible.” Eikenberry was 
dual-hatted as the Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, the office 
responsible for developing the ANA.66 The United States made many other important 
decisions in its capacity as lead nation in the process of Afghan military design, including 
to dismantle and rebuild all Afghan security institutions, “from the Ministry of Defense to 
the ground units.”67 However, as threat levels increased, domestic elites including 
President Hamid Karzai began to see conscription as the only way to maintain Afghan 
security. Without American influence and coalition support, it is much more likely that 
the Afghan army would have returned to conscription to meet its perceived security 
needs.  
I argue that the dynamics that determined military recruitment in Afghanistan are 
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not the exception but the norm. My argument describes three pathways of the 
development of military recruitment practices. In the first pathway, foreign powers 
intervene in military design to prop up their preferred vision for the new state’s security, 
whether that is primarily defined by external threats or to reinforce a friendly or 
strategically important regime. In either case, new states end up emulating the 
recruitment system the foreign power uses at the time. In the second and third pathways, 
foreign powers do not see an advantage to intervening in the new state’s military design, 
leaving the decision to domestic actors. In the second pathway there are neither 
international powers to intervene nor major external threats. These conditions mean 
domestic leaders have the most freedom to design their military. Here it is most difficult 
to predict how they will recruit because they may be influenced by a number of cultural 
considerations and they need not design the military with traditional notions of external 
defense in mind. Finally, the third option for the development of a recruitment system is 
that domestic leaders who control military policy perceive high levels of external threat, 
leading them to use conscription. The three pathways are best summarized in Table 2.1, 
below. 
Table 2.1 Summary of Hypotheses 
 Low Threat High Threat 
High Patronage  Path 1: Emulate 
Path 1: 
Emulate 
Low/No Patronage Path 2: Freedom from Constraints 
Path 3: 
Conscript for Defense 
 
 The remainder of this chapter elaborates on this theory and argues for its greater 
ability to explain military recruitment practices compared to existing theories that 
emphasize military effectiveness or domestic politics and historical legacy. It first 
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addresses the limitations of existing approaches to studying military recruitment. The first 
of these approaches contends that domestic politics, especially as determined by 
historical legacies, determines recruitment, while the second holds that military 
effectiveness alone determines recruitment. Second, it describes the reasons for and 
means of military patronage and details the logic behind each of the predictive pathways. 
Finally, it responds to potential counterarguments to my theory. 
 
I. Limitations of Existing Approaches to Recruitment 
Existing theories emphasize two main sources of military recruitment policy. One 
set of theories argues that domestic politics determines how states recruit for their 
militaries. This approach expects deeply ingrained social and cultural factors or domestic 
institutions to influence state preferences. In particular, the most persuasive arguments in 
this school of thought locate the origins of domestic recruitment preferences in prior 
colonial institutions.68 However, these theories also argue more generally that different 
domestic institutions and norms support specific recruitment practices. National 
ideologies, political institutions, and local norms can all lead states to adopt either 
conscription or volunteer recruitment. 
Thus, these arguments maintain that “culturally and organizationally driven prior 
beliefs about what a military system is supposed to look like” drive recruitment 
decisions.69 These arguments tend to divorce threat perceptions from military recruitment 
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altogether, arguing that states may view the military as an inappropriate tool for dealing 
with some of their threats, or that states knowingly sacrifice military effectiveness in 
order to pursue goals related to domestic stability. Otherwise, recruitment systems may 
reflect practices or values so deeply ingrained that there appears to be only one 
recruitment option—alternatives would be unthinkable. As Maury Feld wrote, “The 
decisions—about who is to serve, in what capacity, and for what sort of compensation—
describe the social policies of a political system, often long before it is itself aware of the 
need for or the existence of such a concept.”70  
A second group of theories predicts that whatever contributes to military 
effectiveness is the most important variable for understanding military recruitment. These 
theories often stress the combination of threat environments and available resources to 
meet those threats. Military recruitment policies, like other facets of military 
organizations, are influenced by what Samuel Huntington called the functional 
imperative, which requires the military to be capable of effectively employing physical 
violence to provide security in the face of external threats.71 
This is particularly the case in Realist theories, which highlight the security-
maximizing tendencies of states. In particular, they emphasize the structural effects of 
anarchy, which lead to a system of self-help that conditions states to guard against 
external threats to their security. One way states do this is through internal balancing, 
which, in contrast to external balancing via alliances, aims to decrease reliance on other 
                                                        
Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces, eds., Anthony Forster, Timothy 
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71 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 2.  
 40 
 
 
 
states and increase one’s own power and military capabilities.72 States must always 
engage in internal balancing to some degree, because, as many realists argue, it offers a 
more reliable safeguard given the inherent uncertainty of anarchy.73 Moreover, internal 
balancing tends to reinforce external balancing efforts, since states that have more 
capable militaries and that are better able to provide for their own defense inspire greater 
confidence among potential allies.74 Thus, these theories contend, states should rationally 
design their militaries and choose the method of recruitment that does the most to 
increase their security, particularly against other states that might threaten them with 
invasion. However, these theories often lack a clear statement of why a given recruitment 
system would be more effective.    
These theories of domestic politics and military effectiveness suffer from two 
main shortcomings. First, they assume states maintain autonomy over their own military 
policies. Both sets of explanations emphasize the military or political preferences of 
domestic policymakers, ignoring the role that international actors often play in military 
design. Second, and partially as a result of the failure to acknowledge the role of outside 
actors, they fail to identify realistic processes by which states pursue their preferred 
recruitment policies. Domestic political theories paint an overly deterministic relationship 
between political institutions, ideologies, and preferences, on the one hand, and military 
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recruitment on the other. Similarly, theories that emphasize military effectiveness and 
threats assume too much efficiency in the way states make decisions; they ignore the 
diverse ways states interpret security environments and the sub-optimal ways they often 
respond to them. I return to these shortcomings and address the potential 
counterarguments these theories propose after introducing my argument, below.  
The next section argues that military influence from stronger countries can 
explain recruitment policy decisions better than either threat or domestic political 
explanation. It first demonstrates the role of patron-client relations in military policies, 
then describes how these relationships are created and perpetuated by encouraging 
emulation or using direct control. It then discusses the causal pathways through which 
recruitment systems are often adopted, before the final section that details objections 
derived from existing theories. 
 
II. International Hierarchy and Patron-Client Relations in Military Design 
In a 2010 article in Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
described security assistance as a fundamental pillar of American foreign policy, by 
“helping others countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces 
by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance.”75 
Indeed, foreign powers often have a determinative influence on many aspects of 
development and domestic policy in weaker states.76 As David Lake and others have 
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convincingly demonstrated, relationships between many states are characterized not by 
anarchy but by hierarchy: the degree to which a subordinate, or client, state endows a 
dominant, or patron, state with authority over its affairs.77 I demonstrate that in many 
cases these hierarchical relationships extend specifically to military policies. This 
indicates the need to view the international system as one in which hierarchy, rather than 
anarchy and the associated drive to self-help, conditions many states’ behavior.  
Relationships that reflect hierarchy in the international system are characterized 
by shared sovereignty. Thus, the more overlap there is in authority over particular issues 
between two states, the more one can describe their relationship as hierarchical. 
Similarly, the more hierarchical states dyads there are, the more the international system 
can be said to be characterized by hierarchy. A particular form of international hierarchy 
is the patron-client relationship. In a patron-client relationship, one state voluntarily 
shares autonomy with or abdicates some autonomy to another state in exchange for 
certain benefits. Patron-client relationships are distinct from other forms of hierarchy in 
several ways. In particular, Christopher Carney argues that patron-client relations reflect 
a degree of affinity between patron and client that may not exist in other dependent 
                                                        
University Press, 2016); Barbara Elias, “The Critical Ally: Coercion and Defiance in 
Counterinsurgency Partnership” (PhD diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2013); Ian S. Lustick, 
“The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical 
Perspective,” International Organization  51 (1997): 653–683. 
77 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations; Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, 
Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford University Press, 2013); Paul 
MacDonald, “Is Imperial Rule Obsolete?: Assessing the Barriers to Overseas Adventurism,” 
Security Studies 18 (2009) 79–114.  
 43 
 
 
 
relationships.78 In addition, patron-client relations entail a degree of reciprocity: while 
one state may benefit more than the other, both receive benefits from the relationship.79 
More broadly, though, a relationship of patronage requires that a patron attempts 
to gain compliance from a client state by distributing favors.80 According to Shoemaker 
and Spanier, “the patron, whatever its specific objectives in the relationship might be, 
seeks to exert some degree of control over the client. This control can take many forms, 
but in general, it implies the surrendering of some measure of the client’s autonomy to 
the patron.”81 Importantly, there is an asymmetry in power between the patron and the 
client: the “client cannot, by itself, become a major military power in the international 
community; nor can it, by itself, guarantee its own security.”82 As a result, the patron 
tends to provide the client with security or security-related goods in exchange for 
political support. This desire for support from the client gives the client some influence 
over the patron. However, the client is also fairly dependent on the patron’s support, 
given the asymmetrical military capabilities. As Carney writes, “the exercise of influence 
and/or control over a client is one of the patron’s primary concerns and is one of the key 
features of the cliency relationship.”83 
While patron-client relationships entail a two-way transfer of benefits—generally 
security assistance to the client and political support to the patron—it is the patron’s 
actions and influence that are most relevant for my purposes. As defined above,  
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patronage entails the provision of goods by a stronger actor to a weaker actor. In 
particular, I am interested in the provision of goods to bolster the military capabilities of 
weaker states. The fact that there are benefits to both the client and the patron explain 
why these relationships may be so common. However, it is the patron’s provision of 
security goods to a state that becomes dependent on these goods that best explains the 
influence patrons gain in the realm of military design. Thus it is less important to 
distinguish patron-client relationships from other relationships of dependency for my 
purposes. Rather, a patron is simply a state that gains leverage over a client state through 
the provision of military assistance. The dependency of the client on the patron then 
endows the patron with greater influence on many aspects of the client state’s policies, 
including military design.  
External interest in how other states organize their armed forces can be motivated 
by a number of factors. Foreign powers may perceive that helping to develop another 
state’s military endows them with some security advantage. There may be an interest in 
creating a strong military to protect the state against external or internal threats because 
the state offers something of strategic value, whether that is control of or access to 
resources or the geographic location of the state itself. For example, US military support 
to Jamaica enhances the Jamaica Defense Force’s ability to maintain internal security and 
participate in joint operations, which the United States maintains is important “because of 
[Jamaica’s] location along vital sea lanes, the ability of its government to influence 
opinion in the English Caribbean, and its role as a major source of bauxite and 
marijuana.”84 Foreign powers often find it simpler and less risky to build up local forces 
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in this fashion than to maintain a direct presence. Indeed, local collaboration was the 
bedrock of European imperial strategy.85 In short, foreign powers assist in military design 
to ensure the continued survival of a friendly regime in states that they view as 
strategically important. 
Sometimes, the foreign actor may not necessarily care about actually building a 
strong military, but rather views developing the relationship between it and the new 
state’s regime as an end in itself. In these circumstances, outside actors may provide 
military advice and assistance to create or reinforce a dependent relationship that will 
provide leverage for pursuing other policy goals. Or it might simply constitute a signal of 
support or a confidence-building measure that can lead to improved relations. In some 
cases, the security interest the outside power is pursuing is actually a decrease in the 
client-state’s dependency. Thus, the United Kingdom sought to strengthen Kuwait’s 
armed forces in the years after Kuwaiti independence so that it could minimize its 
commitment to Kuwaiti security.86 In the words of Alexander Wendt and Michael 
Barnett, strong states create informal empires through “dependent militarization, in effect 
encouraging the development of certain security means to reinforce hegemonic security 
ends.”87 
Normative preferences can also lead outside actors to intervene in another state’s 
military design. Many people believe the military can be an effective venue through 
                                                        
85 Ash Rossiter, “Britain and the Development of Professional Security Forces in the Gulf Arab 
States, 1921–1971: Local Forces and Informal Empire (PhD diss, University of Exeter, 2014): 15-
16. 
86 Rossiter, “Britain and the Development of Professional Security Forces,” 164-175 
87 Emphasis in original. Wendt and Barnett, “Dependent State Formation,” 336. 
 46 
 
 
 
which values can be transmitted to the rest of society.88 Thus, military reform efforts are 
often part of broader projects to redefine the domestic political institutions of other states. 
For example, the OECD describes security sector reform as “based on democratic norms 
and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear 
and measurable reductions in armed violence and crime.”89 Despite rhetoric emphasizing 
local ownership of these processes, security sector reform is typically externally-driven, 
with experts from a handful of countries—typically, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France—leading evaluation and advisory teams.90 While there can be 
strategic benefits for engaging in security sector reform, these principles indicate that 
donor states are undoubtedly also motivated by a normative desire to improve the 
standard of living in target countries.  
The importance of client military practices suggests that foreign powers would 
also care about client recruitment policies. For one, the decision to use conscription or not 
is fundamental to many other aspects of military organization, as described in chapter 1. 
Creating effective colonial and post-colonial militaries is not just a matter of training and 
weapons, but of determining the best ways to recruit manpower for the intended 
missions. For example, peacetime conscription can entail risks to domestic stability that 
undermine the patron’s goals in exerting military influence in the first place. The British 
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Defence Attaché’s annual report for 1979 on Saudi Arabian military development 
articulated such a rationale against using conscripts to address manpower shortages: 
Conscription could play a less than helpful part in maintaining the morale 
and loyalty of the armed forces. It could introduce into the services numbers 
of resentful men who could subvert some of the regular elements. Their 
training requirements would affect the competence of the regular soldiers 
and dilute the expertise now being built up. When the conscripts left they 
would take away both some rudimentary military skill and a knowledge of 
the many weaknesses in the command and logistical structure of the armed 
forces. And they would leave behind regular soldiers better able to compare 
their own pay and conditions with those offered by companies in the 
commercial field.91 
Similarly, American officials during the conflicts in both Korea and Vietnam took an 
interest in the recruitment policies of their local allies. The United States viewed South 
Korean mobilization policies as a delicate balancing act between defeating the North and 
placating the Japanese fear of any increase in military power on the Korean peninsula.92 
This led to frequent American efforts to restrain South Korean conscription efforts. The 
United States also viewed conscription policies as vital to its success in Vietnam. In the 
1950s, American proposals delayed Vietnamese conscription until local infrastructure 
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was better established, while they repeatedly sought to enhance mobilization by asking 
the South Vietnamese government to reduce the draft age after 1964.93  
While these examples highlight that foreign powers often care about the 
recruitment policies that their clients use, this is not necessary in order for the patron’s 
recruitment policy to matter. Weaker states can also seek out the advice and assistance of 
stronger outside powers when setting up their militaries. In many cases, creating military 
dependency is not only viewed as an effective foreign policy tool by stronger states, but 
also as potentially advantageous for weaker states: it can allow weaker states to focus on 
statebuilding, provide regime security, and create alliance interdependence.94 The 
Ottoman Empire sought foreign assistance in implementing European-style military 
reforms throughout the nineteenth century.95 More recently, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement that ended Liberia’s civil war in 2003 explicitly asked that the United States 
“play a lead role in organising this restructuring programme [of Liberia’s armed 
forces].”96 In these cases, local recruitment practices may not be fundamentally important 
to patron state interests. Nonetheless, foreign advisors may transmit their recruitment 
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preferences, based on their own experience of what works, when their military assistance 
is requested.  
A. Methods of Foreign Influence 
Foreign influence can take many forms. Outside powers can directly determine a 
state’s security interests and strategic orientation, they can set manpower requirements 
for contribution to alliances or defense pacts, and they can provide or constrain the 
resources a state has at its disposal to make its own military policies. These direct and 
indirect methods of control all allow great powers to leverage a weak state’s dependence 
on it to influence its military design.  
At the least intrusive level, foreign powers can hope to influence a state’s military 
practices through cultural diffusion and the attraction of soft power. Though this provides 
no control over the practices states will actually adopt, foreign powers can foster high 
exposure for their own militaries and hope they model good practices that others will 
want to adopt. They can try to improve the likelihood that other states will perceive their 
practices in a positive light by deepening their military-to-military ties, including through 
joint military operations, contracting or exchanging officers and instructors, and military 
training missions.97 Thus the high number of British army veterans serving in the post-
independence Irish Army had a strong impact on the latter’s organizational practices.98 
However, this was through their effect on organizational culture, which led to the general 
acceptance of British professional norms, not through the active manipulation of policies 
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by foreign agents.  
While this can properly be described as foreign influence, it falls short of more 
active experiences of foreign intervention that characterize military development in many 
new states. Some powerful states take direct responsibility for creating and governing 
weaker states’ military institutions. One way they do this is by appointing or providing 
people who have the power to make these decisions. This was a favorite technique of the 
British, who would frequently decide on or provide the new states’ top military or 
civilian defense officials. For example, the first two heads of the Ghana Armed Forces 
were British army officers. Perhaps the most famous modern instance of a foreign 
military commander is John Bagot Glubb, the former British army officer who led the 
Arab Legion—Jordan’s national armed forces—from 1939 until 1956.  
These experts do not serve as official representatives of their home country, but 
they frequently pursued policies that were consistent with their home government’s 
preferences, and maintained extensive contacts there. In other cases, foreign powers 
provide formal advisors, who, though they may lack institutionalized authority in the new 
state, can have even greater de facto power arising from their official capacity back 
home. This can include extensive military training missions, often beginning before 
independence, such as the American KMAG in South Korea. It can also take the form of 
a specific individual who is tasked with providing advice to new rulers. For example, a 
Military Liaison Officer—Freddie De Butts—was the formal military link between the 
newly independent United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, tasked with 
recommending the “shape and size on Independence Day to the Rulers, and to estimate 
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what it would cost as they and not [the United Kingdom] would be paying.”99 
While the British typically built small, if weak, native military establishments 
before independence, former French colonies frequently gained independence with no 
native armed forces.100 As a result, France was more likely to exert control over client 
defense policies through the implicit threat of intervention it maintained by keeping 
French troops within newly independent states. This patron-dependence was often 
formalized in Defence Agreements.101 Indeed, France exercised its intervention 
capabilities numerous times throughout the Cold War—and since then—to maintain 
“existing patterns of relations” and favorable defense policies.102 Regardless of their 
exact colonial heritages, many postcolonial countries gained independence with only low 
ranking military officers and no qualified people to lead defense establishments. As a 
result, they often voluntarily ceded early important defense decisions to foreign experts, 
especially from former colonizers. 
Although the relatively small number of states gaining independence in the last 
two decades makes more contemporary examples fewer and farther between, similar 
modern methods of foreigners controlling military design are easy to identify. Military 
design efforts feature prominently in post-Cold War post-conflict peacebuilding and 
democratization efforts. For examples, decisions about the reconstruction of the Afghan 
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and Iraqi militaries in the mid-2000s were made at international conferences held outside 
those countries’ territories and sponsored by the occupying powers, suggesting locals 
were unlikely to be the dominant voice in the process. Similarly, a Rwandan general 
formed the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s army in 1997, while Russia formed a 
committee in Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defense to assist with operational training after the 
civil war there, also in 1997. Changing international norms may make it impractical for 
great powers to install their own representatives at the head of foreign armies or for new 
states to hire foreign nationals to prominent governmental positions. However, it is not 
uncommon for new states or foreigners engaged in security sector reform to hire private 
security companies to advise on or implement defense policies.103 Since these companies 
are mostly composed of foreign nationals with experience in foreign militaries, it should 
be no surprise that they bring with them their prior ideas about effective military 
organization.104 
Foreign influence can come through one more, indirect mechanism. New states 
that are aware of their precarious strategic position and their dependence on foreigners 
for security often adopt the preferences of stronger, potential patron states. By 
subordinating their own beliefs and preferences about defense preparations to those they 
expect a foreigner to want for them, they hope to maintain the support of a patron and 
avoid more disruptive and direct foreign intervention. This second face of power effect 
on military design is most clearly evident during the process of West German 
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rearmament.105 The Adenauer government, initially reticent to rearm at all, quickly 
internalized the need to contribute to NATO’s conventional defense in Europe once it 
became clear that their previous sources of defense manpower—the United States and 
France—were intent on drawing down their human and financial contributions. While 
NATO allies pressured West Germany to increase its contributions to its own defense, 
there is no obvious evidence to indicate that they cared what recruitment method 
Germany used to do this. However, Adenauer feared that a German failure to meet its 
expected contribution to collective defense would weaken NATO’s security 
commitments. Thus, despite domestic opposition, he instituted conscription as a way to 
increase NATO’s commitment to Germany security.106   
The promise of NATO membership and support has continued to shape states’ 
military organization practices, even though the alliance may not exert direct pressure on 
them to change their recruitment practices. Force modernization requirements for NATO 
membership often require expensive reforms that could be difficult for new states to 
meet, especially for former Warsaw Pact states. For most of these states, acquiring 
capital-intensive technologies and undertaking the necessary organizational reforms 
while simultaneously maintaining force levels through higher-paid volunteers was 
prohibitively expensive. Faced with this tradeoff, states like the Czech Republic chose to 
focus its efforts on NATO accession. The government’s Concept for the Development of 
the Army, approved in June 1993, determined that Czech security would be best served 
with a smaller, more professional force that could better integrate with NATO. However, 
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the early 1990s saw smaller enlistments that expected, which “reduced the armed forces’ 
combat readiness, damaged the moral of the military and added to the difficulties 
involved in military planning and management.”107 Thus, reorganizing and retraining 
around a new force structure would create an undermanned, underprepared force that was 
unable to meet the goal of territorial defense. The demands of force modernization 
presented by the anticipation of allied military preferences constrained the Czech 
Republic’s ability to adopt its own recruitment preferences for more than a decade after 
its independence. 
B. When is there Foreign Influence in Military Design? 
The many forms foreign intervention in military design can take makes it difficult 
to predict exactly when such hierarchical relationships will occur. The amount of effort 
that is needed to exert effective influence or control over military design may differ from 
state to state based on the available resources of the patron, the perceived domestic and 
international costs, the severity of opposition and associated risk within the potential 
client state, and the degree of the advantage to be gained. This cost-benefit analysis can 
lead the foreign power to intervene in military design even when the advantage to be 
gained appears to be relatively low. Similarly, the form that foreign influence takes does 
not determine its likelihood of success. While some of these avenues of influence may 
inherently create more opportunity for the diffusion of military practices than others, the 
receptivity of the client state to change must also be considered.108 When the power 
imbalance between patron and client is large, or when their interests are well-aligned, it is 
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possible to effect military change while expending few resources. How this relationship 
between patron interest and client receptivity plays out in terms of the patron’s 
investment in tools of influence can be seen below, in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Patterns of Patronage Investment 
 Not Strategically Important Strategically Important 
Not Receptive to Influence 
No Foreign Patronage or very 
Low Investment for Low 
Influence 
Large Foreign Patron 
Investment for Medium or 
High Influence 
Receptive to Influence Low Foreign Patron Investment for Low Influence 
Low Foreign Patron 
Investment for Medium or 
High Influence 
 
My argument does not attempt to explain why foreign powers intervene in some 
states’ military policies and not others, nor does it seek to predict their method of 
intervention. Is it possible, therefore, that weak states actually tend to seek military 
patrons who use recruitment policies that they already plan to implement? This is 
unlikely, because military assistance is only one part of a larger relationship defined by 
dependency in a number of policy fields. Geopolitics, economics, and ideology are just as 
likely to shape the development of hierarchy as purely military concerns. Thus, 
recruitment practices alone should not determine how these relationships develop. It is 
even less likely that weaker states should be able to pick their patrons; great powers and 
former colonizers are in a better position to control the development of hierarchical 
relations with weak states. While new states may have a say in who influences them, it is 
still up to the potential patron to reciprocate that interest. More importantly, goals of 
emulation may not succeed without actual influence from a patron state. Thus the role of 
foreign influence from the patron remains an important element in explaining military 
recruitment practices.  
Furthermore, outside powers and the states they are assisting often have different 
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preferences for what the military should be designed to do. As a result, even if weaker 
states have a good deal of freedom in choosing their patron, there is no guarantee that the 
recruitment policy that develops would be the one they hoped to achieve. While elites in 
new states may have prior preferences about how to recruit, these are often overturned on 
the advice or edict of a foreign power. In both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, for example, 
local rulers believed conscription would be an effective way to address their internal and 
external security threats.109 The influence of British military advisers, however, 
convinced them otherwise, or at least prevented them from implementing conscription. 
American policy in South Korea after World War II also downplayed the threat of 
invasion from the North and prioritized internal threats to the government’s stability.110 
Consequently, South Korea’s armed forces—tellingly named the Constabulary Force—
was designed more as a police force than as a military capable of territorial defense. The 
potential for divergent threat perceptions between patron and client states underscores the 
importance of identifying who controls military policy in a given case. 
Similarly, the number of states that have the potential to influence military policy 
in new states is also fairly limited. The ability to affect another state’s military policy 
requires substantial power projection. Patron states must not only have important 
strategic interests that extend beyond their borders, but also the resources to incentivize 
compliance from their clients. As a result, the states that can exert influence in the design 
of other states’ militaries are generally limited to great powers, former colonial powers, 
and, less frequently, rising regional powers.  
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III. Patronage, Threat Perception, and Military Recruitment 
The examples above suggest that it is necessary to examine the effects that 
foreign powers have when they intervene in weaker states’ domestic affairs to influence 
military design. In fact, foreign influence in weaker states’ military policies are 
common—more than 70 percent of the 205 post-1918 cases I analyze exhibit some sign 
of foreign influence in military affairs in the first few years after their independence. This 
indicates that the majority of the variation in recruitment policies can be explained 
through the processes described by Path 1 in Table 2.1.  
I argue that threat perception is the most important variable differentiating how 
domestic policymakers states view whether conscription will be advantageous. However, 
I make no prior assumptions about the types of threat that any given actor will prioritize. 
Rather, I follow other recent scholarship in assuming that whoever is making military 
policy—whether the new state itself or its patron—will make recruitment decisions based 
on the greatest threat they perceive at that time.111 The most important distinction 
between threat types for recruitment decisions is whether the state’s primary threat is 
major territorial warfare, most likely arising from invasion from outside its borders. Such 
existential threats require particularly high levels of military preparation, while nearly 
any other threat—external or domestic—can be addressed in a number of ways. Thus, 
major territorial threats constrain recruitment choices so that states without patrons feel 
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they must use conscription to guarantee their security. I define such major territorial 
threats as a high external threat environment. 
A. Path 1: Foreign Military Design 
Regardless of threat environment, foreign influence is likely to lead to emulation, 
the imitation or replication of another actor’s—in this case, the patron’s--practices. As 
described earlier in the chapter, the presence of foreign support allows the 
implementation of military design goals in a more stable, secure environment. There are 
several reasons why a foreign power might prefer to implement its own recruitment 
system in its client state. One argument follows a cultural logic. Outsiders providing 
military assistance are more likely to recommend practices that they know best because 
they view these as better based on a logic of appropriateness—effectiveness is a 
secondary concern. Alternatively, the patron state may care about effectiveness, and 
attempt to enact its own recruitment system for bureaucratic reasons. This logic implies 
that the technicians and policymakers who are actually engaged in military design know 
that their expertise is limited to the recruitment system with which they are most familiar. 
They know that the new state’s army will be most effective in the long run if they design 
a system based on the patron’s policies. Similarly, they may believe that armies based on 
similar recruitment systems are better able to work together, also strengthening the 
patron-client ties in the long run.  
Furthermore, many case studies have demonstrated that emulation through 
security assistance does happen. Latin American countries attempting to enhance their 
war-fighting capabilities in the late 1800s and early 1900s ended up with an array of new 
military policies that largely reflected the beliefs of the French and Prussian advisors they 
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hired, including on conscription.112 During the same period, David Ralston shows how 
non-Western armies sought the advice of dominant European powers to learn how to 
implement effective military reforms. More recently, Theo Farrell argues that 
professional military ties between states may lead to military emulation through the 
diffusion of cultural norms. Thus ties to the UK and United States influenced Irish 
notions about what an army should look like.113  
However, emulation can also derive from a more coercive relationship. In weaker 
cases of hierarchy the client may adopt recruitment practices because of its exposure to 
experts from the patron state, as described above. Thus, the greater the professional or 
political connections between patron and client, the more likely emulation will happen. 
When the patron has higher levels of authority over the client, though, the patron may 
actually enforce its preferred recruitment policy regardless of the wishes of the client 
state—especially if the two actors disagree. This is still likely to result in the adoption of 
the patron’s system, for the reasons described above. 
This pathway suggests three testable hypotheses. The first two hypotheses state 
that the method of military recruitment in new states should be the same as in their patron 
state. In other words: 
H1: New states influenced by conscript-patrons should be more likely to 
recruit conscripts than volunteers. 
H2: New states influenced by volunteer-patrons should be more likely to 
recruit volunteers than conscripts.  
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The third hypothesis emphasizes the extent to which having a patron should lead 
to emulation despite other pressures. When states have patrons, incentives to 
emulate should overpower other factors, such as threat. In other words: 
H3: Threat environment should have a greater effect on states without a 
foreign patron than on states that have either a volunteer-patron or a 
conscript-patron. 
B. Path 2: Domestic Military Design with Low External Threats 
When no foreign power intervenes in military design, domestic policymakers can 
make recruitment decisions based on their own threat perceptions. The second pathway 
describes how recruitment policy is made in the absence of either a foreign patron or 
major external threats. When there are major external threats, states face constraints in 
terms of the different types of uses to which they can put their military; they must design 
the military to protect their sovereignty. However, when these threats do not exist, 
alternative military purposes are possible. This means domestic policymakers have fewer 
constraints in how they design their military. There are many other states they could 
potentially use as a model, and leaders’ beliefs about what is effective or appropriate may 
be decisive. Because these conditions give new states significantly more freedom in 
designing their militaries, it is more difficult to predict what recruitment system they will 
use.  
In the absence of a major external threat or foreign patron, specific domestic 
circumstances within each state that can affect recruitment practices will not be 
overpowered by external circumstances. Thus, when states or regimes perceive that the 
primary threat to their rule does not come from major external territorial threats, it is less 
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clear whether conscription or volunteers are more effective. Historical experience and 
domestic ideologies can shape domestic beliefs about the effectiveness or appropriateness 
of military practices.114 Jeremy Black extends this argument to recruitment specifically, 
noting that recruitment systems reflect different strategies for or cultures of establishing 
security more than any operational function.115 Elizabeth Kier’s book on French and 
British military doctrine, for example, demonstrates the difficulty of predicting cultural 
responses to recruitment systems in different states: historical experiences led the Left 
and Right in the United Kingdom to develop a cultural mistrust of arming the people at 
large, while the French Left feared a long-term service, professional standing army and 
viewed “the people in arms” as a safeguard against tyranny.116 Depending on historical 
experiences, ideological biases, and cultural preferences, then, leaders will develop 
different beliefs about whether volunteers or conscripts will better protect them against 
low-level external threats or internal threats. 
Notably, Kier argues that the perception that the military’s relationship to society 
was the most pressing threat that shaped recruitment practices in the interwar period in 
each of these countries. Unlike massive external threats that require conscription, the 
internal threats that a state would focus on in lower threat environments do not suggest 
clear recruitment logics to maximize security. On the one hand, literature on ethnic 
politics and coup-proofing in authoritarian regimes would lead us to believe that elites 
who view the greatest threat as coming from within the state should be reluctant to arm 
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large portions of the population because their loyalty to the regime is dubious.117 Leaders 
may therefore prefer to eschew conscription and stack the military with loyalists, relying 
on violent repression to stay in power. Conversely, leaders can try to address any of these 
threats by preempting them: they can use the military as a “school for the nation” in an 
attempt to create broad-based support for the regime.118 Which they choose depends on 
how conceptions of security and national identity are constructed in different societies or 
by individual leaders.119 Thus, without external guidance or an major external threat, 
manpower preferences may be fundamentally unpredictable: they are “contingent on the 
particulars of the case and on the creativity of that leadership as it seeks to navigate 
between contending images of the nation.”120 While it may be possible to predict how 
different domestic ideologies and circumstances affect recruitment—discussed more 
below—which domestic factors a new state’s leadership will adopt or respond to may be 
more difficult to predict. 
This pathway does not suggest hypotheses about what should predict military 
recruitment in the absence of either threat or patrons. Rather, it argues that recruitment 
becomes difficult to predict in these circumstances, and is subject to the idiosyncrasies of 
a state’s particular domestic politics, history, and leaders’ preferences. Given the 
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frequency with which the data indicate that foreign patrons control military policy in new 
states, relatively few cases are likely to exhibit such unpredictable and contingent 
recruitment practices.121 Indeed, the next chapter shows that foreign influence, and in its 
absence, threat perception, explain observable variation in military recruitment. 
C. Path 3: Domestic Military Design with High External Threats 
 In the final pathway, however, the threat of major territorial conflict creates 
constraints on domestic military designers. In these circumstances, new states implement 
conscription as the recruitment system that is most likely to allow them to maintain an 
effective defense in what has the potential to be a lengthy struggle with a powerful 
adversary. The absence of a military patron would only exacerbate the challenges that 
weak and developing new states must face when mounting a defense against an 
existential challenge. Thus, states conceptualize their threat environment in one of two 
ways: if there are clear threats to the state’s territorial integrity or the regime’s control 
over significant national territory, states perceive a need to engage in territorial defense. 
Otherwise, they are free to design the military to engage in other types of missions—for 
example, expeditionary or peacekeeping missions abroad, or population control 
domestically—that enable them to adopt a freer hand in designing their recruitment 
policies.   
There are two reasons why major external, territorial threats are likely to lead to 
conscription. First, despite advances in the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of capital-
intensive technologies, manpower-intensive strategies remain necessary for territorial 
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defense. Warfare today is still predicated on successful use of what Stephen Biddle has 
termed the modern system, the “combination of cover and concealment that can allow 
defenders, though battered, to survive modern firepower in sufficient numbers to mount 
serious resistance.”122 While Biddle’s modern system requires well-trained recruits, 
which may be lacking under conscription, his emphasis on modern warfare’s continued 
focus on holding and defending territory in the face of invasion still requires sufficient 
manpower. Conscription provides a greater guarantee of security against major territorial-
based threats than volunteers, who may not be forthcoming in sufficient numbers in a 
sudden crisis or prolonged conflict. In other words, given the nature of modern warfare, 
new states may prefer to ensure they have enough soldiers to than to ensure that they are 
highly trained. This is particularly true in new states, which may lack the resources to 
effectively train soldiers in the use of the modern system, as described below. Thus states 
are likely to perceive conscription as the only way they will have sufficient active and 
reserve forces to defend or deter aggression, at least in the face of existential conflict in 
which they will likely suffer heavy casualties and need many replacements. Even if they 
believe volunteers make better soldiers, conscription allows them to hedge their bets for a 
longer, potentially existential struggle.  
The second reason reinforces the necessity of relying on manpower intensive 
strategies to defend against invasion. Contrary to existing arguments that describe 
conscription as more difficult and requiring greater state capacity to implement, I argue 
that it is actually volunteer armies that require higher levels of state capacity—at least if 
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they are to be effective.123 It is particularly difficult for new states to create highly 
effective volunteer armies. New states are less likely to have the resources to attract 
recruits in sufficient numbers or the technical capacity and ability to train volunteers 
proficiently in capital-intensive technologies and modern military techniques.124 They are 
also less likely to be able to acquire such technologies in sufficient numbers as to be able 
to make a difference on the battlefield. This magnifies the perception that new or weak 
states will need to rely on large numbers of troops to mount an effective defense. 
  Recent events seem to support the notion that states perceive conscription as a 
safer recruitment option when they are faced with potentially major external conflict. For 
the first time since their independence in 1971, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have 
introduced compulsory military service.125 Though other motivating factors are also 
possible, many officials in these countries seem to fear an increasing threat from Iran. 
This is reflected in the emphasis in each country’s conscription legislation on protecting 
“the homeland and its borders.”126 Similarly, Sweden recently reinstituted conscription 
only seven years after abolishing it, citing “a deteriorating security environment” in 
Europe.127 Sweden’s defense minister explicitly compared the country’s defense 
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readiness under both systems: “The all-volunteer recruitment hasn’t provided the armed 
forces with enough personnel. The reactivating of conscription is needed for military 
readiness.”128 These examples suggest that the perception that there may be a major 
challenge to a state’s territorial integrity can lead states to adopt conscription despite 
domestic cultural pressures toward volunteerism.  
Furthermore, the above examples are states whose governments have relatively 
high capacity and access to resources. This means that, compared to most new states or 
those transitioning after regime change, these states should be better able to address 
threats using volunteers. That they nonetheless chose to switch to a conscript system 
indicates the continued perceived advantages of conscription in high threat scenarios. 
States facing high threats with low resources should be even more likely to use 
conscription, particularly if they control little territory and therefore have a smaller 
population from which to recruit. This pathway can be summarized by the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: New states without a foreign patron should be more likely to recruit 
conscripts than to recruit volunteers if they face a dangerous (high external) 
threat environment than if they face a permissive (low external) threat 
environment.  
Before the statistical tests of these hypotheses, however, the remainder of this 
chapter demonstrates why existing theories do not provide satisfactory explanations for 
military recruitment decisions. 
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IV. Alternative Explanations 
 Theories based in both domestic politics and military effectiveness offer 
alternative explanations for when states will adopt specific military recruitment policies. I 
address each of these in turn, below.   
A. Domestic Politics 
Arguments based in domestic politics suggest that states may have preferences for 
specific recruitment policies because they fit with domestic institutions rather than due to 
any functional logic. In other words, recruitment policies should reflect the way 
policymakers think about the role of the military in society. For example, countries with 
governments that are rooted in republican notions of citizenship adopt conscript 
militaries, while those that support more liberal ideologies use volunteers.129 The 
republican ethos conceptualizes military service as a requirement of citizenship; the 
liberal ideals of individual rights, meanwhile, should decrease the state’s willingness and 
ability to use conscription, a form of property taking. 
This is also consistent with the notion that states intentionally use recruitment to 
reinforce domestic values. Recruitment policies that are inconsistent with domestic 
values could undermine support for the regime, the military, or both. Because military 
service makes such extreme demands on individuals, policymakers tend to be particularly 
concerned with whether the policies that determine who serves are fair. Thus, states often 
find it convenient to adopt military recruitment policies that reflect broader norms or 
ideologies, which legitimate the existing government and political system. 
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How do domestic preferences for recruitment practices arise? Many scholars have 
argued that colonial experiences endow states with different conceptions of citizenship or 
norms of appropriateness, particularly in relation to the proper role of the military in 
society. In particular, scholars have found that distinctive British colonial practices have 
important consequences for political development compared to the practices of other 
colonizers.130 This is also true for military practices, including the development of 
volunteer military recruitment. One way this could be the case is if colonial histories 
affect the ideology on which national identity and citizenship are founded. Asal et al. 
argue that a uniquely English tradition of individual liberties explains the general absence 
of conscription in former British colonies, while Yael Hadass finds that states with 
British legal systems are also more likely to use volunteers.131 Thus, the causal arrow 
runs from colonization, to domestic culture or institutions, to recruitment.  
The colonial legacy argument differs from my argument in several ways. First, as 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, patrons and colonizers are not always the same. 
Because independence or major regime change is a critical juncture, new actors can 
become patrons, even if they have no prior relationship with the client state. More 
specifically, though, the colonial legacy argument highlights the role of things that 
happened before independence. The colonial legacy argument maintains that what the 
colonizer did yesterday matters for military design today; my argument is that what the 
patron does today matters for military design today. Thus, independence and major 
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regime change is less of a critical juncture for the colonial legacy argument, as historical 
practices continue to influence contemporary policies.   
There are compelling reasons not to expect colonial legacies to transfer norms of 
military behavior to former colonies, though. New states and transitions often emerge 
through violent social upheavals or war, which create incentives for dissociation from the 
prior power.132 Even when the transfer of power is peaceful, the diffusion of political 
culture or institutions is often weak. While they may have adopted elements of the British 
legal system or culture, it hardly seems the case that governments of the Persian Gulf 
monarchies, Rhodesia, or Nyerere’s Tanzania were deeply concerned with individual 
liberties, as these arguments about colonial emulation maintain. Similarly, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the British themselves considered conscription to be innately 
inappropriate in their colonies. Europeans living in colonies were conscripted to the 
British army during the period of National Service in the early 1950s.133 The British also 
supported conscription for both labor use and the army in Egypt, even after the end of the 
First World War.134 Colonial correspondence shows that the British took a pragmatic 
approach to military recruitment in Malaya, Singapore, and Cyprus, often considering 
conscription and enforcing national registration even when compulsion was deemed 
ultimately not necessary.135 Even when the outcome is still a recruitment system that is 
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consistent with the prior ruler’s domestic values, this is often only achieved after highly 
contentious debates both within the new state and between the new state and its former 
colonizer. The critical juncture created at independence or major regime change limits 
any continued effect of colonial institutions and culture. However, where colonial 
patterns of hierarchy remain due to the continued reliance on security assistance from 
former colonizers, emulation still occurs. 
Existing colonial legacy theories often fail to specify the mechanism through 
which British domestic preferences would be diffused to its colonies. Indeed, Cohn and 
Toronto argue that “more work needs to be done on why British origin affects military 
manpower choices; more detailed case studies and process tracing are required to unpack 
exactly how the British origin effect came about.”136 My argument provides such an 
explanation by pointing to the overlap between colonial and post-colonial foreign 
influence. Colonial legacies may matter, but they are most likely to matter by providing a 
basis for post-independence foreign influence. This could explain important differences 
across countries in the implementation of colonial preferences. Rates of emulation of 
colonial practices vary across colonizers, while not all states colonized by the same 
power adopted the same recruitment system (Table 2.3).137 States including Cyprus, 
Israel, and Singapore were governed by the United Kingdom prior to their independence 
but did not adopt traditional British recruitment policies, while states with a French 
colonial legacy were nearly as likely to select volunteer systems over the more typically-
French conscription. Indeed, scholars have found that the British and French took 
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different approaches in their strategies of military assistance in their former colonies.138 
Thus, the lack of volunteerism in states colonized by the United Kingdom could be due to 
lower levels of British involvement as a patron after independence. Similarly, Eisenstadt 
and Pollack show that Soviet military influence overpowered colonial legacies of military 
culture in some Arab countries but not others.139 This suggests that these differing rates 
of emulation could be due to the different post-colonial strategies for maintaining 
hierarchy that colonizers adopted in specific colonies.  
Table 2.3 Colonial Legacy and Recruitment Emulation 
 Volunteer Army 
N (%) 
Conscript Army 
N (%) 
Total 
N (%) 
French Colonial Legacy 15 (46.9%) 17 (53.1) 32 (100%) 
French Independence 9 (39.1%) 14 (60.9%) 23 (100%) 
British Colonial Legacy 43 (78.2%) 12 (21.8%) 55 (100%) 
British Independence 39 (79.6%) 10 (20.4%) 49 (100%) 
Russian Colonial Legacy  3 (16.7%) 15 (83.3%) 18 (100%) 
Russian Independence 4 (20.0%) 16 (80.0%) 20 (100%) 
 
Legitimating ideologies and domestic preferences do not necessarily derive from 
colonial practices. However, other arguments about how domestic institutions affect 
military recruitment are often indeterminate or contradictory. For example, at the most 
general level, some scholars have expected there to be a relationship between democracy 
and conscription. However, the exact direction of this relationship, if any, is disputed. 
Conscription may reflect democratic notions of equal citizenship or it may conflict with 
democratic notions of individual rights, as described above.140 We may also expect 
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authoritarian regimes to be more likely to suppress individual rights in a way that allows 
them to use conscription more easily, though they equally could be hesitant to arm the 
public. 
Another way that democracy or regime type can affect recruitment system is by 
giving voice or creating accountability to the public. The average citizen prefers to pay 
for a volunteer force than to risk being conscripted.141 Thus, regimes that are more 
responsive to the population should be more likely to use volunteers. However, domestic 
ideology can also generate mass support for the use of conscription. Lee and Parker show 
that, throughout the 1960s, more than 50 percent of public opinion supported the 
continuation of the draft in the United States, while less than 40 percent was opposed.142 
This was true despite the fact that more than 40 percent thought the draft was unfair. 
Most tellingly, in March 1969, the same month that President Nixon created a 
Commission on the Volunteer Force, only 38 percent of respondents to a Gallup poll 
wanted the U.S. military to be based solely on volunteers. Thus, it is not clear whether 
institutions that support public accountability should lead states to adopt conscription or 
not. Indeed, Lee and Parker conclude that the President led public opinion on the draft.143  
In addition, some scholars argue that revolutionary ideology, particularly that 
espoused by Marxism, requires universal conscription: Marxist ideology makes it clear 
that “as long as there are evil capitalists to fight, socialists are duty-bound to arm 
themselves, and they are expected to use military force to advance the cause of socialism 
whenever they can.” Similarly, militaristic ideologies can also support conscription. Chris 
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Payne argues that “Regimes that place a high value on the military believe it is proper to 
compel long periods of military service,” while voluntary systems are more common “in 
countries where the military is given less importance.”144 Victor Asal et al. find mixed 
support linking conscription to militarization, despite evidence that states using 
conscription may be more likely to initiate the use of force.145 However, it is difficult to 
disentangle whether militarism leads to conscription, or conscription makes states more 
militaristic. Furthermore, militarism can also manifest itself in the establishment of an 
exclusive military class, as in pre-Meiji Japan.146 While these examples indicate 
policymakers seem to believe that recruitment systems must reinforce domestic social 
systems, exactly how they do this differs from state to state.  
These explanations run into problems by assuming that the general population 
extends its normative preferences about the state to its beliefs about military service, or 
that the government is responsive to popular culture and preferences. Often, domestic 
ideology is thrown out the window to pursue more pressing or functional goals. Despite 
the revolutionary and egalitarian rhetoric of Soviet communists, Trotsky’s initial 
preference for the defense establishment was to rely solely on highly-motivated urban 
militiamen, in part because mass conscription was associated with the old regime.147 
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Similarly, some advocates of the effect of institutions and ideology on recruitment argue 
that “new forces of revolutionary regimes [are] not formed from colonial forces.”148 
However, a desire to have experienced security forces frequently trumps such ideological 
goals, and revolutionary leaders find themselves needing to rely on ancien regime forces. 
This happened after successful rebellions in cases as diverse as the Russian Revolution, 
Irish Independence, and the post-World War II German rearmament.149  
This does not imply that pre-independence legacies determine military 
recruitment. On the contrary, the point is that policymakers are not constrained by 
domestic institutions, and may ignore revolutionary sentiments and popular ideologies 
favoring the establishment of new military practices when they see fit. In fact, states often 
impose conscription on an unwilling and resisting population. In her classic study, 
Margaret Levi argued that perceptions of fairness determined the extent of popular 
opposition and noncompliance with wartime drafts.150 Yet even in cases where the draft 
was viewed as extremely unfair—or, inconsistent with cultural perceptions of the 
legitimate demands the state could make on citizens—it was still enforced. Similarly, 
George Flynn argues that there is a division between Anglo-Saxon and French 
conceptions of military service, but that “despite fundamental differences in culture,” the 
United States, United Kingdom, and France all used conscription in the twentieth 
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century.”151 For Flynn, as for Levi, national cultures may affect the ease with which a 
recruitment system can be implemented, but cannot override the preferences of a 
determined elite.  
Indeed, there are often competing cultures within a country, or even within a 
policymaking elite. Elizabeth Kier’s book on French and British military doctrine, for 
example, highlights the existence of competing ideas about military recruitment, 
particularly in France, where the Left and Right had different views on how conscription 
would contribute to national security.152 Her argument demonstrates the difficulty of 
predicting cultural responses to recruitment systems in different states. Anna Leander 
similarly argues that culture is malleable, and that the use of conscription depends on the 
ability to frame legitimizing ideologies about the rights and obligations of citizenship.153 
Such cultural factors may determine the legitimacy of the demands the state can make on 
the population, as well as what is viewed as a legitimate and necessary mobilization 
strategy for war. This makes them good at explaining continuity in recruitment practices 
despite new threat environments because culture and institutions are difficult to change. 
However, changes in recruitment system can be a problem for these explanations: it is 
difficult to imagine that French notions of egalitarianism were strong in 1995 and had 
disappeared in 1997, as would be necessary to believe that recruitment systems are tied to 
domestic ideology. My theory avoids these problems emphasizing the way national 
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culture affects the perceptions and interests of the actors who actually make policy at a 
given place and time. 
Finally, states may also use the military to achieve domestic goals besides 
ideological consistency—most notably, full or high employment.  In this way, 
conscription can enhance domestic security through non-military means by acting as a 
form of patronage: it can tie a larger portion of the population to the regime by treating 
the army as a source of employment, by providing people who complete their term of 
service with certain societal advantages, and by providing cheap labor and other rents to 
staff officers.154 By relying on cheap labor through conscription, especially coupled with 
a smaller military force, the state may also be able to spend more money buying support 
from the population (through additional social welfare, economic development projects) 
or the military (through capital-intensive weapons acquisition, which increases military 
prestige). In Norway, for example, conscription supports the welfare state: it could 
increase employment by demanding new military bases “in areas that needed the 
employment offered by auxiliary services” and offering careers for diverse segments of 
the population.155 In these cases, the regime is primarily electing for a security strategy 
that would minimize the likelihood of popular dissent and that may not require the 
military to be able to perform well in combat roles. However, this also makes sense from 
a rational choice perspective: the cost of repressing the population and quelling uprisings 
increases with the size of the opposition expected to revolt.  
If states sometimes appear to use conscription to address chronic unemployment, 
                                                        
154 Graeger and Leira, “Norwegian Strategic Culture”; Rod Thornton, “’There No One Left to 
Draft’: The Strategic and Political Consequences of Russian Attempts to End Conscription,” 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26 (2014): 219–241. 
155 Graeger and Leira, “Norwegian Strategic Culture.” 
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how do domestic labor movements affect this relationship? One study argues that states 
with strong labor movements are more likely to use conscription. Unions, according to 
this theory, should advocate for conscription because it takes more people out of the labor 
force, thereby reducing labor competition for current union members.156 While consistent 
with expectations about how states use recruitment policies to meet employment goals, 
there are even stronger reasons to believe unions should oppose conscription. Most 
significantly, the average worker wants to avoid being drafted. This is not merely because 
of the personal risk it entails in times of war. Even during peacetime, uncertainty over the 
timing of a draft notice inhibits long-term career and family planning, and disrupts 
employment when it does come. Thus, policies pertaining to length of service, age of 
call-up, and exemptions typically aim to make conscription as tolerable as possible to the 
groups most likely to be affected by it: students and young people who are entering the 
workforce and starting families.157 In fact, labor support is usually problematic for 
democratic governments seeking to implement conscription, even during major 
conflict.158 
While there are diverse arguments about what aspects of cultural and 
                                                        
156 Gary M. Anderson, Dennis Halcoussis, and Robert D. Tollison, “Drafting the Competition: 
Labor Unions and Military Conscription,” Defence and Peace Economics 7:3 (1996): 189–202. 
157 Geva, Conscription, Family, and the Modern State. 
158 For example, Peter Simkins describes labor opposition to the possibility of conscription in the 
United Kingdom during World War I, writing, “The [Trades Union] Congress represented 3 
million members and its opposition to conscription could not easily be overlooked….” 
Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–16 (New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1988). See also Vasquez, “More than Meets the Eye,” 650; Frank Myers, “British Trade 
Unions and the End of Conscription: The Tripartite Committee of 1950-56,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 31 (1996): 509–520. The demands of wartime mobilization may also be an 
opportunity for the state to increase its power more generally of over domestic society and labor 
due to what Barnett (Confronting the Costs of War, 1) refers to as the ratchet effect. Nancy Beck 
Young’s description of labor mobilization debates in the United States during World War II is 
consistent with this process. See Why We Fight: Congress and the Politics of World War II 
(Lawrence, KS, University of Kansas Press, 2013): 102–134. 
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organizational practices matter, in what ways, and where they come from, they make 
little room for foreign actors to affect military recruitment after independence. Thus these 
theories ignore not only the actors that make important recruitment decisions, but also the 
process by which those decisions are made.  
B. Military Effectiveness and Recruitment  
 Military effectiveness arguments assume that states will adopt the recruitment 
practice that is most effective given specific military goals. What is the optimal method 
of recruitment for enhancing a state’s military capabilities? The problem is that there is 
no immediately obvious prescription for states to follow. Volunteer militaries tend to 
incur fewer casualties, but this may be due less to any inherent advantage in using 
volunteers and more to the greater care and efficiency with which states deploy them as a 
costly resource—characteristics that states using conscript armies could theoretically 
adopt as well, regardless of cost.159 However, there are good reasons to believe volunteers 
are also more effective on the battlefield. For one, they tend to be better trained and have 
higher levels of expertise, due in large part to their ability to serve for longer periods of 
time.160 They also have higher morale because recruits all serve by choice. This in turn 
gives them an advantage when it comes to unit cohesion, which many scholars have 
argued is among the most important components of military effectiveness.161 Conscript 
                                                        
159 Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam, “Domestic Institutions.” 
160 In previous military epochs armies based largely on press-ganging could have career-service 
conscripts who served for decades. However, modern armies must severely limit conscript service 
terms to avoid removing large portions of the population from economically productive roles. See 
for example McNeil, The Pursuit of Power; Ralston, Importing the European Army.  
161 S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1947); Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The 
Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” International Security 11 (1986): 37–71; Stephen P. 
Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” International Security 19:4 (1995): 5–31; 
Jason Lyall, “Why Armies Break: Explaining Mass Desertion in Conventional War.” Working 
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armies are more likely to have lower levels of cohesion, or at least face greater obstacles 
to achieving cohesion, due to the fact that recruits often have little in common beyond 
low morale and a shared desire to be doing something else.162 Thus, the evidence 
suggests that volunteer armies may be more combat-effective.  
On the other hand, many people argue that labor-intensive military strategies—
which provide cheaper manpower through conscription—make just as much sense for 
states facing high levels of external threat. The anticipation of major conflict may lead 
states to build conscript armies that provide a steady supply of replacements over larger 
fronts and for longer periods of time. In other words, while volunteer armies may be the 
more effective choice based on individual or even unit-level performance, states may 
prefer to respond to the functional imperative by adopting a strategy of attrition, for 
which conscription may provide a safer, long-term recruitment basis and a deeper 
defense. The view that conscription increases the chances of state survival is well 
represented in the existing literature.163 Scholars have argued that involvement in 
interstate wars or rivalries, or the perception of potential threats based on geographical 
                                                        
Paper. Published November 9, 2016. Available at 
http://politicalscience.nd.edu/assets/217567/desertion_paper.pdf. 
162 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz. “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in 
World War II, Public Opinion Quarterly 12:2 (1948): 280–315; Dara Kay Cohen. “Explaining 
Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009.,” American Political Science 
Review 107:3 (2013): 461–477. 
163 Barry Posen, for one, unequivocally writes that “The mass army is a successful practice from 
the point of view of survival in international politics” (“Nationalism, the Mass Army, and 
Military Power,” International Security 18 (1993), 82). See also Cohen 1985; Pfaffenzeller, 
“Conscription and Democracy”; Haltiner, “The Definite End”; Charles Moskos, John Allen 
Williams, and David R. Segal, eds, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000; Gregory D. Foster, Alan Ned Sabrosky, and 
William J. Taylor, Jr, eds., The Strategic Dimension of Military Manpower (Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987).  
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conditions, like the number of states on its borders and the favorability of terrain for 
defense or isolation, may lead states to use conscription.  
These diverse arguments about volunteer and conscript effectiveness have led 
many scholars to argue that there is no natural advantage to using one or the other. 
Lindsay Cohn, for example, has shown that volunteer armies in Europe exhibit wide 
variation in their levels of effectiveness according to the specific personnel policies 
countries use, which are in turn determined by the domestic economy and labor 
markets.164 Similarly, states can rely on conscripts and volunteers in different numbers 
and for different missions, which would indicate that “there are no technical or economic 
imperatives” that would require states to use exclusively one system or the other to be 
effective.165 This can even take the extreme form of dual military establishments, often 
combining a national conscript service for territorial defense with an ideological militia 
for regime protection.166 As a result, states often come to different conclusions regarding 
what recruitment strategies are best, even when they face the same functional 
imperatives. 
Even if there is an advantage to using volunteer or conscripts, policymakers may 
not agree on what that advantage is. Thus, leaders of states in similar threat environments 
may adopt different recruitment practices because they believe their decisions will create 
                                                        
164 Cohn, “Who Will Serve?” 
165 Leander, “Drafting Community,” p.572; See also Betts 1995, 150 and Thomas Ross, Raising 
an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment,” Journal of Law and Economics 37 (1994): 
109–131. 
166 Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle 
East,” Political Science Quarterly 115:1 (2000): 67–92. Further supporting the argument that 
there are no technical, functional imperatives driving recruitment strategies, dual militaries can 
equally be designed with a poorly-trained conscript military intended to transform national 
identity with little military function reinforced by a highly-trained and ideologically-motivated 
volunteer cadre that can spearhead military operations.  
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the most effective military. As Alastair Iain Johnston has convincingly demonstrated, the 
subjective perceptions of policymakers, particularly across distinct historical and cultural 
contexts, lead to differences in strategic evaluations.167 Jeremy Black extends this 
argument to recruitment specifically, noting that recruitment systems reflect different 
strategies for or cultures of establishing security more than any operational function.168 
This is consistent with the argument in this dissertation, which suggests that the 
preferences and expectations of influential patron states affect military design. Except in 
the face of existential threats, the pursuit of military effectiveness may lead states to 
adopt either volunteer or conscript systems.   
It may be the case that different national-level characteristics determine an 
individual state’s optimal recruitment strategy. This view is not well-developed in cross-
national research, but is prevalent in many case study accounts of military design. To an 
extent, it is a logical extension and modification of arguments that describe how 
technology affects warfighting practices: if volunteer militaries are better adapted to 
using capital-intensive technologies and strategies, then it makes sense that states seeking 
to maximize their military effectiveness will use conscription if they lack access to or the 
ability to take advantage of existing technology. Developments including the rise of 
expeditionary and coalition-based military operations, occupational trends in military 
organization, and decreased public support for military spending may lead to 
convergence on smaller, volunteer forces.169 Using volunteers without the necessary 
capital-intensive resources would be inefficient and less effective. 
                                                        
167 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security 19 (1995), 
32–64. 
168 Black, “Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective,” 892. 
169 Williams and Gilroy, “The Transformation of Personnel Policies.” 
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Factor endowments are one way to understand how technology affects the 
efficiency of military design in response to the functional imperative. Alexander Wendt 
and Michael Barnett note that capital-intensive military organization in the most 
industrialized countries of the West “makes sense from the standpoint of factor 
endowments,” but nonetheless poses many challenges and is “almost impossible for the 
capital-poor states of the Third World.”170 Thus, the fact that new, under-developed states 
pursue inefficient, capital-intensive military practices poses a puzzle. They argue that this 
is due in part to the fact that the international environment in which they exist is less 
competitive, dampening or changing the focus of military design to internal security. 
Other ways to explain the technological role in the functional imperative are 
based in specific aspects of social and economic development. For example, scholars 
have argued that conscription requires larger populations and higher levels of education, 
or greater gender imbalances.171 Others focus on a more general administrative capacity 
as a necessity for conscription. Sometimes, this refers to the coercive aspects of 
conscription, underscoring the extent to which it requires the state to have greater levels 
of centralization and a well-developed bureaucracy. Mulligan and Shliefer identify 
several ways in which conscription has higher fixed costs than volunteer systems such as 
by requiring: “deriving algorithms for enumerating the population subject to the draft, 
setting up and staffing offices throughout the country to administer the draft, verifying 
qualifications for exemptions, including medical ones, establishing institutions 
specializing in catching draft dodgers, and policing the system itself to assure fairness 
                                                        
170 Wendt and Barnett, “Dependent State Formation,” 325.  
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and avoid corruption.”172 Similarly, Hillel Soifer argues that systematic and legalized 
conscription emerged among Latin American states that employed more effective 
bureaucratic policies. Without this greater coercive capacity, colonial officials were 
unable to implement conscription successfully.173 For others, state capacity provides 
necessary political stability. Amos Perlmutter writes that “public authority must be stable 
in order to pursue consistent educational policies and to keep alive the popular will to 
participate in state-sponsored activities, including the military.”174 Legitimacy is 
commonly cited as the most important component of capacity and stability.175 Without 
legitimacy, states have too much reason to fear opposition and rebellion in response to 
conscription: any efforts to institute conscription would by necessity be short-lived. It 
provides a valuable resources states need for coercing their citizens into military service. 
However, these supply-side explanations of when states use conscription are 
insufficient. Their major shortcoming is their failure to consider demand-side 
considerations. They assume that states that can implement conscription will want to do 
so, without addressing the purpose of conscription. They also imply that states are more 
likely to conscript when they have the resources to do it successfully. However, there are 
many examples, particularly outside of Europe, where state-building rulers instituted 
conscription despite their weak legitimacy, underdeveloped economies, and unqualified 
                                                        
172 Mulligan and Shliefer, “Conscription as Regulation,” 5 
173 Hillel David Soifer, State Building in Latin America (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015). 
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and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977): 61 
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native officers.176 It is difficult to imagine a more challenging environment in which to 
implement conscription than Afghanistan in the 1880s or Iraq in the 1930s, yet the 
governments in each of these states tried to nonetheless. In many cases, universal 
conscription was actually viewed as the remedy for low literacy and poor development; 
the army was to be a school for the nation in both ideology and basic education. Such 
attempts vary in their success, but they nearly universally experience initial extensive 
opposition, often resulting in high levels of desertion or even rebellion.177 While 
economic development likely facilitated the ease with which rulers could enforce 
conscription, there is no evidence to suggest that states only implement conscription 
where they consider it feasible. In short, we should not expect that states will adopt the 
most efficient military design, any more than we would expect them to adopt other 
institutions based on optimal efficiency.178  
 
V. Conclusion 
 To sum up, existing literature has expected recruitment policies to be determined 
primarily by domestic factors. One school of thought argues that domestic politics and 
ideology exert the greatest impact on recruitment, while another maintains that how states 
                                                        
176 Ralston, Importing the European Army; Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: 
State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
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view their recruitment system will allow them to face certain threats. I argue that both 
sets of explanations overlook the path-dependent process by which new states design 
their militaries. As a result, they omit the important role that foreign patrons often play in 
influencing military design in new states. Thus, I make two arguments. First, I argue that 
when new states have a foreign patron they will emulate its recruitment practices. 
Second, I argue threat matters when there is no patron, because policymakers continue to 
believe that conscription is the best way to secure their territory when they face large 
threats and have no external patron. This demonstrates that hierarchical relationships 
between states play out in the realm of military policy, despite the fact that this has 
traditionally been viewed as a bastion of national autonomy.  
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CHAPTER 3: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 This chapter uses original cross-sectional data to test the hypotheses about 
military recruitment preferences that I generated in the previous chapter: specifically, that 
the presence of foreign military intervention and threat environments predict whether 
states design militaries based on conscripts or volunteers. The quantitative analysis in this 
chapter tests this theory by isolating cases in which states make military recruitment 
decisions after their independence or other major changes in their domestic political 
regimes—what I refer to for shorthand as new states. Formally, my hypotheses state that: 
H1: New states influenced by conscript-patrons should be more likely to 
recruit conscripts than volunteers. 
H2: New states influenced by volunteer-patrons should be more likely to 
recruit volunteers than conscripts.  
H3: Threat environment should have a greater effect on states without a 
foreign patron than on states that have either a volunteer-patron or a 
conscript-patron. 
H4: New states without a foreign patron should be more likely to recruit 
conscripts than to recruit volunteers if they face a dangerous (high external) 
threat environment than if they face a permissive (low external) threat 
environment.  
The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that, as predicted, the influence 
of foreign actors after independence has an important effect on new state military design 
that is exerted through pathways of professional emulation. First, the results show that 
patron-state influence affects military design even when models account for a new state’s 
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colonial legacy. States tend to emulate the practices of their patrons, especially when 
their patron uses conscription. Second, this effect does not depend on the threat 
environment; in other words, patron states support the adoption of their own practices 
regardless of how threatening the international security environment is. Third, dangerous 
external threat environments lead states to adopt conscription when they do not have a 
patron.  
In addition, the results demonstrate several more findings beyond those that I 
hypothesized. First, despite changing technological and economic conditions that others 
have suggested should have a determinative effect on recruitment practices, the findings 
in this chapter show that the causes of recruitment do not statistically vary in the period 
under examination. Second, both internal and external threats affect military design under 
certain conditions. Finally, while existing research has pointed to unique characteristics 
of the British volunteer tradition as motivating states to adopt volunteer militaries, this 
chapter finds little support for this effect.  
 
I. Research Design 
The unit of analysis in this chapter is universe of new states created since 1918. 
New states are states that have recently undergone major changes in their domestic 
political regimes; there is little or no continuity between new states and the political 
entities that controlled their territory the previous year. The most obvious examples of 
new states are those that, having recently been a colony, recently gained independence 
and are entering the international system for the first time, or those that recently seceded 
from another state.  
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However, this is not the only situation in which states are likely to completely 
redesign their political institutions. Thus, my universe of cases includes two additional 
types of cases in which states’ domestic politics should have changed substantially 
enough to demand and allow the redesign of military institutions. Such major changes in 
domestic politics makes these types of cases comparable to new states that recently 
gained independence for the purpose of testing my theory.179 First, I included cases of 
social revolution based on Goodwin’s description of a social revolution as entailing “a 
significant change in the control and organization of state power.”180 Second, civil war 
termination can constitute an important period for the reorganization of security 
institutions.181 Post-conflict reconstruction may include a formal process of security 
sector reform, or bring new actors to power who want to use their own armies. Even if 
neither of these is the case or the incumbent remains in power, internal conflict can create 
incentives to restructure existing institutions and may lead to changes in military 
practices. Thus, I also included cases of civil wars that ended in rebel victory or 
negotiated settlement, since these forms of conflict termination are most likely to create 
similar conditions to those that define my other observations. These are the most drastic 
types of changes in domestic institutions and thus are most comparable to new states. 
                                                        
179 My statistical results lose significance when I include a dummy variable for civil war states, 
but that variable is not statistically significant (see Robustness Tests, later in this chapter).  
180 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11; Jeff Carter, Michael Bernhard, and Glenn Palmer, 
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181 Heiner Hänggi, “Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction,” in Reform and 
Reconstruction of the Security Sector, edited by Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, 1–11 (DCAF 
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Indeed, 8 out of 68 of the cases that were not cases that entered my dataset through their 
membership in the ICOW dataset change their recruitment system within two years after 
the year of the critical juncture. Since a critical juncture does not require that a state 
changes its recruitment system, merely that the opportunity to do so is greatly increased, 
the higher rate of change for these cases indicates that they are also likely to be a critical 
juncture. 
In total, the dataset includes 224 observations of new state creation since 1918. 
The baseline criterion used to populate the dataset was the existence of an observation in 
the Issues Correlates of War (ICOW) Colonial History dataset with an independence date 
of 1918 or later. This constitutes 141 observations, which represent a state’s first entrance 
into the international system. This dataset defines and dates independence according to 
when a state gains de facto control of its own foreign policy.182 This definition better 
captures the assumption that independence creates institutional freedom in military 
design compared to the Correlates of War (COW) State Membership dataset, which 
adopts a more formal definition based on international recognition and population size.  
There are in fact few differences between these two datasets during the period 
under examination. COW includes additional observations because it permits states to 
enter and exit the system multiple times, in accordance with the loss of sovereignty due to 
conquest or occupation. For example, France enters the COW dataset at the end of the 
period of German occupation, in 1944, while the Baltic countries each appear twice in the 
dataset, at their independence in 1918 and again after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. To supplement the 141 cases in the ICOW dataset, I added to the dataset 22 COW 
                                                        
182 Paul Hensel, 2014, “ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0” codebook. Available at 
http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html. 
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observations that were originally excluded from ICOW on the basis of being the reentry 
of a prior state whose international system membership was interrupted.183 This adds new 
states as diverse as post-liberation France in 1944, Morocco in 1956, and reunified 
Germany in 1990. I also included Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) after the US-led 
invasions as instances of state creation; although their institutions—including the 
military—were built essentially from the ground up, they were not in the other datasets I 
used to populate my own. Finally, there are 12 cases of Goodwin’s social revolution that 
were not already in my dataset, as well as 47 cases from the COW Intra-State Wars 
dataset that ended in rebel victory or negotiated settlements. Observations in the dataset 
are distinguished by the name of the state and the year of its creation. 
While in principle my argument should be able to explain recruitment decisions in 
a given state at any point in time, I limited my empirical tests to new states starting in the 
year 1918 for both practical and methodological reasons. My use of novel independent 
variables made data collection a time-consuming enterprise. Acquiring reliable measures 
for all country-years in the period I examine was not a feasible undertaking and will have 
to wait to be completed in a future project. Concerns about data availability, reliability, 
and comparability—especially for data on state capacity—also led me to use 1918 as the 
cut-off point for my quantitative tests.  
                                                        
183 See Appendix B for a list of these cases. After this addition, there are only 15 additional cases 
of state creation included in COW that are excluded from ICOW. However, these appear to be 
cases in which states already had independence and sovereignty before 1918 but that enter 
COW’s dataset after this date for idiosyncratic reasons. Therefore, I excluded them from my 
analysis. Of the 141 observations of state creation that ICOW and COW share, the years of 
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adopted the ICOW independence date in all cases but two: For East and West Germany, I used 
the COW independence dates of 1954 and 1955, rather than the ICOW dates of 1949, because 
these reflect the formal end of their occupation and legal attainment of full sovereignty. 
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In addition, there are methodological reasons to focus on the initial period of 
military design rather than recruitment at any point in time for a given state. Even if data 
were available for all country-years, recruitment systems create institutional 
dependencies that make them difficult to change once they are well established. As a 
result, the values for the dependent variable would be serially correlated, resulting in 
severely suppressed standard errors. Other studies have nonetheless attempted to explain 
recruitment choices in any country-year through time-series analysis by using various 
strategies to address temporal dependence of their dependent variable values, including 
lagged dependent variables, count variables to control for the consecutive years a state 
has used the same recruitment system, time-period average values for the dependent 
variable, extrapolating from or averaging across regression results from individual years, 
or country-fixed effects.184 However, because my theory is primarily about how new 
states make decisions, none of these alternative approaches is appropriate. Given the 
extensive findings about recruitment’s path dependence, I am less interested in explaining 
how states make decisions long after independence, which is more likely to be 
determined by factors that enable military change more generally. My approach, while 
reducing the number of observations, circumvents the problem of serial correlation by 
examining the factors that lead states to adopt initial recruitment systems. Thus, my 
empirical strategy identifies the conditions that lead states to start down certain self-
                                                        
184 Lindsay P. Cohn and Nathan W. Toronto, “Markets and Manpower: The Political Economy of 
Compulsory Military Service,” Armed Forces and Society (forthcoming); Asal et al, “I Want 
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reinforcing paths of military recruitment policies. It also permits me to test an argument 
specific to new states, which make decisions in a distinct institutional context compared 
to states with more developed institutions.  
 
II. Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in this chapter measures whether a new state developed a 
military that used conscripts or volunteers. I updated and revised existing data on 
conscription from Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam (2011) and Nathan Toronto’s Military 
Recruitment Dataset.185 I followed their coding rules, which treats conscription as a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a state uses any form of a draft to recruit any 
quantity of its military personnel and zero otherwise. I discuss the reasons for examining 
conscription as a dichotomous variable in Chapter 1. To summarize, however, the 
difference between conscription and volunteerism remains an important one that affects 
other aspects of military design and other sociopolitical outcomes of interest.  
My revisions relied on three types of source material whenever possible to verify 
the coding of these datasets. First, I referenced some of the sources that these datasets 
used for their coding to verify their accuracy. This included John Keegan’s World Armies 
(1983), as well as documentation from War Resisters’ International (WRI), an 
international non-profit organization that has periodically published information about 
military recruitment policies, with a particular focus on conscientious objection 
                                                        
185 Horowitz et al, “Domestic Institutions and Wartime Casualties”; Nathan Toronto (2005). 
Military Recruitment Data Set, version 2005.1. Available from the author at 
nathan.toronto@us.army.mil. See Chapter 1 of this dissertation for a discussion of the 
conceptualization of conscription and reasons for using a dichotomous measure.  
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policies.186 The WRI-published Conscription: A World Survey: Compulsory Military 
Service and Resistance to It, by Devi Prasad and Tony Smythe (1968), as well as a more 
recent survey of country conscription policies found on their website, are the two sources 
that are most commonly referenced in the quantitative study of conscription.187 Second, I 
referred to the U.S. Library of Congress’s Country Studies, whenever available. Finally, I 
often resorted to additional secondary source case studies, especially when Toronto and 
Horowitz et al.’s codings differed from each other.188  
Because this chapter seeks to explain choices about military design, and it often 
takes time to establish sufficient control to evaluate defense policies military needs, it is 
important to make sure the dependent variable coding actually represents the recruitment 
policies that a new state uses. Therefore, the coding allows for a grace period of two 
years after the year of independence in which states could finalize their recruitment 
system. There was insufficient data to code the value of the dependent variable in 19 
cases, limiting the dataset to 205 observations.189 
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187 Toronto, “Military Recruitment Dataset; Choi and James, “No Professional Soldiers”; 
Pickering, “Dangerous Drafts.  
188 The vast majority of these differences were instances in which Toronto coded data as missing.  
189 Most of these lost observations are small island nations, with the exception of North Yemen 
(1918), Lebanon (1943), Bhutan (1947), Benin (1960), Equatorial Guinea (1968), and Guinea-
Bissau (1974). For a complete list, see Table 3A.1, in the Appendix. While the recruitment 
decisions in individual micro-nations can seem puzzling and are interesting in and of 
themselves—what purpose might conscription serve in the Seychelles, for example?—they 
should offer little explanatory power in terms of the broader phenomenon of military design in 
states where the military has more than symbolic value. 
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This coding scheme minimizes the risk of mischaracterizing a country, for 
example, as using volunteers when strategic or ideological realignment in the first year of 
its independence led it to institute conscription the following year and it never changed its 
recruitment policy after that.190 For example, West Germany is coded as using volunteers 
in its first year of independence. However, policymakers enacted conscription in 1956, 
the year after independence, and never changed its recruitment again. Characterizing 
West Germany as a volunteer state because of its original recruitment choice would have 
been highly misleading.  
As can be seen in Table 3.1, new states’ choice of recruitment system after two 
years is split almost exactly equally between conscription (105, or 51% of cases) and 
volunteer (100, or 49% of cases) across all instances of state creation in my dataset. This 
proportion is similar regardless of whether I allow no grace period for military 
reorganization in new regimes (106 states chose volunteer versus 99 that chose conscript) 
or a five-year grace period (100 chose volunteer versus 105 chose conscript). The same is 
true among cases that meet different definitions of state creation, as can be seen in Table 
3.2. Among those cases that that meet the ICOW definition for initial state independence, 
55 percent (67 cases) adopted volunteer recruitment compared to 45 percent (55) that 
                                                        
190 Decisions regarding the timing of such a cutoff inevitably entail some degree of arbitrariness. 
However, robustness checks show that alternative cutoff periods do not change my results. While 
my analyses included multiple dependent variable codings for different assumed grace periods, 
the exact length of time is ultimately not important, as changes in recruitment policy are 
uncommon overall. Of the 54 observations of state creation in my dataset that change recruitment 
practices, 11 of these make changes in the first two years after their independence, and 7 more 
change in the first five. Moreover, recruitment changes that happen early—in the first five years 
after independence—seem to result in more stable recruitment compared to changes that happen 
later. Only one state that changed in its first two years changed its recruitment again after that, 
and only three of the 18 states that changed in their first five years made further changes. This is 
in comparison to 9 states that made multiple changes out of 36 that changed their recruitment for 
the first time after the first five years. 
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adopted conscription.191 This gap narrows even further to 50 percent each, or 72 out of 
144 total, when COW’s states that reentered the system after membership interruptions 
are included. The 47 post-civil war states included in the sample also exhibit nearly equal 
variation, with 23 of them electing to use only volunteers compared to 24 that employed 
conscription. The distribution of values for the dependent variable is roughly the same 
when I expand the dataset to include these cases. We should not expect the post-civil war 
or post-revolution cases to change the results.192 
Table 3.1: Variation in Recruitment at Different Times after Independence 
 Year of  
Independence 
2 Years After 
Independence 
5 Years After 
Independence 
Volunteer 106 (51.7%) 100 (48.8%)  100 (48.8%)  
Conscription 99 (48.3%) 105 (51.2%) 105 (51.2%) 
Total 205 (100) 205 (100) 205 (100) 
 
Table 3.2: Variation in Recruitment Among Different Types of New States 
 All New States Post-Independence States 
Post-Civil War 
States 
Volunteer 100 (48.8%)  67 (54.9%)  23 (48.9%)  
Conscription 105 (51.2%) 55 (45.1%) 24 (51.1%) 
Total 205 (100) 122 (100%) 47 (100%) 
 
 
III. Independent Variables 
 Given the theoretical focus on how foreign intervention influences state design of 
militaries, a key task involves capturing whether a foreign state controls or exerts a 
determinative effect on security policies in new states. There are many challenges to 
identifying the actor (or set of actors) who has the greatest influence on policy 
                                                        
191 19 observations are missing. 
192 Confirmation can be seen in the Robustness Checks section later in chapter.  
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decisions.193 For example, it may not be necessary for a patron state to overtly pressure 
the emulation of certain military policies because the client knows its patron’s support is 
contingent on its adopting the right practices. Thus, in many cases identifying whether 
there is in fact a foreign influence on military practices is best left to in-depth qualitative 
analysis, as undertaken in the coming case study chapters. The key obstacle to obtaining a 
definitive indicator of foreign control over military design is that the level of intervention 
needed to affect a new state’s security policies depends on a variety of circumstances in 
both the patron and client state. How important is the client to the patron’s interests? How 
much do their interests overlap? What are the competing domestic and international 
agendas that may limit available resources for projecting power? 
Patrons must consider these questions when they weigh the likelihood of 
successfully influencing policy against the potential strategic payoffs or losses given 
limited resources. Thus, patrons may be able to achieve strategic goals with minimal 
resources—for example, a small military advisory mission or weapons transfers—in 
particularly weak new states with friendly domestic populations. However, patrons may 
require a more resource-intensive strategy involving forward-deployed troops and 
extensive training operations if a new state is viewed as strategically vital but resistant to 
outside interference in its affairs. In some cases, patrons may view the potential security 
payoffs of contributing such costly military design interventions as necessary. In other 
situations, potential patrons may decide the level of intervention necessary for policy 
success is not worth the trouble it could cause at home or in the new state. This could be 
because the security payoff is not high enough, the risks are too high, or there are 
                                                        
193 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science 
Review 56 (1962): 947–952.  
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alternative client states that offer similar security advantages in the vicinity. The effects 
of these considerations on the likelihood of patronage can be seen in Table 3.3, below. 
Table 3.3: Patterns of Patronage 
 Not Strategically Important Strategically Important 
Not Receptive to 
Influence No Foreign Patronage 
Low/Medium Levels of 
Patronage if costs sufficiently 
low 
Receptive to Influence 
Low/Medium Levels of 
Patronage if costs sufficiently 
low 
High Levels of Patronage 
 
The preceding discussion demonstrates plausible variation in strategies of patron-
client control. Preferred methods of influence change depending on preferred goals and 
available resources both across patrons and for individual patrons over time. In his study 
of U.S. military assistance, for example, William Mott describes how US preferences for 
securing its interests throughout the Cold War emphasized arms sales, military training, 
and military guarantees at varying times and in varying regions.194 Similarly, patrons 
often “develop strategies of force projection and crisis response” outside of “purely 
military solutions” such as troop deployments to minimize risks of escalation.195  
A. Foreign Patronage 
While military patronage is difficult to measure, it is possible to identify policy 
practices that are highly likely to be correlated with or indicate control or influence over 
military policy. Therefore, I collected original data that measure the tools foreign powers 
may use to influence military design in new states, which became my variables 
                                                        
194 William H. Mott, IV, United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2002); William H. Mott, IV, Military Assistance: An Operational 
Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999). 
195 William H. Mott, IV, Soviet Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2001).   
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measuring the presence and nature of military patronage.196 As described in Chapter 2, a 
defining feature of patron-client relationships is the provision of goods—in particular, 
security assistance—to the client state. Thus, a measure of patronage should capture 
whether a strong state provides certain goods to a client that can improve the client’s 
security situation. Patrons use a variety of methods to influence defense and military 
policy in client states. I identified the presence of military advisory missions, seconded or 
contract officers, and troop deployments as the three factors that suggest a foreign power 
is influencing a new state’s military. Below, I explain why I chose each of these factors. I 
coded each of these factors based on publicly available government assessments, official 
background documents, and historical accounts focusing on new states’ independence 
and the history of their armed forces.  
The first method of military control I looked for, and arguably the most obvious 
or effective method, is the presence of troop deployments. This can have a particularly 
powerful influence through the implicit or explicit threat of withdrawal or aggression, 
because external forces are often helpful for helping regimes stay in power in the face of 
internal or external threats. Consequently, overseas troop deployments are frequently 
used as an indicator of hierarchical, patron-client relations.197 David Lake, for example, 
uses deployments as an indicator of hierarchy, arguing that American troop deployments 
in South Korea, West Germany, and Japan in the early years of the Cold War gave the 
                                                        
196 See Appendix A for a list of sources used to code the foreign patronage variables. 
197 Lake, Hierarchy; Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military 
Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972–2000, International Studies Quarterly 50 
(2006): 509–537; See also Idean Salehyan, “No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International 
Conflict,” The Journal of International Politics 70 (2008): 54–66 for a discussion of troop 
deployments in civil wars. 
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United States some control over those countries’ security policies.198  
These troops can affect an array of policies in both combat and noncombat 
situations, including economic development, human rights, and foreign policy.199 While 
troop deployments are important tools for influencing policy, it would be insufficient to 
rely solely on this as an indicator. Not only would this limit military influence to those 
great powers with sufficiently global force projection capabilities, but it is also the case 
that patrons may view troop deployment as overkill: sufficient influence might be 
achieved with tools that are cheaper and less likely to risk unnecessary escalation.    
Therefore, I also looked for additional indicators of foreign military influence. 
The second indicator that the existing literature identifies is the presence of foreign 
military training missions. These missions allow great powers to reach a large proportion 
of the target country’s troops—as opposed to military exchange or education programs 
that provide for smaller numbers of officers to travel to a patron state for training—and 
thus have a greater influence on whether states successfully adopt new military 
doctrines.200 While often difficult to identify and highly secretive by nature, there is a 
nascent literature exploring the role of American military education and advisory 
                                                        
198 Lake, Hierarchy, 68.  
199 Sam R. Bell, K. Chad Clay, and Carla Martinez Machain, “The Effect of US Troop 
Deployments on Human Rights, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2016); Carla Martinez Machain 
and T. Clifton Morgan, “The Effect of US Troop Deployment on Host States’ Foreign Policy, 
Armed Forces and Society 39 (2013): 101–123; Tim Kane, “Development and US Troop 
Deployments,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (2012): 255–273.   
200 Grauer, “Moderating Diffusion.” See also Farrell on the role of military-to-military ties in 
military emulation and diffusion. Theo Farrell, “World Culture and the Irish Army, 1922-1942,” 
In The Sources of Military Change, edited by Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002): 69–90. Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Armies of 
Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries,” Middle 
East Journal 55 (2001): 549–578; Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications.” 
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programs on politics in other beneficiary states.201 Much of this emphasizes the most 
public of these programs, the American International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) program. However, IMET brings foreign military officers to the United States for 
training—and thus would not be expansive enough based on my coding rules, following 
Ryan Grauer’s definition of a foreign military mission, in which a state sends: 
“a group of officers to serve as trainers, instructors, and advisors….well 
versed in the military state of the art, [and] are then afforded varying levels 
of power and influence in the contracting state’s armed forces. Often, 
members of the mission are assigned to faculty and administrative posts in 
military educational institutions. Others advise field- and high-level 
commanders. Still others may act as consultants to the political elite and 
suggest national-level reforms that might bolster the state’s military 
capability.”202 
Modern examples are common in post-conflict construction and security sector reform, 
include the United Kingdom-led IMATT effort in Sierra Leone. Similarly, military 
missions like that under British Major General Stephen Butler following Ethiopia’s 
independence in 1941 demonstrated an important commitment from the United Kingdom 
by providing finance, training, and equipment for the Ethiopian army and placing British 
                                                        
201 Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley, “Human Capital Against the Capitol: Foreign 
Aid in the Form of Training and Military-Backed Coups” (2016). Available at 
http://www.jonathancaverley.com/uploads/2/9/7/2/29726853/caverleysavagecoups.pdf; Tomislav 
Z. Ruby and Douglas Gibler, “US Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad,” 
European Journal of International Relations 16 (2010) 339–364; Stephen Biddle, Julia 
Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The military effect of security force 
assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2017).  
202 Grauer, “Moderating Diffusion,” 277 
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officers in all battalions.203  
 I also code influence along this dimension as a 1 if a private military corporation 
(PMC) based in another country plays a significant role in the new state’s security sector 
reform. This makes sense given the importance of emulation as a potential avenue of 
indirect influence for my argument. Members of a PMC are often veterans of the country 
in which the company is based. Therefore they are likely to have internalized many of the 
same military practices as would trainers who are still active in a patron country’s 
military. The only case where this coding decision changes the outcome of the variable is 
Liberia’s post-conflict security sector reform project in 2003, in which the predominantly 
U.S.-veteran manned DynCorp mission provided both trainers and the American 
contingent of peacekeepers—though the United States had a role in determining the 
vetting process for recruits.204 The influence of the PMC in this case is comparable to that 
of the ex-British soldiers and officers who took on contracts as private individuals in 
Jordan’s army in the 1940s and 1950s, whose relationship to British policy preferences 
can only be described as independent in the most technical sense of the word.205  
 Another case in which PMCs mattered was during the security sector reform 
                                                        
203 Fantahun Ayele, The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977–1991 (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2014).  
204 International Crisis Group, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform. Africa Report 
No.148 (January 13, 2009); Sean McFate, Building Better Armies: An Insider’s Account of 
Liberia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Study Institute and US Army War College Press, 2013), 
43–45; Adedeji Ebo, “Local Ownership and Emerging Trends in SSR: A Case Study of 
Outsourcing in Liberia, in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, edited by Timothy 
Donais, 149 –168 (Geneva: DCAF 2008), 155. While it is possible that there are other cases in 
which foreign influence primarily be exerted through private individuals due to the lack of 
transparency that characterizes many countries’ relationships with PMCs, Liberia in 2003 is the 
only case in which it was clear that a primary patron relied almost exclusively on PMCs. See 
Singer, Corporate Warriors.  
205 See Chapter 4.  
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process that followed the Bicesse Accords in Angola. Executive Outcomes provided 
advising and training for the newly united Angolan Armed Forces beginning in early 
1993.206 However, because veterans came from multiple countries—South Africa, 
Namibia, and Angola—the influence from Executive Outcomes does not clearly reflect 
the experience of a single country’s military tradition, and so it was coded as having no 
patron. 
Third, numerous case studies demonstrate that the presence of seconded or 
independently contracted officers can also permit foreign powers extensive influence, 
since they may have formal or informal loyalties to their home state. Such forms of 
control are often part and parcel of larger military advisory missions, as in the above 
example of the British mission to Ethiopia. In these cases, it may be difficult to 
distinguish between whether foreign officers are acting in an advisory or leadership role. 
For example, after Chad’s independence, hundreds of French troops stayed in the country 
as advisors, but many also served as commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the 
small Chadian armed forces.207 Military missions can also be so large and so important to 
the client state that their leader effectively—or occasionally, even de jure—assumes 
command of all the new state’s armed forces. Conversely, a single military figure 
contracted to lead the development of a new state’s army may be all that is necessary to 
establish effective control. Some combination of these different methods of assigning 
foreigners to combat leadership roles—as opposed to merely a training capacity—has 
                                                        
206 Stephen L. Weigert, Angola: A Modern Military History, 1961–2002 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2011), 114. 
207 A.F. Mullins, Born Arming: Development and Militry Power in New States (Stanford 
University Press, 1987); David Wood, Armed Forces of African States (London: Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1966). 
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been used frequently in post-colonial settings to continue patterns of dominance.208 Allan 
Millett, for example, lists the following foreign figures who led military reform efforts, 
many of which are included in my dataset’s scope conditions: 
“William Carr Beresford in Portugal, Charles George Gordon in China, Ivor 
Herbert in Canada, H.H. Kitchner in Egypt, Orde Wingate in Jewish 
Palestine, John Bagot Glubb in Jordan, Joseph-Simon Gallieni in Indochina, 
Huburt Louis Lyautey in Morocco, Colmar von der Goltz and Liman von 
Sanders in Turkey, Emil Körner in Chile, Hans Kundt in Bolivia, and Max 
Bauer and Hans von Seeckt in China….Charles P. Stone in Egypt, William 
McEntyre in the Kingdom of Choson (Korea), Herbert J. Slocum in Cuba, 
Charles Young in Liberia, Smedley D. Butler in Haiti, Henry T. Allen and 
Edward G. Lansdale in the Philippines, and Joseph W. Stilwell in China.”209 
Whether through taking command positions in combat units or developing militaries 
from scratch, the presence of foreigners in new states’ militaries is an important indicator 
of outside control. Often it is difficult from historical records, especially of smaller states, 
to establish the activities with which military figures were primarily tasked. In either 
case, though, these advisors and officers likely brought their own biases, preferences, and 
organizational practices with them to their new roles and the institutions to which they 
were assigned, as happened with John Bagot Glubb in Jordan (see Chapter 4).  
As described above, no single measure can adequately capture a foreign power’s 
intervention in domestic policy in all cases. Therefore, I coded foreign influence as a 1 
                                                        
208 Wood, Armed Forces of African States. 
209 Allan R. Millett, “Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945–
1950,” Armed Forces and Society 23 (1997), 503–504. 
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wherever one of these factors was present, and zero otherwise.210 Data on these measures 
of foreign influence in the first few years after independence was available in 205 
observations, with some form of foreign influence present in 65 percent of all cases (146 
out of 224 total cases). Of these, 115 new states had either foreign trainers or seconded 
officers—only nine cases had seconded officers but no trainers. 87 new states were 
created with foreign troops on their soil, and in 34 of these cases no foreign military 
advisory or training mission accompanied those troops. The constituent elements of the 
foreign influence variable and the frequency of their use over the period analyzed by this 
dissertation can be seen in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
Table 3.4: Percent of New States Experiencing Different Types of Foreign Influence 
(number in parentheses) 
 Foreign Trainers Seconded Officers 
Deployed 
Troops 
Any Foreign 
Influence 
Pre-Cold War 39.4% (13) 9.1% (3) 39.4% (13) 63.6% (21) 
Cold War  59.7% (71) 32.4% (36) 33.6% (40) 65.9% (89) 
Post-Cold War 41.5% (22) 15.1% (8) 64.2% (34) 64.3% (36) 
Total 47.3% (106) 21.0% (47) 38.8% (87) 65.2% (146) 
 
The next step to creating the independent variable was identifying the patron 
country for each instance of foreign influence and whether that country used volunteers 
or conscripts at the time of the new state’s independence. Thus, new states influenced by 
the United Kingdom were coded as having been influenced by a conscript state during the 
period of the United Kingdom’s National Service, from 1939–1957, as were states 
                                                        
210 Results are similar when this variable uses only at troop deployments or only foreign 
trainers/seconded officers together. In models without the interaction terms, the foreign influence 
variables are not statistically significant at the .05 level, though the substantive effect is still in the 
predicted direction. Interestingly, volunteer influence is closer to statistical significance in some 
specifications.   
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influenced by the United States when it used conscription.211 In most cases identifying 
the primary military influence on a new state was straightforward: one country was the 
sole or clearly lead influence on all dimensions of foreign influence. However, coding 
was more complex when there was more than one patron country exerting military 
influence. Such efforts by multiple patrons were noticeable in 14 cases. For these cases, I 
was guided in my coding by the logic used in datasets that code colonial influence: I 
looked for evidence of which potential patron had the largest and most influential effect 
on military design.212  
Table 3.5: Number and Type of Foreign Influence Strategies Across States 
   Only One Type 
Only One Type Only Trainers 37 (17%)  
74 (33%) Only Officers 6 (3%) 
Only Troops 31 (14%) 
   Only Two Types 
Two Types Trainers and Officers 16 (7%)  
50 (22%) Trainers and Troops 31 (14%) 
Officers and Troops 3 (1%) 
   All Three Types 
All Three Types Trainers, Officers, and 
Troops 
22 (10%) 22 (10%) 
    
Any Influence   146 (65%) 
 
For example, Uganda was influenced by both Israel and the United Kingdom at 
the time of its 1962 independence. Deciding which of these potential patrons had the 
greatest effect on Ugandan military design is particularly important because their 
                                                        
211 The UK continued to conscript in small numbers through 1960, though the number sharply 
dropped off after the 1957 formal decision to end conscription. It makes most sense to code 
preferences as changing when formal decisions made, although policy implementation often lags 
by several years. In this case, it only affects the coding of Ghana (1957), Malaysia (1957), and 
Nigeria (1960). For more on UK National Service, see Richard Vinen, National Service: A 
Generation in Uniform, 1945–1963 (United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 2015). 
212 See for example, Paul Hensel, 2014, “ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0” 
codebook.  
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organizational preferences were opposite: while Israelis used conscripts, the United 
Kingdom had decided to return to its traditional system of volunteers several years 
earlier. Available sources show that the post-independence army was still largely under 
British command—including the position of army commander—during a period in which 
there were only two native lieutenants. Meanwhile, Israeli influence was secondary—
while Israel seconded fifty instructors to Uganda, they appear to have focused on pilots, 
artillery, and paratroopers, rather than the main forces. Thus, I coded Uganda as 
experiencing influence primarily from a volunteer-recruiting patron—the United 
Kingdom—at independence.  
Conversely, Lithuania had a strong Russian influence in the first two years after 
its independence in 1991, but by August 1993 Russian troops had withdrawn and 
Lithuania had replaced them with more NATO contacts, including a small American 
military advisory team. In this case, the early Russian influence seemed most formative. 
Training courses continued to be taught primarily by former Soviet officers, and many 
former Soviet officers joined Lithuania’s armed forces. The small size of the American 
mission (four members) seemed intended to reinforce a local preference for the existing 
conscript-influence on Lithuanian military design, as it consisted of selective service 
specialists. Thus, I coded Lithuania’s 1991 experience of state creation as occurring 
under influence of a patron using conscription.213  
Similarly, I coded cases in which the only foreign influence on any of the three 
constituent influence measures was from an international organization like the UN or 
NATO as having no foreign influence, because it is unlikely that such diverse 
                                                        
213 Non-interactive hypothesis results are robust to coding Lithuania as volunteer, while the 
conscript influence and threat interaction is significant at a 0.1 level. 
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multinational actors would be able to exert unified pressures on military design. As 
Michel Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis write, “multilateral peacebuilding, because of its 
impartial character will not be the choice that states that seek unilateral advantages will 
choose. It is not the favored means to impose neo-imperial clients, acquire military bases 
or garner economic concessions.”214 The competing interests within multilateral missions 
makes it more difficult for the client state to emulate a single set of practices.   
For example, the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi after the settlement of its 
civil war in 2003 was tasked with creating an integrated national defense force. Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, and South Africa were all key contributing nations, and it is not 
immediately clear that the experience of one country would dominate military reform. In 
many such missions, the contributors also frequently change, further complicating the 
identification of a primary influencer. The 1992 UNPROFOR deployment in Macedonia, 
for example, was first supplied by a dispatch of 500 Canadians—a volunteer country—in 
January 1993. They were withdrawn in February to be replaced by a 700-strong Nordic 
battalion, which was in turn supplemented by several hundred American infantrymen in 
July.215 One case I examine in detail, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is coded as having no 
foreign military influence at independence, despite extensive international involvement in 
statebuilding there. This is an issue I address further in Chapter 6. However, the diverse 
interests of actors that were involved as a result of the international nature of military 
patronage in this case reflects my broader logic for not coding international organizations 
as having a clear influence on recruitment practices. In total, there were only 15 cases in 
                                                        
214 Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations 
Peace Operations (Princeton University Press, 2006): 2. 
215 United Nations Department of Public Information, “United Nations Protection Force,” 
September 1996. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_b.htm. 
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which a multinational institution was the primary influencer on one of the dimensions of 
foreign influence. However, as can be seen in Appendix B, tests using alternative codings 
for cases of multinational institution influence do not change the results. 
The coding process above resulted in a trichotomous, categorical independent 
variable that coded separate categories if a new state had a primary patron that used 
volunteers, if it used conscripts, and if there was no military patron or no clear influence. 
This captures the fact that volunteer influence is expected to decrease the likelihood of 
conscription (and increase the likelihood of using volunteers) to the same extent as 
conscript influence is likely to increase the probability that a new state will use 
conscripts. The absence of foreign influence serves as a reference category for which 
there is no expected effect on a new state’s military recruitment practices. However, to 
aid with the interpretation of interactive hypotheses I transformed this variable into two 
dichotomous variables, coded 1 in the presence of volunteer influence or conscript 
influence, respectively.  
Of the 205 cases for which I was able to gather data on foreign military 
influences, roughly 20 percent have volunteer influence, 36 percent have no influence, 
and 44 percent have conscript influence, for a total of 131 foreign-influenced new states. 
This variation is nearly identical if post-civil war state creation is dropped from the 
sample, with a breakdown of 20 percent volunteer, 31 percent no influence, and 49 
percent conscript influence. The four most common influencers constituting the patron 
state in 85 percent of states experiencing foreign influence: the United Kingdom (34), 
Russia (28), the United States (27) and France (22). 
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B. Threat Variables 
 According to my theory, another key variable is the extent to which policymakers 
in the new state perceive major external threats. Threat perception is inherently 
subjective. Leaders prioritize threats differently depending on their ideology and 
cognitive biases, so that something that is perceived as highly threatening to the leaders 
of one state may be benign to others. Fortunately, my theory expects only certain types of 
threats to have a clear effect on conscription. It is only necessary to distinguish major, 
external, land-based threats from other types of threat, since these are the only types of 
threat that should create clear and overriding incentives to conscript their military 
personnel. Furthermore, there are many existing variables that political scientists use to 
identify such major threats for cross-national analysis. I employ several of these variables 
to proxy for potentially-existential threats that are likely to create pressures toward 
conscription. 
First, one way to directly measure a new state’s threat perceptions is its number of 
contiguous land borders. This measure captures a broader, more accurate 
conceptualization of external threats compared to the actual existence of conflict at 
independence. However, it has also repeatedly been linked to interstate conflict, and so 
also constitutes an appropriate proxy variable.216 This variable represents a similar 
argument to Eliot Cohen’s speculation that land border length is “perhaps the best (if 
crudest) predictor” of whether [states] will use conscription.”217 In other words, the more 
                                                        
216 For a summary, see: Douglas Gibler, The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development, and 
International Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 1-12. The variable I 
use is coded from the COW Contiguity dataset, taking integer values ranging from 0–14. 
Correlates of War Project. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.2.   
217 Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, 25 
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land neighbors a state has, the more likely it is to have territorial disputes that can 
escalate or enemies that may threaten it.   
Another way to measure threat is the number of militarized interstate disputes it is 
involved in at the time of its independence. MIDs data codes any instance in which states 
threaten or use military force against each other. Because MIDs include shows of force 
that fall short of war, it provides a more complete conceptualization of threat 
environments than a variable that only counts major open war—a relatively rare 
occurrence. In addition, MIDs data includes descriptions of the severity of individual 
disputes, ranging from “no militarized action” to “war.” This allows for the coding of 
alternative measures of threat environments that only count disputes that are the most 
likely to require the type of major military preparations provided by conscription.  
I created a threat measure that is coded 1 if the state was involved in any MIDs in 
the first two years after a state’s independence—to match the threshold I used for 
identifying finalized recruitment policies—and zero otherwise.218 The inclusion of MIDs 
after the year of independence means my threat variables may include disputes that occur 
after some states made their initial military decisions. However, post-independence MIDs 
should still lead to accurate threat codings. Militarized interstate disputes do not arise 
from nowhere, and so will generally be the culmination of prior conflictual and 
threatening relationships. However, the longer the post-independence time period for 
which my threat variables count MIDs, the more likely it is that the variables will include 
disputes that are unforeseeable at the time of independence and military design. While I 
also examine alternative codings that allow for longer time-horizons, I assume that new 
                                                        
218 Results are robust to using alternative MIDs time periods (see the Appendix). 
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states will be most concerned with—and better able to predict—threats the closer they are 
to the year of independence.  
C. Alternative Hypotheses 
 The main hypothesis competing with my theory is that domestic politics, through 
local culture, ideology or previous experiences, has the biggest effect on recruitment 
practices. In other words, critics would contend that foreign influence after independence 
should have no effect on recruitment after controlling for historical experiences favoring 
or disfavoring conscription. Rather than contemporary influence from foreign patrons 
affecting military recruitment, events from before independence matter most. I control for 
these arguments in two ways. First, following previous studies of conscription I include 
dichotomous variables of a new state’s colonial legacy based on Paul Hensel’s Colonial 
History dataset.219 This approach uses dummy variables to identify whether a state’s 
primary colonial/pre-independence power was either the United Kingdom, France, 
Russia, or Turkey/the Ottoman Empire.220  
While including these dummy variables allows me to test the effects of specific 
colonizers, I also created and tested models using a separate dichotomous colonial history 
variable. This second approach measures whether a new state’s most important prior 
colonial power traditionally used volunteers, with a coding of one indicating that it did 
and zero indicating that it did not have this colonial legacy. In practice, this captures 
whether the state was colonized by the UK (the Pearson R coefficient for the correlation 
                                                        
219 See Douglas Lemke and Jeff Carter, “Birth Legacies, State Making, and War,” Journal of 
Politics 78 (2016), 497–511; Hensel, “ICOW Colonial History Dataset.” 
220 Hensel defines a state’s primary colonial ruler as “the colonial or imperial power that as most 
responsible for shaping the development of the entity (or entities) that became this modern state. 
This is typically the state that ruled over the majority of this territory…or the state that ruled over 
this territory for the longest time.” Hensel, “ICOW Colonial History Dataset Codebook,” 2. 
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between conscript tradition and UK colonization is -0.87). Specific colonizer dummies 
are advantageous because they directly capture some of the existing hypotheses about the 
relationship between specific colonizers and conscription. However, using all of these 
dummies also substantially reduces my degrees of freedom, which should be avoided due 
to my small sample size. As a result, I adopt the dichotomous variable that measures 
whether there is a history of colonial volunteer recruitment in most models, though the 
results using specific country dummies can be seen in the robustness checks section.  
 
IV. Descriptive Statistics 
A broad overview of my dataset supports the patterns described by my theory. 
Overall, states that have no land borders—and thus are more secure against land 
invasions—are more likely to adopt a volunteer system. As Table 3.6 shows, 76 percent 
of states with no borders rely on volunteers, while only 43 percent of new states that have 
land borders do. Moreover, all seven states that are both unconstrained by foreign patrons 
and have no borders use volunteers.221 Table 3.7 shows that the percentage of patron-less 
states that use volunteers when they have borders remains roughly the same, at 46 
percent. This shows that when states face threats and have no patron, they are more likely 
to use conscription than to use volunteers, but not by much. New states facing threats also 
become much more likely to use conscription or volunteers if they are influenced by a 
conscript or volunteer patron, respectively.222 Among states with land borders that also 
have a volunteer patron, 75 percent use conscription. However, among states with land 
                                                        
221 These states are Dominican Republic (1924), Indonesia (1949), Cuba (1959), Trinidad and 
Tobago (1962), Mauritius (1968), Solomon Islands (1978), and St. Lucia (1979).  
222 See Appendix A for tables.  
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borders that have a conscript patron, 71 percent use conscription. This suggests that the 
effect of threat environment is drowned out by the influence of patron states. This is 
consistent with my argument that in cases with an external patron, new states should 
adopt the patron’s recruitment system, even when the threat is high. 
 Table 3.6: Frequency of Recruitment System by Threat Environment 
 No Land 
Borders 
Any Land 
Borders 
No MIDs Any MIDs 
Volunteer 76% (26) 43% (74) 52% (64) 44% (36) 
Conscript 24% (8) 57% (97) 48% (59) 56% (46) 
Total 100% (34) 100% (171) 100% (123) 100% (82) 
 
Table 3.7: Patron Influence in States with Borders/MIDs 
 No Influence Volunteer Influence Conscript Influence 
 Borders MIDs Borders MIDs Borders MIDs 
Volunteer 46% (30) 40% (12) 75% (18) 73% (8) 29% (23) 36% (14) 
Conscript 54% (35) 60% (18) 25% (6) 27% (3) 71% (56) 64% (25) 
Total 100%  100% 100%  100% 100%  100% 
 
The data looks similar when we used MIDs as a measure of threat. States without 
a patron and that also experience any MIDs are more likely to use conscripts than 
volunteers, by 60 to 40 percent. The proportion of states adopting conscription is similar 
when states face external threats and have patron that uses conscription (64 percent). 
Unsurprisingly, and consistent with Hypothesis 2, volunteer patrons again manage to 
drown out the effects of threat, with 73 percent of states with volunteer patrons and 
facing high threats using volunteer recruitment.   
Out of 61 new states that were colonized by a state that has a history of using 
volunteers, 80 percent use volunteers—roughly the same as the 82 percent of the 38 new 
states that experience post-independence volunteer influence that choose to use 
volunteers. Similarly, nearly 69 percent of 89 new states influenced by conscript patrons 
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design conscript militaries, compared to 66 percent of those that have been influenced by 
a conscript colonizer in the past. This demonstrates that influence by patron states after 
independence is at least as plausible a predictor of recruitment policies as historical 
practices.  
Furthermore, patrons are often different from colonizers. States with foreign 
patrons that were colonized by the United Kingdom had a different foreign patron in 13 
out of 41 cases, while French colonizers had a different foreign patron in 11 out of 29 
cases. Former Russian colonies with patrons were patronized by Russia in all but one 
case, but Turkish colonies always had a different patron. This is further evidence of the 
need to analyze patrons separately from colonizers. 
 The distribution of patron influences over different threat level in the new state is 
also notable (see Appendix B). In particular, patrons that use volunteers appear less likely 
to get involved in military design in states that experience high levels of threat. Only 28 
percent of states with volunteer patrons experience any MIDs, while roughly 40 percent 
of states with either a conscript patron or no patron experience at least one MID.223 This 
amounts to only 11 states in the sample that experience MIDs and have a volunteer 
patron, compared to 70 other states that face high threat levels. This should not 
necessarily be surprising. A reasonable explanation is that volunteer patrons are less 
likely to devote resources to states experiencing higher levels of major conflict, because 
they realize it increases the chance that their own forces will get dragged into it. In fact, 
this is consistent with my theory: volunteer states recognize both that volunteer 
                                                        
223 However, the p-value for the associated difference in means test is 0.11, suggesting that the 
null hypothesis that the two mean threat values are not statistically different cannot be rejected at 
conventional levels. The difference between the mean value of threat based on whether a state has 
any borders for volunteer and non-volunteer patrons is statistically significant at a 0.0003 level.  
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recruitment is less-suited to high risk environments and that it is difficult to change 
recruitment systems, and thus they try to avoid scenarios that might require conscription. 
Conversely, it is possible that high levels of patronage deter threats from arising in the 
first place.   
Overall, patron states are more likely to influence states that have a low threat 
environment, with nearly two-third of states with patrons experiencing no MIDs. 
Additional summary statistics for the dataset can be seen in Table 3.8. Just over a third of 
the observations (36 percent, n=74) have no foreign patron, while 19 percent have a 
volunteer patron (n=39) and 45 percent (n=91) have a conscript patron. However, 33 
percent (n=74) have a history of colonization by a state that used volunteers, while 65 
percent (n=141) have a history of colonization by a state that used conscription—nine 
states have no colonial legacy. Nearly 40 percent of observations exhibit a high threat 
environment as measured by MIDs, and nearly 80 percent have at least one contiguous 
land border.  
Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Years 
Available 
Conscription 205 0.51 0.50 0 1 1918–2008 
Land Borders 223 2.80 2.26 0 14 1918–2008  
MIDs 224 0.83 1.44 0 7 1918–2008 
Hostile MIDs 224 0.55 1.07 0 5 1918–2008 
Volunteer Legacy 224 0.33 0.47 0 1 1918–2008 
Volunteer 
Influence 
204 0.19 0.39 0 1 1918–2008 
Conscript Influence 204 0.45 0.50 0 1 1918–2008 
 
No variables are highly correlated with each other, with the highest Pearson’s R 
correlation statistic (Table 3.9) for any two variables that would be included in the same 
model being -0.46, for the relationship between having an historical legacy of volunteer 
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usage and being influenced by a state that uses volunteers after independence. This is 
particularly important for my ability to distinguish between the colonial legacy and 
patronage arguments.  
Table 3.9: Pearson's R Correlation Matrix 
Variables Conscription Land Borders MIDs 
Hostile 
MIDs 
Volunteer 
Legacy 
Volunteer 
Influence 
Conscript 
Influence 
Conscription 1.00       
Land 
Borders 0.3163 1.00      
MIDs 0.0990 0.3698 1.00     
Hostile 
MIDs 0.1535 0.3030 0.8861 1.00    
Volunteer 
Legacy -0.4176 -0.2830 -0.1448 -0.1205 1.00   
Volunteer 
Influence -0.3241 -0.2045 -0.0660 -0.0683 -0.4609 1.00  
Conscript 
Influence 0.3021 0.0884 -0.0699 -0.0152 0.3267 -0.4370 1.00 
 
V. Model Testing  
 Having found support for my theory in the raw data, I turn to regression analysis. 
In my main models, I use logistic regression because the dependent variable is binary. I 
also use clustered standard errors to address the possibility that observations of the same 
country at different times are correlated with each other. Additional models using OLS 
regression are available in Appendix B, though results are the same. 
A. Base Models 
I begin by testing models designed to reveal the impact of foreign influence and 
threat on military recruitment choice, controlling for recruitment legacy. All models test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 by including two dichotomous variables measuring the type of 
foreign patron influence in a new state during the period of military design. The included 
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variables measure the presence of a volunteer patron and of a conscript patron, so that 
having no patron is the excluded reference category. I would expect the volunteer 
influence variable to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable: new states 
influenced by volunteer-recruiting patrons should emulate their patron and therefore be 
more likely to have a volunteer army, and vice versa. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested in 
models that include interaction terms (see Table 3.12).  
Table 3.10: The Effect of Patrons on the Probability of Conscription224 
Variables 
Model 1: 
Without 
Threat 
Model 2: 
Borders 
Dummy 
Model 3: 
MIDs 
Dummy 
Model 4: 
Forceful 
MIDs 
Dummy 
Model 5: 
Borders 
Count 
Model 6: 
MIDs 
Count 
Model 7: 
Forceful 
MIDs 
Count 
Patron 
Influence 
0.726*** 
(0.246) 
0.704*** 
(0.259) 
0.726*** 
(0.247) 
0.723*** 
(0.248) 
0.745*** 
(0.266) 
0.753*** 
(0.251) 
0.757*** 
(0.255) 
Volunteer  
Legacy 
-1.602*** 
(0.451) 
-1.480*** 
(0.464) 
-1.588*** 
(0.462) 
-1.593*** 
(0.454) 
-1.391*** 
(0.481) 
-1.552*** 
(0.461) 
-1.548*** 
(0.451) 
Any Land 
Borders 
 1.335** 
(0.533) 
     
Any MIDs   0.0855 (0.344) 
    
Any 
Forceful 
MIDs 
    
0.125 
(0.363) 
   
Total Land 
Borders 
    0.253*** 
(0.0827) 
  
Total MIDs      0.101 (0.105) 
 
Total 
Forceful 
MIDs 
      0.274* 
(0.148) 
        
Constant 0.316 -0.875* 0.277 0.273 -0.526 0.199 0.127 (0.237) (0.527) (0.272) (0.264) (0.352) (0.269) (0.263) 
Observations        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The first set of models test my non-interactive hypotheses, H1 and H2 (see Table 
3.10). The first way I do this is measures patron influence using a trichotomous variable 
                                                        
224 Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient in each regression table. 
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that takes the value of 1 if a state has a conscript patron, 0 if a state has no patron, and -1 
if a state has a volunteer patron. This captures the fact that the effect of having a patron 
who uses conscription is predicted to be symmetrical and in the opposite direction 
compared to the effect of having a patron who uses volunteers. Thus this variable should 
be positively associated with the probability that a state uses conscription. In Model 1, I 
regress conscription on only my patron influence variables and an indicator that captures 
the primary alternative hypothesis, a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
state’s primary colonizer has a history of using volunteers and zero otherwise.  
In Models 2 through 7, I include controls capturing different conceptualizations of 
the international threat environment. Models 2–7 offer further tests for Hypotheses 1 and 
2 by including another potentially important variable that is omitted from the previous 
model: threat environment. Models 2–4 assume that threat environment is dichotomous. 
A state may either perceive that its primary threat is a major territorial invasion, or it does 
not. Thus the first of these models is a general measure of threat based on whether a state 
has any land borders, while Models 3 and 4 measure threat using the presence of any 
MIDs and any high hostility MIDs, respectively. Models 5–7 measure threat as a 
continuum. This is consistent with the way states balance the various threats they often 
face at the same time: the greater the likelihood of a major territorial threat, the more 
likely that this will dominate the state’s military design process. Therefore, these three 
models use continuous measures of the threat variables from Models 2–4. In Model 5, 
more land borders equates to more potential adversaries and therefore to a greater 
likelihood of perceiving a high threat environment, while more MIDs and more hostile 
MIDs should similarly make states more wary of potential threats in Models 6 and 7, 
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respectively. In all models the variable for patron influence is statistically significant at a 
p=0.01 level, providing strong support in favor of hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Table 3.11: The Effect of Patrons on the Probability of Conscription 
Variables 
Model 8: 
Without 
Threat 
Model 9: 
Borders 
Dummy 
Model 
10: 
MIDs 
Dummy 
Model 
11: 
Forceful 
MIDs 
Dummy 
Model 
12: 
Borders 
Count 
Model 
13: 
MIDs 
Count 
Model 
14: 
Forceful 
MIDs 
Count 
Volunteer 
Influence 
-0.823* -0.640 -0.820* -0.817* -0.772 -0.817* -0.819* 
(0.441) (0.461) (0.443) (0.446) (0.486) (0.452) (0.472) 
Conscript 
Influence 
0.674* 0.738** 0.674* 0.672* 0.731** 0.719** 0.723** 
(0.360) (0.361) (0.359) (0.360) (0.362) (0.365) (0.363) 
Volunteer 
Legacy 
-1.589*** -1.487*** -1.576*** -1.581*** -1.388*** -1.545*** -1.540*** 
(0.453) (0.465) (0.464) (0.456) (0.484) (0.462) (0.455) 
Any Land 
Borders 
 1.343**      
 (0.532)      
Any MIDs   0.0844       (0.344)     
Any 
Forceful 
MIDs 
   0.123    
   (0.362)    
Total Land 
Borders 
    0.253***   
    (0.0832)   
Total MIDs      0.0996       (0.106)  
Total 
Forceful 
MIDs 
      0.274* 
      (0.148) 
        
Constant 0.350 -0.904 0.311 0.307 -0.516 0.222 0.149 (0.283) (0.551) (0.316) (0.303) (0.395) (0.318) (0.302) 
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Models 8–14 repeat the analysis in Models 1–7 but splitting the patron influence 
variable into its constituent parts, creating dummy variables for whether a state had a 
conscript patron and whether a state had a volunteer patron. This allows me to better 
examine whether the emulation effect is stronger for some type of patrons than for others. 
The results, which can be seen in Table 3.11, show that the conscript and volunteer 
influence variables are statistically significant at a 0.10 level. Both variables have 
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substantive effects in the predicted directions, with conscript influence having a beta 
coefficient of 0.67 and volunteer influence having a beta coefficient of -0.82 in Model 8, 
which only includes a control variable for colonial legacy. This translates into odds ratios 
that predict that states with a conscript patron are almost twice as likely as states without 
a conscript patron to use conscription.  Similarly, states with volunteer patrons are 0.44 
times less likely to use conscription, though the effect is not significant at conventional 
levels. The results are shown in Figure 3.1, below, with 95 percent confidence intervals. 
Figure 3.1: The Effect of Patron Influence on Recruitment 
 
While volunteer influence is statistically significant at a 0.10 level in all but two 
of the models that include threat models, conscript influence remains statistically 
significant at a 0.05 level in Model 2 and all models where threat is measured as a 
continuum. It is significant at a 0.10 level in the other models. Furthermore, no form of 
MIDs threat measurement is statistically significantly associated with military 
recruitment at the conventional 0.05 level. Having any land borders, however, is 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of conscription at a .05 level. The number of 
forceful MIDs a state experiences is significant at a 0.10 level. Furthermore, the results 
show that the more land borders that a state has, the more likely it is to use conscription, 
with statistical significance at a 0.01 level. These somewhat conflicting results are likely 
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due to two things. First, states with no land borders are islands and so may have much 
less to fear in the way of territorial invasion than other states, regardless of the number of 
their MIDs. Second, consistent with the theory, the emulation effect of foreign patrons 
may be sufficiently strong and common as to drown out the effect of MIDs. Therefore it 
is difficult to get a sense of the effect of threat unless we only look at those cases that do 
not have foreign patrons, as suggested by Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
These results suggest that conscript influencers have the predicted effects on 
military recruitment. There is some effect of volunteer influences, and though there is 
less confidence in what that effect is, signs point to it being in the predicted direction.225 
This absence of an effect of volunteer influencers is in contrast to existing arguments that 
emphasize the unique characteristics of the British volunteer recruitment culture, instead 
suggesting that conscript militaries drive the emulation effect. In addition, threat 
environments likely have some effect on military recruitment, and continuous measures 
of threat may have more explanatory power than dichotomous ones.  
However, in order to test the hypotheses about threat correctly, it is necessary to 
use interactive statistical models. Recall that threat is only expected to have an effect on 
recruitment practices in the absence of foreign patronage. Model 15 is the first of my 
interactive hypotheses. Each of the Models 15 through 20 regress the use of conscription 
on variables that interact threat environment with both conscript influence and volunteer 
influence from a patron (Table 3.12). This allows me to evaluate Hypotheses 3 and 4. To 
test Hypothesis 3, which says that threat does not matter when there is a patron, it is 
necessary to perform a two-tailed difference in means test. This evaluates the difference 
                                                        
225 Volunteer influencers is statistically significant at a 0.1 level in all the models except the one 
measuring threat as land borders when an alternative coding of recruitment legacy is used. 
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between the volunteer patron-threat and conscript patron-threat interaction terms by 
testing whether the coefficients for the two influence-threat interaction terms are jointly 
equivalent to zero. In other words, when this t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients for these two interaction terms are jointly equally to zero, there is support 
for the hypothesis that threat has no effect on conscription when there is a patron state. If 
there is support for Hypothesis 4, the coefficient for the threat variable will be 
statistically significant in models that include variables that interact threat and patron 
influence. In these models, the threat variable captures the effect of threat when there is 
no patron, while each of the interaction terms captures of the effect of threat when there 
is a patron. As in Tables 3.10 and 3.11, the first three of these models (15–17) measure 
threat dichotomously, as the presence of any borders, any MIDs, and any forceful MIDs, 
respectively.226 Models 18–20 employ continuous measures of these threat variables and 
their interactions.  
The threat variable is statistically significant at least at a 0.05 level in Models 15, 
18, 19, and 20. The only models in which threat is not statistically significant are those 
that include the presence of any MIDs or any forceful MIDs as threatening. However, it 
makes sense that the presence of any MIDs would not necessarily be statistically 
significant. The presence of a single MID does not necessarily reach a threat threshold 
large enough to affect the design of security institutions, since MIDs can include not only 
violent conflicts, but also disputes in which there was no militarized action, or in which 
there were only threats to use force. Indeed, the effect of threats seem to be strongest 
                                                        
226 Due to the perfect prediction of outcomes for several variables, the results from logistic 
analysis cannot be interpreted reliably in Model 8. OLS regression results for Model 8 are 
available in the Appendix and should be used instead. The results from linear regression models 
are still valid when the dependent variable is dichotomous. 
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when they are violent and cumulative. The continuous forceful MIDs variable is 
correlated with an increase in the probability of conscription at a 0.01 level. Each 
additional high-level MID that a state has is associated with a 1.9 increase in the 
probability of conscription, when there is no patron state. Substantive effects and odds 
ratios for Model 20 can be seen in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b, below. Thus, there is support 
for Hypothesis 4, that states without a patron are more likely to conscript when they face 
high threats compared to when they face low threats.  
Table 3.12 The Effect of Influence and Threat on the Probability of Conscription 
in New States 
Variables 
Model 15: 
Interaction 
with 
Borders 
Dummy 
Model 16: 
Interaction 
with MIDs 
Dummy 
Model 17: 
Interaction 
with 
Forceful 
MIDs 
Dummy 
Model 18: 
Interaction 
with 
Borders 
Count 
Model 19: 
Interaction 
with MIDs 
Count 
Model 20: 
Interaction 
with 
Forceful 
MIDs 
Count 
Any Land 
Borders 
15.56***      
(0.485)      
Any MIDs  0.574      (0.495)     
Any Forceful 
MIDs 
  0.773    
  (0.523)    
Total Land 
Borders 
   0.352***   
   (0.126)   
Total MIDs     0.300**      (0.147)  
Total Forceful 
MIDs 
     0.619*** 
     (0.217) 
Volunteer 
Influence 
13.60*** -0.725 -0.305 -0.0415 -0.316 -0.306 
(1.104) (0.586) (0.536) (0.754) (0.545) (0.564) 
Conscript 
Influence 
15.44*** 1.110** 0.990** 1.133 1.084** 1.009** 
(0.901) (0.479) (0.432) (0.700) (0.428) (0.408) 
Volunteer 
Influence*Threat 
-14.35*** -0.219 -1.938 -0.236 -0.497 -0.877 
(1.157) (1.110) (1.466) (0.178) (0.318) (0.672) 
Conscript 
Influence*Threat 
-14.89*** -0.987 -0.936 -0.130 -0.384* -0.523* 
(0.984) (0.657) (0.694) (0.200) (0.211) (0.293) 
Volunteer 
Legacy 
-1.52*** -1.533*** -1.629*** -1.453*** -1.592*** -1.583*** 
(0.470) (0.471) (0.491) (0.519) (0.494) (0.498) 
       
Constant -15.01*** 0.0930 0.100 -0.817* 0.0100 -0.0402 (0.441) (0.350) (0.325) (0.467) (0.331) (0.322) 
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.2a: Logit Coefficients for Model 20 
 
Figure 3.2b: Odds Ratios for Model 20 
 
There is also support for Hypothesis 3, which says that threat only has an effect 
when there is no patron. If threat only has an effect on recruitment when states have no 
patron and has no effect when there is a patron, then each of the interactions between 
threat and conscript influence and threat and volunteer influence should be equal to zero. 
As can be seen in Table 3.13, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that these variables are 
jointly equal to zero at a 0.05 level in Models 16–20. This means that the effect of threat 
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on military recruitment is greater for states without a patron than for states that have 
either volunteer or conscript patrons.227  
Table 3.13: Hypothesis Testing for Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis Tested 𝜒2 Statistic P-value 
Model 
15 
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*anyborders = 	𝛽 conscriptinfluence*anyborders=0 328.34 0.00 
Model 
16 
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*anymids = 	𝛽 conscriptinfluence*anymids=0 2.37 0.31 
Model 
17 
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*anyhostmids = 	𝛽 
conscriptinfluence*anyhostmids=0 
2.95 0.22 
Model 
18 
𝛽 volunteerinfluence* totalborders = 	𝛽 conscriptinfluence*totalborders=0 1.80 0.41 
Model 
19 
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*totalmids = 	𝛽 conscriptinfluence*totalmids=0 4.62 0.10 
Model 
20 
𝛽 volunteerinfluence*totalhostilemids = 	𝛽 conscriptinfluence* 
totalhostilemids =0 
3.93 0.14 
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 shows the substantive effects of threat—measured as both the 
number of land borders and the number of forceful MIDs—given no military patron. 
Among states with no patrons, the predicted probability of using conscription increases 
from 30 percent for those with no land borders, to 65 percent for those with five land 
borders, like the post-Soviet states Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, and 97 
percent for Russia, which has 14 land borders. Similarly, states with no forceful MIDs 
have less than a 45 percent chance of adopting conscription. States with one forceful 
MID, however, are more likely to conscript by 12 percentage points, while those with 
three have a 77 percent likelihood of adopting conscription. China, which is one of five 
                                                        
227 Splitting the sample into states that have patrons and those that do not provides similar results. 
As can be seen in Appendix A, none of interactions between threat and volunteer influence is 
statistically significant in any of the models that are limited to states that have patrons, while the 
two stronger indicators of threat are statistically significant at a 0.05 level in the models that are 
limited to those states without patrons. 
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states with the most forceful MIDs at 5, had only a 10 percent probability of adopting a 
volunteer military. 
Figure 2.3: Marginal Effects of Land Borders on Probability of Conscription 
 
Figure 3.3: Marginal Effects of Threat on Probability of Conscription 
 
B. Additional Control Variables 
 While any model must include some measure for each of the variables described 
above, existing literature on the determinants of recruitment practices is sufficiently 
scarce and inconclusive as to leave open for interpretation the necessary additional 
control variables. Below I discuss the available possibilities and reasons for the inclusion 
or exclusion of various control variables from my final models. Additional variables that 
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are said to affect military recruitment fall into two broad categories, depending on 
whether they describe political institutions or economic factors and resource availability.  
 First, many scholars have argued that there should be a relationship between 
democracy and military recruitment. However, the exact direction of this relationship, if 
any, is disputed. Conscription may reflect egalitarian notions of citizenship or it may 
conflict with liberal notions of individual rights—both of which are more likely to be 
associated with democratic regimes.228 While it is possible that democracies are more 
likely to use a particular recruitment system, the fact that they have successfully used 
both conscript and volunteer recruitment systems—in war and in peacetime—at various 
times over the last century should weaken the arguments that associate it with a particular 
system.229 Similarly, we may also expect authoritarian regimes to be more likely to 
suppress individual rights in a way that allows them to use conscription more easily, 
though they equally could be hesitant to arm the public.  
The most likely way political institutions can affect recruitment system is by 
giving voice or creating accountability to the public. The average citizen prefers to pay 
for a volunteer force over risking being conscripted.230 Thus, regimes that are more 
responsive to the population may be more likely to use volunteers. Yet, states often 
impose conscription on unwilling populations. For example, Margaret Levi argued that 
perceptions of unfairness led to noncompliance with wartime drafts, though the draft was 
still enforced in each of the five democracies she studied, even when it was perceived as 
                                                        
228 See Asal et al., “I Want You!” for a review of the literature. See also Pfaffenzaller, 
“Conscription and Democracy.” Asal et al find that democracy decreases the likelihood of 
conscription.  
229 Kier, Imagining War; Leander, “Drafting Community.” 
230 Caverley, Democratic Militarism, 32 
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extremely unfair.231  
Table 3.14: The Effect of Regime Type on Military Recruitment 
Variables 
Model 21: 
Democracy 
Dummy 
Control 
Model 22: 
Democracy 
Index Control 
Model 23: 
Excluded 
Ethnic 
Groups 
Control 
Model 24: 
Excluded 
Ethnic 
Population 
Control 
Total Land Border 0.392*** 0.393*** 0.394*** 0.336** (0.139) (0.141) (0.132) (0.151) 
Volunteer Influence 0.234 0.246 0.590 0.565 (0.855) (0.846) (0.836) (0.859) 
Conscript Influence 1.053 1.071 0.860 0.832 (0.761) (0.763) (0.757) (0.789) 
Volunteer Legacy -1.660*** -1.649*** -1.677*** -1.722*** (0.569) (0.567) (0.588) (0.598) 
Volunteer Influence*Borders -0.332* -0.333* -0.371* -0.343* (0.194) (0.193) (0.194) (0.204) 
Conscript Influence*Borders -0.0967 -0.0940 -0.0658 -0.0506 (0.222) (0.222) (0.215) (0.229) 
Democracy (dichotomous) 0.170    (0.405)    
Democracy (continuous)  0.0120    (0.0284)   
Total Excluded Ethnic 
Groups 
  -0.0447  
  (0.0370)  
Total Excluded Population    0.378    (1.218) 
     
Constant -0.878* -0.986 -0.726 -0.733 (0.506) (0.609) (0.506) (0.521) 
Observations 175 175 171 171 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I tested two version of variables that represent arguments that there should be a 
relationship between democracy or political accountability and conscription. First, I 
included a control variable from the Polity IV dataset to measure how democratic a new 
state is at independence. This variable was never statistically significant and did not 
change the results of the basic model, whether measured as a continuous variable or as a 
dichotomous variable with different cutoffs to define democracy. Second, I test the same 
                                                        
231 Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism. 
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models using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset’s measurements for the number 
of excluded groups and the size of the excluded population. Higher values on each value 
should indicate that a state’s government is less responsive to the preferences of the 
population. These variables may also proxy not for regime type but for perceived threat 
environment, with states being less willing to take the many risks associated with 
conscription if their hold on power requires excluding large portions of the population. 
Although the EPR dataset’s more limited timeframe—it begins in 1946—reduces my 
number of observations to 171, no specification of these domestic regime type variables 
is statistically significant at a p=0.10 level (see Table 3.14). 
Economic factors may also affect recruitment decisions. These theories emphasize 
supply-side constraints on or prerequisites for conscription. Rational, power-maximizing 
states should not want to implement a military personnel system unless they have the 
tools to implement it successfully. Conscription may require the state to have greater 
levels of centralization, better-developed bureaucracy, or greater domestic stability 
compared to volunteer systems.232 States with lower capacity or fewer coercive resources 
may fear opposition too much, and therefore, on average, not even try to implement 
conscription. Conversely, states with greater economic or administrative capacity would 
equally be better able to provide sufficient compensation to attract volunteers without 
using coercion.  Given the lower risks to stability volunteers entail, this option may be 
more appealing to states that have high levels of resources.  
 
                                                        
232 Mulligan and Shleifer, “Conscription as Regulation”; Barnett, The Fragmentation of 
Afghanistan; Wendt and Barnett, “Dependent State Formation”; Van Doorn, “The Decline of the 
Mass Army in the West.” 
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Table 3.15: The Effect of State Capacity on Military Recruitment 
Variables 
Model 25: 
Urban 
Population 
Control 
Model 26:  
State Capacity 
Index Control 
Model 27: 
GDP Per Capita 
Control 
Total Land Borders 0.303** 0.293** 0.322** (0.145) (0.136) (0.145) 
Volunteer Influence -0.439 -1.319 -0.238 (0.834) (1.037) (0.952) 
Conscript Influence 0.889 1.321 0.754 (0.722) (1.029) (0.812) 
Volunteer Legacy -1.376** -1.159* -1.941*** (0.557) (0.595) (0.631) 
Volunteer Influence*Borders -0.219 0.0217 -0.274 (0.197) (0.183) (0.196) 
Conscript Influence*Borders -0.0853 -0.191 -0.0848 (0.210) (0.271) (0.219) 
Urban Pop. Perc 3.217**   (1.468)   
Capacity Index  1.344**   (0.604)  
GDP per capita   0.000103   (6.93e-05) 
    
Constant -1.017** -1.857** -0.775 (0.488) (0.916) (0.582) 
Observations 194 110 162 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To test these competing hypotheses, I add different specifications of resource 
capacity to my base models (see Table 3.15). Model 25 includes a variable measuring the 
state’s urban population percentage. This variable is often used in modernization 
literature to measure a state’s level of economic development, and consequently its 
ability to control resources—which should aid in the implementation of conscription.233 
Urban population percentage is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Substantively, this 
may offer support for the hypothesis that states are more likely to conscript where doing 
so is easier. Large urban populations may indicate greater state ability to control the 
                                                        
233 Toronto, “Why War is Not Enough.” 
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population. Rural recruitment is often challenging, especially in new states that are still 
stablishing their authority, both because it is more difficult to extend control and 
legitimacy the further from the state’s center and because cities offer a higher 
concentration of potential recruits. Thus, another interpretation of this variable is as a 
proxy for responses to certain threats: if states anticipate resistance to conscription among 
populations they have less control over, then they would only conscript when they 
perceive that resistance is manageable.  
Similarly, a composite measure from the Relative Political Capacity dataset 
measuring “the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to 
advance public goals,” is also statistically significant at a .05 level, as seen in Model 
26.234 This is a more direct measure of governmental resources compared to GDP, which 
is usually used as a measure of state capacity but is not statistically significant (Model 
27). However, there is extensive missing data for the RPC variable, reducing the sample 
by nearly half. Moreover, the missing data is likely not randomly distributed, as weaker 
and poorer countries are less likely to have the data available that was used for coding.  
The statistical significance of some of these control variables suggests the need to 
test a single model including all control variables. Table 3.16 shows the results from this 
logistic regression. Model 28 and Model 29 include controls for level of democracy, 
number of excluded ethnic groups, and the urban population. In addition, I test whether 
internal ethnic exclusion may function as a pressure on recruitment in the same way as 
external threats do. This is important because many scholars have suggested that states 
                                                        
234 Marina Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Ali Fisunoglu, Jacek Kugler, Mark Abdollahian, Kristin 
Johnson, Kungkook Kang, Zining Yang, “Replication Data for: Relative Political Capacity 
Dataset.” 
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are just as likely to design their security apparatuses in response to internal threats as in 
response to external threats.235 Thus Model 28 tests whether Hypotheses 1 and 2 still find 
support when all additional control variables are accounted for, Model 29 does the same 
for Hypotheses 3 and 4, while Model 30 tests whether Hypotheses 3 and 4 also apply to 
states’ perceptions of internal threats.   
Table 3.16: Full Regression Table 
Variables Model 28: No Interaction 
Model 29: 
External Threat 
Interaction 
Model 30: 
Internal Threat 
Interactions 
Total Land Borders 0.298*** 0.351** 0.527** (0.111) (0.164) (0.224) 
Volunteer Influence -1.355** -0.153 0.836 (0.668) (1.111) (1.351) 
Conscript Influence 0.630 0.570 0.736 (0.392) (0.823) (0.839) 
Volunteer Legacy -1.586** -1.678** -1.760** (0.626) (0.677) (0.734) 
Volunteer Influence*Borders  -0.321 -0.456 
 (0.243) (0.384) 
Conscript Influence*Borders  0.0227 -0.211  (0.242) (0.285) 
Democracy (cont.) -0.0110 -0.00786 -0.00578 (0.0292) (0.0291) (0.0288) 
Total Excluded Ethnic Groups -0.0366 -0.0425 -0.179** (0.0360) (0.0372) (0.0849) 
Urban Pop. Percent 3.780* 3.900* 3.930* (2.183) (2.116) (2.136) 
Volunteer Influence*Excluded Groups   -0.701   (0.477) 
Conscript Influence*Excluded Groups   0.217*   (0.118) 
    
Constant -0.826 -1.016 -1.201* (0.625) (0.651) (0.663) 
Observations 157 157 157 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                        
235 Greitens, “Coercive Institutions”; Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War 
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 The model without interactions still provides support for Hypothesis 2, but not for 
Hypothesis 1. However, only the control variable for urban population is statistically 
significant at greater than a 0.1 level. Model 29 shows similar results, though 
unsurprisingly the patron influence variables are no longer significant when the 
interaction terms are included. We also fail to reject null hypothesis that the interaction 
terms are jointly equal to zero at a 0.35 level. Together this provides strong support for 
Hypotheses 3 and 4.  
 Interestingly, there is also support that the perception of internal threat, defined by 
the number of excluded ethnic groups, also affects military recruitment only in the 
absence of a patron state. When interactions between the number of excluded groups and 
patron influence are included in Model 30, a country with no patron has a lower 
likelihood of using conscription with each additional ethnic group that it excludes. Such a 
patron-less country with no excluded groups—like Yemen after reunification in 1990—is 
associated with a 63 percent probability of using conscription. Meanwhile, one with ten 
excluded groups—for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2002—would 
have only a 34 percent probability of using conscription. Furthermore, the interaction 
terms between excluded groups and patron influence cannot be statistically distinguished 
from each other and from zero at more than a 0.05 level. This demonstrates, consistent 
with Hypotheses 3 and 4, that states are less likely to use conscription when they exclude 
many groups from power, but not when there is patron influence to overpower local 
threat perceptions. 
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C. Robustness Checks 
 Finally, it is important to check that alternate specifications of my key 
independent and dependent variables do not affect the model results. The results from the  
base models remain fairly robust when I account for the possibility that the process of 
military design may be different for some of the observations in my dataset. The 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the observation is a new regime that emerged 
after civil war is not statistically significant, demonstrating that the heterogeneity of my 
sample is not a problem for my theory (Table 3.17). However, the patron influence 
variables are also no longer significant at conventional levels. 
Table 3.17: Robustness Checks 
Variables Model 31: Civil Wars, No Interaction 
Model 32: Civil Wars, 
with Interaction 
Total Land Borders 0.258*** 0.360*** (0.0824) (0.128) 
Civil War State -0.0936 -0.125 (0.355) (0.356) 
Volunteer Influence -0.782 -0.0433 (0.490) (0.751) 
Conscript Influence 0.713* 1.116 (0.373) (0.700) 
Volunteer Legacy -1.383*** -1.447*** (0.483) (0.517) 
Volunteer Influence*Borders  -0.240  (0.179) 
Conscript Influence*Borders  -0.133  (0.201) 
   
Constant -0.499 -0.799* (0.400) (0.465) 
Observations 199 199 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 In Table 3.18, models 33 and 34 tests an alternative measure of foreign influence 
on military design. I created an alternative variable that more directly measures the 
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hypothesized process of professional emulation. This continuous variable measures the 
proportion of a new state’s formal allies that use conscription, using data from the 
Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset.236 Values closer to 1 indicate that a higher 
proportion of a new state’s allies use conscription, while 0 would represent a case in 
which all allies use volunteers.237 Frequent contact between allies should increase the 
likelihood that norms of appropriateness regarding military recruitment practices diffuse 
between them. Furthermore, because recruitment practices affect so many other aspects 
of military design, allies may feel pressured to conform to the same military recruitment 
practices, which may allow them to benefit from greater interoperability. Model 26 
examines whether this measure of foreign influence affects military recruitment. As 
expected, the ally recruitment variable is statistically significant. It also has a large 
substantive effect—larger, in fact, than the effect of having a colonial legacy of 
conscription: the predicted probability of adopting conscription increases from 4 percent 
to 95 percent across the range of ally recruitment, while it only decreases from 59 percent 
to 32 percent between states without and with a volunteer legacy. 
Model 34 tests the interactive hypotheses 3 and 4 by including additional 
variables to account for the possibility that a state has allies but no direct military patron. 
It also includes interactions between these two influence variables and threat perception, 
as measured by the number of land borders. The ally recruitment variable remains 
statistically significant at a 0.01 level, providing support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. The 
interaction between states with no patron and threat environment is statistically 
                                                        
236 Douglas M Gibler, International military alliances, 1648-2008. CQ Press, 2009. 
237 States with no allies are coded 0.5, to indicate that they have an equal chance of going either 
way.  
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significant at a 0.10 level, suggesting some support for Hypothesis 4. Moreover, the 
effect is in the predicted direction: states without a patron that experience high threat  
environments are more likely to use conscription. There is also support for Hypothesis 3, 
as the interaction between ally recruitment and threat is not statistically significant.  
Table 3.18: Robustness Checks 
Variables 
Model 33:  
Alliance Emulation, no 
Interaction 
Model 34: 
Alliance Emulation, 
with Interaction 
Total Land Borders 0.221** -0.219 (0.0857) (0.291) 
Ally Conscription 7.145*** 5.297*** (1.423) (1.778) 
No Patron  -1.457**  (0.686) 
Ally Conscription*Land Borders  0.705  (0.539) 
No Patron*Land Borders  0.363*  (0.219) 
Volunteer Legacy -1.622*** -1.675*** (0.459) (0.476) 
   
Constant -3.877*** -2.547** (0.852) (1.019) 
Observations 203 203 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Four final models replace the dichotomous variable for whether a new state’s 
principal colonizer predominantly used conscripts with four dummy variables indicating 
the specific identity of the colonizer as either the United Kingdom, France, Russia, or 
Turkey/the Ottoman Empire (Table 3.19). This allows for an investigation of more 
specific, cultural influences of colonizers, and thus is also a direct test of my hypotheses 
against the common argument that British norms against using conscription led former 
British colonies to use volunteer systems.  
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Table 3.19: Robustness Checks 
Variables 
Model 35:  
Colonizer 
Dummies, 
Borders/No 
Interaction 
Model 36: 
Colonizer 
Dummies, 
Borders 
Interaction 
Model 37: 
Colonizer 
Dummies, 
MIDs/No 
Interaction 
Model 38: 
Colonizer 
Dummies, 
MIDs 
Interaction 
Total Land Borders 0.244*** 0.320**   (0.0827) (0.135)   
Total Forceful MIDs   0.232 0.481**   (0.148) (0.190) 
Volunteer Influence -1.079** -0.515 -1.017** -0.634 (0.502) (0.797) (0.509) (0.639) 
Conscript Influence 0.983** 1.293* 0.931** 1.178*** (0.390) (0.687) (0.395) (0.446) 
Volunteer Influence*Borders  -0.179    (0.210)   
Conscript Influence*Borders  -0.0991    (0.196)   
Volunteer Influence*MIDs    -0.626    (0.674) 
Conscript Influence*MIDs    -0.424    (0.268) 
British Colony -0.721 -0.739 -0.987* -1.008* (0.529) (0.541) (0.523) (0.565) 
French Colony -0.492 -0.486 -0.354 -0.382 (0.472) (0.469) (0.503) (0.508) 
Russian Colony 0.773 0.777 0.990 0.908 (0.713) (0.717) (0.693) (0.710) 
Turkish Colony 1.310** 1.320** 1.222* 1.180* (0.641) (0.646) (0.647) (0.659) 
     
Constant -0.907** -1.147** -0.241 -0.377 (0.419) (0.499) (0.350) (0.373) 
Observations 195 195 195 195 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Models 35 and 36, threat is measured as the number of land borders, and an 
Ottoman colonial legacy is statistically significant but a British one is not. This may cast 
some doubt on arguments that emphasize a British cultural heritage as affecting military 
recruitment. However, Models 37 and 38, which measure threat using the number of 
forceful MIDs that a new state experiences, show slightly different results. Here, British 
legacy is significant at a 0.1 level and Ottoman/Turkish legacy are both only significant 
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at a 0.1 level. This indicates that colonial legacy may affect recruitment less through the 
ideological or cultural traits of a particular colonizer being passed down to the colony, 
and more through the way different colonizers interacted with threat environments or 
behaved after independence. It also demonstrates the need for a reexamination of other 
arguments that point to French or Russian origins as making conscription more likely. 
Most importantly, however, there is stronger support for the effect of a conscript 
colonizer—The Ottoman Empire/Turkey—than for the United Kingdom. Thus, there is 
little evidence that specific colonizers endowed new states with cultural preferences that 
led them to adopt certain recruitment practices after independence. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 This chapter has tested hypothesis that foreign influence after independence 
affects how new states make military recruitment decisions. Importantly, the results 
suggest that, while colonizer recruitment practice remains significant, so is foreign 
influence after independence. In particular, states that have patrons interested in their 
military design are likely to emulate the recruitment practices of their patron. 
Independence acts as a critical juncture: patrons after independence can affect military 
recruitment decisions.  
Threat environments play a role in military recruitment policies, but the relative 
effect of threat is highest when there is no foreign patron to dictate or otherwise influence 
policy. This makes sense, not only because states with patrons have actors that may 
directly guide their military design, but also because new states with foreign patrons can 
more readily count on foreign help in the event of a major conflict. Having a patron 
inevitably dampens the effect of threats, while patron-less states are more likely to need 
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to rely on their own capabilities. It also seems that to the extent that threat perceptions 
affect military recruitment practices in new states, it is through broad evaluations of the 
state’s geostrategic position. Having more borders may make a state’s position more 
precarious, leading to a greater willingness to take on the risks of conscription as a way to 
increase security. More acute indicators of threat have a less consistent effect on military 
recruitment practices. 
 In sum, this chapter has demonstrated an association between the recruitment 
practices of new states and the recruitment practices of foreign states with influence in 
the new state in the years after its independence. However, the statistical methods used in 
this chapter leave several questions still in need of answers. For one, it is not yet clear 
what role recruitment plays in determining or creating this association. Do new states 
specifically look at and prioritize the recruitment practices of their patrons when 
designing their own, or does emulation of recruitment follow from other emulated 
practices? Does the interest in emulation originate in the new state, or does it occur 
through a top-down process of pressure from the patron? In addition, it is important to 
examine the particular logic motivating emulation: what purpose do states have in mind 
when they adopt recruitment policies, and do these differ for patrons and their clients? 
Finally, this chapter has only examined recruitment policies at a single moment in time—
during periods in which states are likely to be designing military institutions that they 
expect will last a long time. It remains to be seen whether the initial effect of foreign 
patrons continues to influence military recruitment policies after independence, as well.   
To test these aspects of my theory, it is necessary to turn to case studies in the 
following chapters.  The case study chapters provide further evidence to support my 
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argument that post-independence patrons affect military design through a mechanism of 
emulation. While they continue my emphasis on new states, they also tease out the role of 
my explanatory variables beyond initial periods of military design. 
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CHAPTER 4: JORDAN 
I. Introduction 
The development of Jordan’s armed forces offers a quintessential case study of 
foreign intervention in military design, as is described by my first causal pathway for the 
development of recruitment policies. While there is no doubt that the British influenced 
Jordanian military development, existing research has not established a clear causal 
relationship between that influence and the country’s volunteer recruitment. This chapter 
offers such a test. I find support for my first hypothesis: new states influenced by patrons 
that prefer volunteer systems are more likely to develop volunteer armies. This chapter 
also provides support for hypotheses 3 and 4 by showing that the Jordanian army was 
developed in a high threat environment that influenced the recruitment preferences of 
local Jordanian officials but did not affect how its British patrons perceived recruitment. 
The British maintained high levels of influence on Jordanian military policy both 
before and after independence. While the constant use of a volunteer military during this 
period is consistent with an argument about cultural diffusion, I argue that it is actually 
British policy itself that enforced volunteer military recruitment. The fact that British 
influence can be interpreted as affecting either culture or military policy directly makes it 
difficult to identify which mechanism is correct. However, I examine the policy 
preferences of Jordanian and British officials in each period—before and after 
independence—to show that a cultural opposition to conscription was unlikely to exist in 
Jordan, despite British influence.  
 By contrast, the most common explanations of military recruitment would 
attribute Jordan’s development of a volunteer army not to active British influence and 
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control of military policy, but to either domestic factors or the international threat 
environment. Such explanations emphasize that British influence during the Mandate 
period diffused a cultural appreciation for individual rights, or, at the very least, the idea 
that conscription was inappropriate. Thus, these theories predict that Jordan would have 
developed a volunteer army even without British influence after independence because it 
had become part of its domestic culture. If archival evidence supported these arguments, 
there would be little evidence that Jordanian leaders debated whether to use conscription 
or volunteers, because the cultural expectations would have made volunteer recruitment 
the only permissible choice. Alternatively, if functional demands determined Jordanian 
military recruitment, the debates would emphasize the internal security role of the 
Jordanian army or the absence of a threatening international environment that would 
require large amounts of manpower. Instead, archival evidence reveals consensus on an 
external role for the Arab Legion, including debates on the use of conscription and size of 
its forces.  
In fact, a careful examination of the development of the Arab Legion—the name 
of Jordan’s army until 1956—demonstrates that its volunteer army was far from 
inevitable. British colonial practices in Jordan may have increased the likelihood that 
volunteer recruitment would prevail after independence. However, the reason for this has 
more to do with the way it set the stage for the British to foster a post-independence 
patron-client relationship than the transmission of colonial values to the new state. 
Whereas the latter explanation reflects a logic of normative isomorphism and cultural 
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diffusion, I argue that the policymaking process was far more coercive.238 Rather, British 
policymakers designed the Arab Legion. All evidence suggests that Jordanian leaders did 
not fully internalize their colonizer’s cultural preference for volunteer militaries. Without 
continued British intervention in military policy after independence, it is much more 
likely that Jordan would have adopted a conscript recruitment system. Moreover, the 
British decision to rely on volunteers was informed by a logic of consequences more than 
by a logic of appropriateness, though one that was strongly influenced by British strategic 
culture. Correspondence between Glubb and British government officials at the time 
indicates that the British were reluctant to permit conscription in the Arab Legion despite 
an increasingly dangerous external environment. 
The chapter proceeds as follows, using documents from the British National 
Archives in Kew, London and the John Bagot Glubb collection at St. Anthony’s College, 
Oxford’s, Middle East Centre Archive to support my arguments throughout. These 
archives contain first-hand reports that identify the key decision-makers during the period 
of Jordanian military design, including the British Foreign Office, War Office, Chiefs of 
Staff, General Headquarters of the Middle East Land Forces, and the Treasury, as well as 
the commander of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb. First, I briefly survey the 
background and initial development of the Arab Legion to describe the extent to which 
British military preferences dominated the client state. I examine the development of the 
Arab Legion during the Mandate era and the early years of Jordanian independence, from 
1946 through the end of the first Arab-Israeli War in 1949. This section establishes the 
                                                        
238 Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism 
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 
147–160). 
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high degree of control the British maintained over Jordan’s military policy as well as the 
threat environment in which both local and British actors believed the Arab Legion 
would initially operate. It uses archival sources to identify evidence that the important 
debates and decisions about Jordanian military policy took place between Glubb and 
officials in the United Kingdom. Second, I demonstrate that Jordanian actors did not 
internalize the British preference for a volunteer system, and that without British 
influence conscription may have been the most likely outcome. I find archival evidence 
that Jordan’s leaders, including King Abdullah, considered implementing conscription 
but were swayed by the greater influence of Jordan’s British patrons. This supports 
Hypothesis 1, which argues that it is foreign influence, not cultural legacies, that 
determine military recruitment. The third section demonstrates that, contrary to the 
predictions of the colonial legacy, norms-driven argument, Glubb’s preferences for 
Jordanian military design did adjust to changes in his perception of the threat 
environment, though they remained dominated by a British preference for volunteer 
militaries. Finally, I briefly summarize developments in military recruitment policies 
after the decline of British influence. This section supports my second hypothesized 
causal pathway, that a focus on internal threats rather than external ones, combined with 
the absence of a clear patron interested in affecting military design, permitted greater 
flexibility in recruitment policies. In sum, this chapter shows that it was British 
domination of Jordanian security policy, rather than the diffusion of British cultural 
practices, that influenced Jordanian military design.  
The early development of the Arab Legion over the course of the two decades 
before Jordanian independence, coupled with the continuity in its leadership under John 
 145 
 
 
 
Bagot Glubb after independence, means 1946 may constitute less of a critical juncture for 
the purposes of military design than does independence for many other states. As P. J. 
Vatikiotis writes, “one could argue in this case that the army created the state.”239 More 
to the point, the British made the army, and continued making the army well after 
independence. Whether military design in Jordan began in 1946 or earlier, it is clear that 
the military practices of the United Kingdom and its proxies in Jordan determined that 
country’s recruitment policies. As Kenneth Pollack wrote in his dissertation on military 
effectiveness, “The British had built the Jordanian Army in their own image….Thus just 
as Britain traditionally relied on a small, long-term service professional army, so too did 
Jordan. Just as Britain had traditionally relied on a purely volunteer force so too did 
Jordan.”240 This chapter will show that Jordan’s volunteer recruitment system was the 
result of foreign security assistance and not of the diffusion of a British culture that 
viewed conscription as contrary to an ideology of individual rights. Furthermore, it will 
demonstrate that the dominant cultural tendencies in Jordan throughout the period of 
British military influence would have been more likely to produce a conscript system in 
the absence of that influence. In short, it was British influence after independence, not a 
legacy of British influence from before independence, that led Jordan to emulate British 
volunteer military recruitment. 
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II. The Development of the Arab Legion 
As Mark Heller writes, “it is impossible to overstate the British role in the history 
of the Jordanian army.”241 Jordan’s military was subject to extensive influence from the 
United Kingdom under the League of Nations Mandate system, as well as after its 
independence in 1946. According to the Mandate system, territories whose populations 
were not yet seen fit to govern themselves would be administered by more developed 
states on behalf of the League. In the case of the former Ottoman territories, like Jordan, 
the Mandatory system was intended to be temporary, “until such time as they are able to 
stand alone.”242 Administrative control for the territory that became Jordan fell to the 
United Kingdom under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, in which the 
United Kingdom and France divided their future control of the Ottoman Empire’s 
territory in the Middle East. It was on this basis that the United Kingdom negotiated the 
creation of a protectorate of Transjordan that, along with neighboring Palestine, would be 
governed by the British Mandatory authorities.243 The British recognized Abdullah bin al-
Hussein, son of the Sharif of Mecca, as Emir of Transjordan’s autonomous 
administration, before he was crowned King following Jordan’s formal independence in 
May 1946.  
Nonetheless, Jordanian military affairs were essentially the sole preserve of the 
British Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Peake from 1921 until 1939, when he was 
succeeded by another British army officer, John Bagot Glubb, who retained control until 
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his forced resignation on March 1, 1956. Given this British influence, it is not necessarily 
surprising that Jordan developed a volunteer army—a recruitment choice it continued to 
rely primarily on even after Glubb’s dismissal and replacement with local, Arab 
commanders. British culture has traditionally had an uneasy relationship with 
conscription, so it is only natural that a heavily British-influenced former colony like 
Jordan would similarly oppose this recruitment system.244 Yet it is important to realize 
that the development of a Jordanian volunteer army was based on this British influence 
during the process of military design, not through vaguer cultural channels. 
 The forces that would later form the core of the Arab Legion were first raised by 
Frederick Peake as the Mobile Force in 1921. In 1923, all security forces in Transjordan 
merged into the Mobile Force and were renamed the Arab Legion; Abdullah appointed 
Peake as its commander—a position he held as an employee of the Emirate.245 In 1926, 
the British formed the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF) and declared it responsible for 
protecting Jordan’s frontiers. From that point until World War II, the British were 
responsible for Jordan’s external security and the Arab Legion was relegated to providing 
internal security.  
 The British maintained effective control over Jordanian military policy during this 
period. While Peake (and later Glubb), were employed in a private capacity by Abdullah 
and “technically were not instruments of British policy,” prior to independence they were 
still “ultimately subordinate to the British Resident.”246 Furthermore, British financial aid 
“furnished Abdullah with a solid economic base,” that made him ultimately dependent on 
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the United Kingdom: “Annual British aid reached £100,000 by the mid-1920s [and] £2 
million by the mid-1940s.”247 Nadav Safran writes that “the dependence of Jordan on 
outside financial support has meant that outsiders have largely set the pace for the 
development of its forces and limited its strategic choices.”248 Thus, this British 
patronage was vital to the development of the Arab Legion, whose support Abdullah 
relied upon for survival.  
With the end of World War II, the beginning of the Cold War, and Jordan’s 
looming independence, it became necessary for the British to reevaluate the role of the 
Arab Legion. The British government, not Abdullah, both evaluated what these roles 
would be and how the Arab Legion would be organized to achieve them. The British 
actively discussed and determined the organization of the Arab Legion post-Jordanian 
independence. In particular, throughout late 1945 representatives of different government 
offices discussed who had financial responsibility for subsidizing the Arab Legion; 
before the British evacuation of Palestine—in May 1948—the burden was borne by the 
Foreign Office and War Office, while afterwards it would be only the Foreign Office that 
paid.249 Until then, but even after independence, the Arab Legion was classified as a 
“contingent force” by the British.250 This meant that “the War Office undertook to 
‘maintain’ [it] and admit at least a certain amount of responsibility for making the 
arrangements work.”251 Tellingly, the British government internally debated whether the 
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Arab Legion should continue to be classified as a contingent force or rather as a foreign 
army—and noted that in the case of the Arab Legion, it made little difference. One report 
argued that “While ‘camouflaged’ as a foreign army, the Arab Legion is entirely paid for 
by Great Britain, commanded by British Officers, and is essentially a British interest.”252 
The size and structure of the Arab Legion was also often discussed in conjunction 
with the cost of the subsidy, in ways that implied the British would have final say over 
these issues. For example, in one meeting at the Treasury on March 6, 1946, British 
Resident in Transjordan Alec Kirkbride is reported to have voiced that “apart from the 
infantry formations which would be kept on as long as the War Office wanted them, the 
permanent strength [of the Legion] would probably be two of the three existing 
mechanized regiments.”253 Similarly, in April 1946 the Treasury wrote to the Foreign 
Office to determine how many mechanized units should be the starting point for financial 
assistance.254 Glubb’s plans for the reorganization of the Arab Legion in 1947 were also 
reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces before they received his 
“full backing and approval.”255 
During this time the British were planning the subsidy to an independent Jordan 
based on primarily internal roles.256 While the British continued to plan that the Jordanian 
army would have a “subsidiary role to the British army in the event of another world 
war,” they deemed internal stability a more pressing and more likely mission.257 In 
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particular, several internal security roles were envisioned. In March 1946 the British 
assessed that the key tasks of the Arab Legion that determined the size of its subsidy 
included “internal security,” “protection of the [Kirkuk-Haifa oil] Pipe Line,” which ran 
from Iraq to Palestine, and “sealing off of the frontier with Palestine in the event of large 
scale troubles,” as well as serving as Abdullah’s private army.258 The need to “keep the 
tribes in order” to ensure that oil would continue to flow through the pipeline meant 
stability in Transjordan was important in and of itself.259 However, Palestine was 
considered the real vital territory within the British Middle East, and therefore stability in 
Transjordan was also necessary because instability would inevitably have implications 
for control over Palestine.260  
The British perception of the security link between Palestine and Jordan would 
only increase later. The increasingly uneasy situation in neighboring Mandatory Palestine 
began to affect British strategic thinking about the Arab Legion. As an impending British 
withdrawal from Palestine became clear, the long-term shape of the Arab Legion began 
to be more organized around frontier defense. Glubb had been concerned about the 
Palestine problem spilling over into Jordan in 1939, and by 1947 he was engaged in 
comprehensive efforts to prepare for this threat once again.261 The British recognized that 
the Arab Legion was vital for stability in Palestine and would need to be used in the event 
of disturbances in Palestine, which would likely affect Jordan as well. The British 
decided that “a long term reorganisation of the Arab Legion [was] connected closely with 
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future developments in Palestine” and as a result, believe[d] it was “unwise to embark on 
any sweeping changes in the strength or character of that force now.”262  
The eruption of war with Israel in 1948 further changed the Arab Legion’s role 
toward greater external defense. While the Arab Legion had always been trained to be 
used in conventional conflict with external forces, by 1948 it had become a corps d’elite 
fighting force among the Arab powers.263 This was a result of British planning and 
reorganization. The British heavily supplemented the Arab Legion with more British 
officers.264 Glubb, the only division commanders, both brigade commanders, three 
battalion commanders, and nearly all other officers ranked major or higher were 
British.265 During the war, “Abdullah was completely dependent on Glubb and the other 
British officers who took orders not only from him but also from London.”266 This only 
increased the extent to which the British controlled Jordanian military development. 
The outcome of the war—which saw Jordan absorb the West Bank, more than 
tripling its population—cemented this change in Jordan’s security environment. In early 
1948, a meeting of the United Kingdom’s chiefs of staff noted that “Transjordan’s 
strategic importance would increase if any parts of Palestine, which is of greater strategic 
importance, were added to it.” Notably, they added that “This would similarly increase 
the importance to us of the Arab Legion.”267 These predictions continued to hold true in 
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1949, when discussions of Jordan’s subsidy focused on the new threat environment. In 
June 1949, as a direct result of the end of hostilities in the Arab-Israel war. Glubb 
assessed that the Arab Legion would likely have to deal with urban riots and rural 
disturbances involving “actions by local gangs or gangs infiltrating from neighbouring 
states,” such as Israel or Syria.268 
The connection to Israel/Palestine and relations with Palestinians were not the 
only external defense concerns of the United Kingdom at this time. The British also 
envisioned a “national defense role” and “operational role in a major war.”269 The Chiefs 
of Staff assessed that any major war in defense of Egypt would likely be conducted 
mainly in Northern Palestine and Southern Syria, and thus Jordan could “scarcely fail to 
be embroiled.”270 They also did not rule out the possibility of incursions from Iraq or 
Saudi Arabia, with whom Jordan had a fraught history. Though some officials considered 
external defense somewhat as a “bogey,” the Chiefs of Staff continued to plan for it.271 
Thus, despite an increasing orientation toward territorial defense and external threats, 
British policy continued to dominate Jordanian military design.  
 
III. Jordanian Military Preferences 
 The above discussion supports my first hypothesis by demonstrating the British 
maintained a decisive role in determining policies related to the size and organization of 
the Arab Legion. Furthermore, that the Arab Legion remained a volunteer force despite 
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the increasing British recognition of external threats to Jordan’s security supports 
hypothesis 4—that threat perception is less likely to affect military recruitment when 
there is a foreign patron. In this case the preferences of the foreign patron were most 
decisive for determining recruitment.  
This is all the more evident when the British role in military design is compared 
to the Ottoman undercurrents in military culture, which could have influenced military 
policy if there had been no British patronage. When Peake transferred control of the Arab 
Legion to Glubb in 1939, it still had strong connections to the Ottoman army. As a result, 
if there was any effect of colonial legacy on military recruitment in Jordan at the time, it 
would have prejudiced the military toward a system of conscription—the system the 
Ottomans employed when they ruled the territory of Jordan. Only 5 of the 47 officers in 
the Arab Legion were British at the outbreak of World War II, and the following year 
there were only two.272 Most of the rest were veterans of the Ottoman army and were 
opposed to British influence.273 In 1944 there were still 15 officers of the former Ottoman 
army serving in the Arab Legion, and while senior officers were all British after the war, 
senior Arab officers were still primarily from the Ottoman era in 1946.274 Moreover, new 
officers received little training under Peake.275 This lack of training, combined with the 
small number of British officers, meant that there would have been little opportunity or 
ability to transmit norms surrounding military recruitment to the old guard.  
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 This does not necessarily mean that the former Ottoman officers would have 
preferred conscription. Indeed, many locals opposed conscription when it was 
implemented during the brief period of Syrian rule before the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.276 
Conscription was enough of an issue to merit a promise from Herbert Samuel, first 
British High Commissioner for Transjordan under the Mandate system, upon taking 
office that Transjordanians would not be conscripted.277 However, it is possible that this 
opposition was to the perception of enforcement of conscription by a foreign government, 
rather than to conscription itself. The tribes of Transjordan enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy during the Mandate. Furthermore, it does not suggest that Abdullah would not 
have tried to implement conscription anyway. In fact, Abdullah’s government sought to 
extend its control over the tribes by implementing a census and election registrations, 
which tribal leaders saw as the first steps to conscription.278 This resulted in domestic 
unrest during registration campaigns in 1929. While it is not clear whether Abdullah 
intended to use a national registry to enforce conscription—and he undoubtedly would 
have had difficulty doing so—this would have been consistent with his broader goals of 
extending his power and limiting the independence of the tribes. As Vatikiotis writes, “In 
its earlier history the function of the Legion was mainly to extend and impose the 
authority of Amman, i.e. of Prince Abdullah, over a fractious society.”279  
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Furthermore, it is also likely that the ex-Ottoman officers of the early Arab 
Legion shared the preferences of their similarly anti-British and nationalist former 
colleagues in neighboring Iraq.280 There, conscription was strongly preferred over 
volunteer recruitment. Similarly, Joseph Massad describes the anti-colonial nationalism 
of non-Abdullah supporters as very similar to the nationalism in Iraq in ways that would 
likely also create support for conscription. He argues that “for these nationalists, the army 
was seen as a central institution to unify the nation. Its role was to integrate a varied 
citizenry within the framework of national defense, the supreme duty of a nationalist.”281 
Again, while not requiring conscription, contemporary nationalists tended to view 
conscript service as a great unifier and source of support for the nation.  
Similarly, Yoav Alon argues that the Jordanian “experience of statehood stemmed 
from the Ottoman legacy.”282 He further argues that, while the Ottoman influence 
weakened in the 1930s, there were nonetheless important cultural and institutional 
continuities in the transition from Ottoman to Hashemite rule: “the authorities drew on 
Ottoman methods of governing tribal society and further developed them.”283 Thus it 
seems that Hashemite preferences, like those of the Ottomans before them, may have 
been to use conscription as a way of weakening alternative sources of authority, despite 
local opposition. In any event, the limited penetration of British military practices below 
the leadership of the Arab Legion demonstrates that cultural diffusion would not have 
been sufficient to influence military design toward a volunteer system. It could have been 
just as likely to support conscription. 
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 It was not until the 1940s that British culture even started to take hold in the 
Jordanian military. In 1939, Peake handed control of the Arab Legion over to another 
British officer, John Bagot Glubb. Under Glubb and in wartime conditions, the make-up 
of the Arab Legion shifted. Glubb began to promote officers slowly from within the 
ranks, providing greater opportunity for professionalization.284 The Arab Legion was 
greatly expanded, strengthened with more British officers, and sent to participate in 
combat elsewhere in the Middle East.285 After the war, the British saw it necessary to 
reorganize the Arab Legion to return to its prior focus on internal security—though as 
shown above this would only be a temporary shift. In January 1946, High Commissioner 
Sir Alan Cunningham noted that “the special use to which the Arab Legion was 
successfully put during the war, and which justified its very large expansion, is now at an 
end.”286 However, many British officers stayed with the Arab Legion after the war, which 
provided for some continuity. In October 1947, 41 out of 191 officers were British.287 
Thus, the British continued to influence policy through the provision of a subsidy and 
officers and the presence of Glubb. 
 Despite the increase in British influence during World War II, and the substantial 
continued British influence after independence, Jordanians were still not convinced 
volunteer recruitment was the best way forward. The negotiations between the United 
Kingdom and Jordan over the post-independence relationship demonstrates the continued 
importance of a volunteer system to the United Kingdom, as well as the possibility that 
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Jordanians would have implemented conscription if not for British patronage. Abdullah’s 
concern for the continuation of support for the Arab Legion led him to secret discussions 
with Iraq to provide an alternative source of patronage if terms with the British proved 
unsatisfactory or if the British were to renege on their agreement.288 The British feared 
that, just as British patronage created a British-style army, Iraqi patronage would lead the 
army to develop more along Iraqi line. In a note on British-Jordanian negotiations, Glubb 
wrote that Iraqi patronage would include the replacement of British officers with Iraqi 
offices, and that as a result, conscription would probably be introduced.289 Thus, not only 
did the British at the time view it likely that Jordan would adopt conscription if not for 
British patronage, but the British were also strongly enough opposed to conscription to at 
least note this as a negative consequence of loosening its grip on Jordanian military 
policy. 
Furthermore, even after independence, Jordanian leaders were not inherently 
opposed to conscription. Indeed, without their dependence on Britain they are much more 
likely to have implemented conscription. In May 1947, Glubb noted that Abdullah was 
uneasy about his reliance on the British willingness to continue to supply a subsidy. He 
wrote: “The Transjordanian government is extremely anxious to have an army of its 
own….In my previous memorandum on the defence of Trans-Jordan I pointed out how 
extremely small is the Trans-Jordan Army compared to those of it’s neighbours [sic].” In 
response to this dilemma, Glubb noted, the Transjordanian government considered the 
possibility of conscription. He “strongly opposed the proposal” because “Experience has 
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shown that Arab conscript armies are no use…to transform it into a conscript army would 
spoil it.”290 The British government made a similar assessment shortly before Jordanian 
independence, arguing,  
The Arab Legion is a long service well paid professional force. All other 
Arab countries have made the fundamental mistake of introducing 
conscription. Patriotism is not yet strong enough in any Arab country to 
persuade men to serve willingly in an army without adequate pay. Well paid 
armies of a fraction of the size of their present conscript armies would be 
much more valuable to most Arab countries. As long as the other Arab 
armies are recruited by conscription, the Arab Legion is likely to be the only 
one efficient and loyal.291 
These beliefs would continue to dominate British strategic thinking. This was the British 
government’s assessment despite the belief that “the greater the contribution which 
Transjordan can make to its own defence the smaller would be the British effort required 
to fulfill [their] treaty obligations” to come to its aid.292 Thus, despite a perceived role in 
a major conflict that might necessitate more manpower, the British influenced Jordan to 
stay fast to the Arab Legion’s volunteer recruitment scheme. 
The extensive pre-independence British influence on Jordan was clearly not 
sufficient to convince Jordanians that the British preference for volunteers was correct. In 
addition to Abdullah’s questions about conscription, Jordanian Prime Minister Samir al-
Rifai also had concerns about the Arab Legion’s current ability to meet the threats it 
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faced. British government correspondence notes that Rifai believed that “the Arab Legion 
must be maintained at a reasonable strength as a measure for collective defence” and that 
“the Arab Legion as now formed needs complete reorganisation.293 This is in direct 
contrast to the British view, that saw reorganization as undesirable and maintained that 
small, highly trained mobile forces were ideal. Indeed, there was extensive back and forth 
among British officials regarding whether reorganization of the Arab Legion was 
necessary, though ultimately they decided some reorganization would be beneficial.294  
While this this does not show that Rifai or other Jordanian officials necessarily 
would have implemented conscription had it not been for British influence, it does 
suggest that they were more eager to engage in the types of military reform that would be 
consistent with the goals of conscription than were the British. Without British influence 
it is more likely that Jordan would have resorted to conscription to increase its defensive 
capabilities. The next section will show that while the British influence kept the Arab 
Legion itself volunteer, the high threat environment of Jordan’s early post-independence 
years led to the development of auxiliary forces that would use alternative forms of 
military recruitment. 
 
IV. The Development of Jordan’s National Guard 
Consistent with hypothesis 3, the Jordanian preference for conscription was at 
least partially a response to their perception of a high external threat environment. Again, 
this was especially true after the 1948 war with Israel. The West Bank, once absorbed by 
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Jordan, was “certain to be the first objective of an Israeli attack.”295 Moreover, it was 
clear that Jordan would be unable to prevent an Israeli breakthrough into the West 
Bank.296 
 In fact, the external environment was so threatening that the British did permit a 
form of compulsory recruitment to be implemented in Jordan. Notably, the Arab Legion, 
as the principal military force of Jordan, was to remain purely based on volunteer 
recruitment. However, Glubb proposed, and was permitted to implement, a National 
Guard system that incorporated at least elements of conscript service. Glubb’s goal was 
to develop an efficient, well-trained force capable of defending the West Bank.”297 
However, as Kenneth Pollack writes, British officers were “completely opposed to 
diluting the caliber of manpower by adopting large-scale conscription.”298 Instead, a 
compromise emerged. The British would accept more volunteers at the same level of 
training into the Arab Legion, but permit Glubb to implement his plan for a National 
Guard to enhance readiness.  
Glubb’s plan was influenced by the Israeli practice of ensuring that populations 
living on the frontier were trained and armed well enough to defend themselves.299 In 
June 1949 he proposed a plan to develop a “Home Guard” (later named the National 
Guard) in which civilians in each village would be instructed on how to provide basic 
training to other villagers.300 That instructor was then to give basic training for the whole 
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of their village. In 1952 National Guard legislation was passed making one month of 
training compulsory for every man in every village, without pay.301 The goal, according 
to Glubb, was village defense and as a base of recruitment for the Arab Legion, and 
would be “of far greater value in the event of a long war.”302 
Consistent with my argument that British patronage led to British control over 
recruitment policy, final approval on the development of the National Guard in 1949 
seems to have rested with British officials. This is evident in a series of reports that 
followed Glubb’s proposal to implement his National Guard plan. A first dispatch from 
the British Legation in Amman, to Ernest Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
notes that Glubb required approval for his plan, which demanded the purchase of 
additional rifles from the United Kingdom.303 The request was forwarded to the War 
Office on September 9th, with the handwritten note “As the [Secretary of State] is away, I 
think that I ought to clear this with the Minister of Defence.” 304 The proposal was 
approved on October 4th, 1949.305 
 King Hussein, who came to power in 1953, also viewed the National Guard as an 
important element of defense. He asserted that its purpose was to “defend the border in 
order to allow the better trained and equipped army, in the event of [Israeli] aggression, 
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to direct its strikes at specific targets.”306 Ultimately Glubb noted that there were 
sufficient volunteers to avoid conscripting individuals into the National Guard.307 
However, that this system was approved and implemented at all supports the hypothesis 
that high threat environments encourage conscription. That it was strictly implemented in 
a military force that was separate from the Arab Legion, however, indicates that British 
military influence was important for keeping the latter a volunteer force.  
V. Post-Glubb Developments in the Jordanian Army 
 Hussein dismissed Glubb on March 1, 1956. The circumstances that led to his 
dismissal and the subsequent loss of British military control had developed relatively 
recently. Part of the explanation has to do with the personality of the new king. Vatikiotis 
argues that Glubb’s own beliefs about his dismissal—that the young Hussein resented 
Glubb’s experience and influence over him—“May reflect accurately the feelings of a 
young monarch struggling under immense and inimical pressure to establish his political 
primacy.”308 Lawrence Tal agrees that much of the decision wrested with Hussein and his 
personal ambitions.309 Kamal Salibi also emphasizes the identity and age of the new 
monarch, referring to “the generation gap” between Glubb and Hussein that created 
differences between them.310 
 All three of these sources agree that these differences were more than merely 
personal, however, and rather reflected important political developments in the broader 
Arab world. The rise of Arab nationalism made it increasingly untenable for the army to 
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be dominated by the British, both at the level of officers and in terms of broader policy. 
In the early 1950s—influenced by the nationalist coups in Syria and Egypt—a movement 
formed in the Arab Legion called the Free Officers, which sought to “sack Glubb and 
Arabise the Legion.”311 Riots in December 1955 and January 1956 centered on the 
perception that the country was too much under the British thumb.312 In this political 
environment, Glubb’s plan to Arabize by the Legion by 1965 was simply unacceptably 
slow to many in the political opposition.313 Similarly, given this rising anti-British 
sentiment and the overall decline in British imperial capabilities at this time, the benefits 
to the British of retaining their influence or of preventing Glubb’s dismissal may have 
been no longer perceived as worth the increasing cost. 
British influence suffered a notable decline with the sacking of Glubb in 1956. By 
1957, the United States had replaced the United Kingdom as Jordan’s principal source of 
foreign support.314 However, the United States did not have the same interest in Jordanian 
military design as did Glubb, as its leader. One of the key goals of Glubb’s firing was to 
take back control of the Arab Legion. Hussein wanted to Arabize it, and in doing so 
wanted to “demonstrate he was breaking the fetters of imperialism” and distance the Arab 
Legion from its perception as “an alien force, run by British officers, taking orders not 
from Jordan, but from their British commander.”315 Indeed, this was when the Arab 
Legion was renamed the Jordan Arab Army, and British officers were quickly replaced 
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with Jordanian ones.316 Thus, rather than simply replacing one patron with another, after 
Glubb’s dismissal Jordan gained much more autonomy over its military than it previously 
enjoyed. 
In addition, the army leadership that replaced Glubb “had little use for the British 
colonial notion of ‘tradition’” and “saw the army as an instrument of national 
unification.”317 This is a goal that conscription is better suited to than volunteer 
recruitment. Conscription is better able to force the integration of diverse populations 
compared to volunteer recruitment, which must rely on the segments of the population 
that are traditionally attracted to military service. Glubb, on the other hand, sought to 
cultivate a high level of cohesion and corps d’esprit. He ensured separation between 
recruits from tribes and the sedentary population, and recruited primarily from specific 
tribes.318  
 The end of British influence created a permissive environment in which 
Jordanians policymakers were able to make recruitment decisions based on their own 
ideas about military design. Thus, while military recruitment stayed stably voluntary 
throughout the period of British patronage, Jordan now began to change its recruitment 
system more frequently. In 1966 it abolished the National Guard and instituted 
compulsory military service for the first time. Two years later the service term was 
expanded from ninety days to two years; two years after that they transitioned back to a 
volunteer force, and in 1976 conscription was reinstated. These frequent recruitment 
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changes suggest that Jordanian leaders were unconstrained by a patron to guide their 
military design choices during this time. 
This period was characterized by particularly high threat levels for Jordan. 
Security threats emerged from an ever-shifting array of inter-Arab alliances and the rise 
of Pan-Arabism.319 However, the government perceived the dominant threat as coming 
from within the state. The Jordanian Prime Minister argued that, in addition to the threat 
from Syria, it was internal security “which made it essential” to maintain high force 
levels.320 In order to maintain these force levels he had even discussed the possibility of 
implementing conscription with Hussein as early as October 1957, though they ultimately 
decided against it.321 Notably, however, the tone of reports on debates about conscription 
contrasts with the earlier report from Glubb. As will be discussed below, recruitment now 
appeared to be under the control of the King and his Jordanian advisers, rather than 
adopted according to British interests.  
The internal threat became especially severe after the formation of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The PLO constituted a potential alternative 
source of authority for Arabs from the strategically important West Bank, who made up 
most of the country’s population. One demand the PLO made was for stronger defense of 
the frontier, including compulsory military service.322 The Jordanian government’s 
implementation of conscription in the 1960s was designed not only to satisfy these 
popular demands, but also to “prevent the likelihood of Jordan’s youth joining the 
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[Palestinian] guerrillas.323 Again, the British now appear to have allowed recruitment 
decisions to rest with the Jordanian government. While the British continued to offer 
advice, reports from the Military and Air Attache’s officer show that the most important 
policymakers were no longer British advisers but Jordanian advisers: In 1964, one report 
describes how a chief adviser to Hussein “had no intention of allowing conscription to be 
introduced,” and that “his plan was to expand the Army…without resort to 
conscription.”324 This contrasts with King Abdullah’s earlier consideration of 
conscription. Then, Glubb’s opposition resulted in an alternative reserve scheme that was 
adopted by the Jordanian government. Post-Glubb reports on conscription reveal less 
about British preferences, and instead report Jordanian debates and outcomes as matters 
of policy.   
Ultimately skepticism regarding the risks of arming the entire population 
prevailed and Jordanians temporarily abandoned conscription in 1970. However, the 
connection between the initial implementation of conscription in the 1960s and concerns 
for internal stability show that conscription would not have been possible without the 
earlier change in leadership. This permitted domestic policymakers with new ideas about 
the role of the military in society to take power and implement their preferred recruitment 
policies. 
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VI. Conclusion  
 Jordanian military policy was for all intents and purposes the sole preserve of 
British policymakers from the beginning of the Mandate system through the first ten 
years after independence. The resulting recruitment policies followed a logic that was 
consistent with how the British tended to think about the role of the military at the time. 
Although the British themselves used conscription for their own armed forces in the 
1940s, British thinking still favored volunteer recruitment. Domestically, conscription 
was viewed as an unfortunate necessity and was never intended to provide a permanent 
basis of recruitment.325 It was the government’s “constant aim to increase the proportion 
of regulars and…our ultimate object [to achieve] smaller active forces based on voluntary 
long-term engagements.”326 Moreover, the British citizens who led the Arab Legion 
became officers in a period before National Service was ever implemented. It is 
unsurprising that, as the evidence in this chapter shows, they preferred to recruit 
volunteers to the foreign army they were designing, as well.  
As British influence in Jordan declined, Jordanian policymakers became freer to 
experiment with alternative forms of recruitment. Nationalists who viewed regime 
stability as the primary goal and the military as an important resource for pursuing that 
goal came to power. They eventually implemented conscription, though only for a few 
years. Nonetheless, this shows that domestic leaders, when not constrained by high levels 
of external threat and foreign patrons, are able to adopt recruitment policies based on 
their own preferences. Moreover, these policies are more malleable, in part because they 
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are subject to changes in domestic politics rather than to the relatively more stable 
preferences of a foreign patron. 
Therefore, this chapter supports my argument that foreign patrons influence 
military recruitment in new states. It also supports the hypothesis that threat plays little 
role in influencing foreign patron’s military recruitment preferences, as the British 
maintained the Arab Legion as a volunteer force despite changes in threat perception. 
Finally, I have demonstrated that colonial legacies were not enough to shape recruitment 
practices in Jordan. Ottoman-era preference for conscription continued to influence 
Jordanian thinking through much of the post-independence period. The principal factor 
explaining Jordan’s volunteer recruitment system was the ongoing policy intervention of 
the British.  
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CHAPTER 5: IRAQ 
I. Introduction 
In 2003, the United States dismantled the Iraqi military and rebuilt it from the 
ground up, electing to design it around a system of volunteer recruitment. This was a 
stark change from the type of army Iraq had traditionally maintained. In fact, when it last 
had an army recruited on a volunteer basis, Iraq was under a similar occupation by a 
different foreign power. Then it was the United Kingdom, in its capacity as the colonial 
power overseeing a League of Nations Mandate, that oversaw and shaped Iraq’s armed 
forces.327 During the entire period of the Mandate, the United Kingdom exercised 
enormous influence over the entire Iraqi government, including the defense 
establishment, and sought to shape the army in its own image as a volunteer force. 
Nonetheless, Iraq adopted conscription nearly immediately upon receiving independence 
in 1932. Why? 
 In this chapter I argue that Iraq’s conscript army developed along the lines of my 
second causal pathway: military recruitment free from external patronage and external 
threat. Its recruitment policy was a result of Iraqi domestic policymaking, which was in 
                                                        
327 The legal basis for the British administration of Iraq changed with the ratification of the 1922 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, which established a system of home rule for Iraq but left the 
United Kingdom in charge of finance and foreign relations. Nonetheless, the Treaty replaced the 
Mandate more than it did remove it. See Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation 
Building and a History Denied (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), 20–23; Peter 
Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914–1932 (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 61; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, 
and Economic History (Beirut, Lebanon: Oxford University Press, 1968), 142; Majid Khadduri, 
Independent Iraq, 1932–1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1960), 5. Thus, for simplicity’s sake, I refer to the entire period of formal British influence, from 
the end of World War I until independence and admission to the League of Nations on October 3, 
1932, as the Mandatory period. Even after the treaty, Iraq’s independence process still centered 
around the question of how to end a mandate (see Ernest Main, Iraq: From Mandate to 
Independence (London, UK: Kegan Paul, 2004), 104). 
 170 
 
 
 
turn influenced by policymakers’ familiarity with and preference for Ottoman military 
practices. Furthermore, this relative freedom to adopt recruitment policies based on 
historical experiences was made possible by the absence of two key constraints on the 
Iraqi military. First, neither the United Kingdom nor any other country took on the role of 
a military patron—while the United Kingdom provided some support to Iraq after 
independence, as described below, it chose not to exert control over recruitment 
decisions. Second, there was no major external threat to Iraq’s security.  
Iraq’s decision to adopt conscription is even more puzzling given the apparent 
continuity in Iraqi politics after independence. The United Kingdom remained the 
paramount force in Iraqi politics well after the Mandate ended, and many scholars argue 
that it continued to exercise considerable influence over the Iraqi military.328 However, I 
argue that despite the United Kingdom’s continued influence, there was one key 
difference that characterized the relationship between Iraq and the United Kingdom after 
the former’s independence. While Iraq was dependent on military support from the 
United Kingdom, after independence it was granted autonomy to adopt its own military 
design decisions. The United Kingdom may still have had the capacity to intervene in 
military design if it wanted to, but it sent clear signals that Iraq could adopt its own 
preferences for recruitment policies. For the United Kingdom, the costs of continued 
intervention in Iraqi military design were too high given the history of rebellion and the 
availability of Jordan as a base of operations for the region.  
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 What, then, explains the Iraqi preference for conscription and its implementation 
after independence? I argue that the British attitude of non-interference, coupled with an 
environment of low external threats, created few constraints on Iraqi policymaking. 
Instead, Iraqi leaders’ personal beliefs about the role of the military in society influenced 
their decision-making. The recent experiences and education of Iraqi policy-makers 
fostered beliefs that the military could be a tool for nationbuilding—the process of 
creating a unified Iraqi national identity—and statebuilding—the strengthening of central 
state institutions. More specifically, post-independence Iraqi leaders were more the 
product of an Ottoman military education that stressed conscription’s nation- and 
statebuilding aspects than of the British advisors that had most recently trained them. In 
other words, in the absence of external influence after independence, one of Iraq’s 
competing colonial legacies—that of the Ottoman Empire—played a major role in 
determining recruitment decisions.  
 This explanation differs from the most common alternative theory presented in 
the literature on military organization, that recruitment decisions represent deeply 
ingrained culture or norms inherited from the colonial period. While both my theory and 
a colonial legacy argument attribute Iraqi decision-making to domestic ideology, they 
differ in terms of what constitutes the source of that ideology and how determinative it is. 
For one, my theory only attributes importance to ideology because two other factors—an 
interventionist foreign patron and a dangerous external environment—were not present to 
otherwise constrain policymaking. Furthermore, I do not assume that ideology is 
automatically passed down from colonizer to colonized. Rather, many states—Iraq 
included—are characterized by competing colonial or pre-colonial legacies that could 
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equally have become dominant after independence. In the case of Iraq, for example, it is 
not clear—until one examines the nature of Iraqi military training and development—
why an Ottoman cultural legacy would supersede the more recent British one.  
In addition, I recognize independence as an important critical juncture that, under 
the right conditions, permits new policymakers to act on their own ideas. These ideas 
may be influenced by cultural legacies, but are at least as likely to have more proximate 
origins. The fact that in Iraq’s case policymakers were influenced by less proximate 
historical ideas says more about how the circumstances in which Iraq achieved 
independence fostered continuity than it does about the prima facie power of a specific 
colonial legacy.  
Moreover, these early decisions have important implications for the modern Iraqi 
army. Iraq’s longtime reliance on conscription has left deep marks in its security culture. 
Post-2003 governments have considered re-implementing conscription in Iraq.329 
Consistent with my theory, the main obstacle to Iraq’s returning to its traditional form of 
recruitment is the high level of international involvement in military design and training 
since the 2003 invasion. The United States currently has hundreds of advisers in Iraq that 
have trained tens of thousands of Iraqi troops.330 In addition, at least 5,000 American 
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troops—likely more, given undisclosed deployments—have been participating in the war 
against Islamic State, which has required extensive cooperation with the Iraqi military.331 
If not for this overwhelming presence and advice, Iraq would likely return to conscript 
recruitment.   
However, this chapter focuses on the initial conditions in which Iraq built its 
military after its 1932 independence. I first describe the genesis of the Iraqi army and its 
organization during the Mandate era, highlighting the British role in these pre-
independence military design decisions. Second, I examine the extent to which British 
preferences diffused to their Iraqi patrons, arguing that, as in Jordan, the pre-Mandate 
Ottoman influence remained the dominant ideological force that affected Iraqi thought on 
military organization. In the next section I address the claims of my theory. I argue first, 
that the British did not play an active role in military design in Iraq after its 
independence, and second, that Iraqi leaders who did make military design decisions did 
not perceive their external threat environment to be particularly threatening. These two 
conditions created a permissive environment in which Iraqi leaders could design the 
military based on idiosyncratic factors relating to their prior beliefs about the relationship 
between the military and society.  
This chapter tests my theoretical claims in several ways. First, it highlights the 
importance of independence as a critical juncture in the process of military design. 
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Despite high levels of British influence before and after 1932, formal independence 
increased the costs of direct British interference in the field of military design, especially 
given divergent Iraqi preferences. Independence permitted Iraq greater control over its 
military policies, allowing it to deviate from existing British practices. 
Second, it emphasizes the freedom domestic political leaders have to design the 
military based on idiosyncratic preferences when they have neither committed foreign 
patrons nor major external threats to address. Thus the case of Iraq after independence is 
illustrative of my second causal pathway for military recruitment decisions. One cannot 
predict the recruitment practices the Iraqi military would adopt without a detailed 
understanding of the country’s leaders’ particular preferences. 
Finally, this chapter highlights the inability to understand military recruitment 
based on theories that rely purely on colonial legacy. A more traditional colonial legacy 
approach ignores two key facts about military recruitment in Iraq. First, it overlooks the 
immense difference in preferences between Iraqi and British policy elites during the key 
period of Iraqi military design. Colonial legacy arguments require believing that colonial 
preferences are passed on to the policymakers in the newly independent state. This was 
clearly not the case in Iraq. Thus, a colonial legacy argument cannot reconcile the 
immense British role in all aspects of Iraqi foreign and defense policy—including 
military design—during the Mandate era with the post-independence Iraqi leadership’s 
explicit rejection of British colonial practices. Second, an alternative explanation based 
on colonial legacy could highlight the continuity between the Ottoman period and post-
independence Iraqi military practices. However, this argument requires ignoring the very 
real influence of the British during the intervening Mandate era, as well as the possibility 
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that the British could have continued to enforce their preferences after independence. 
While ultimately Ottoman military preferences did influence independent Iraqi leaders’ 
decisions on military design, this was only possible because the British did not exercise 
their influence on the Iraqi military after independence. To argue that an Ottoman 
colonial legacy was the decisive factor leading to conscription in Iraq fails to 
acknowledge the ability of the British to overpower these underlying preferences for 
more than a decade during the Mandate era.  
 
II. The History of the Iraqi Army 
 As with the Jordanian army, the development of the Iraqi army combined 
powerful Ottoman-era influences with efforts to superimpose contemporary British 
interests. World War I ended with the United Kingdom in control of much of the Middle 
Eastern territory of the Ottoman Empire, including the territory that would become Iraq. 
In 1920 the San Remo Conference formalized this control under the aegis of the League 
of Nations Mandate system, which made the United Kingdom responsible for overseeing 
the creation of effective governance and stability in Iraq until it met the criteria for 
admission to the League of Nations as a sovereign state. Unsurprisingly, the British found 
the creation of armed forces to be useful for the purposes of establishing stability.  
The British created two separate armed forces. First, they recruited a force known 
as the Iraq or Assyrian Levies. Initially formed during World War I, the Levies were 
under direct British control and were ultimately manned mainly by ethnic Assyrians, 
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except for the officers, who were British.332 The Levies numbered more than 5,000 at 
their peak strength at the end of World War I, but had only light weaponry and were 
tasked primarily with guarding British military installations—air bases that were 
considered vital stop-overs on the way to India.333 They were also a major point of 
contention between Iraq and the United Kingdom. The British viewed the Levies as an 
important force loyal exclusively to them that could be counted upon absolutely to 
protect their assets within the country.334 For precisely this reason, the Iraqi government 
viewed the Levies as a major affront to their future sovereignty.335 
The British were aware of this tension and had no intention of making the Levies 
the national armed forces of Iraq. Well-trained locals were too scarce to dilute the ethnic 
makeup of the Levies, and in any event the British had no desire to give up control of the 
force that guarded their important military bases. Conversely, local opposition to British 
rule was too pervasive and powerful to deny Iraqis the important symbol of sovereignty 
that would come with control over their own military force. This became particularly 
clear after the 1920 rebellion against British direct rule. Indeed, Abbas Kadhim argues 
that this was the key memory for the British as they planned their administration of 
Iraq.336 The 1920 insurrection was largely caused by the perception of Iraqis that the 
British were reneging on their promises of home rule. While the cities remained largely 
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loyal and under British control, it inflicted major losses on both sides, bringing “almost 
total anarchy to the countryside.”337 Pacification required “some months of exhausting 
British military efforts,” including several “misadventures,” “the summoning of 
important reinforcements from India,” and expenditure of £40 million: much more than 
had been spent during contemporaneous conflicts elsewhere in the region.338 The high 
cost of the conflict also mobilized British domestic public opinion against intervention in 
Iraq.339 
One of the key consequences was the decision that continued intervention in 
Iraq’s domestic policies would be too costly. The British decided to accelerate Iraq’s 
transition to home rule, including the establishment of Feisal I as King of Iraq and the 
reduction of Iraqi reliance on British troops. While the British had more than 60,000 
troops in Iraq in 1920, only the Levies remained by 1930.340 Thus, it became clear that 
Iraq would need an army not only as an important symbol of home rule, but also to 
relieve the British of some of the responsibilities of enforcing stability.341 In addition, one 
way in which a locally recruited national army would contribute to stability was by 
providing employment for the “large and articulate group of unemployed and 
discontented” officers from the recently defeated Turkish army.342  
An Iraqi national army became an important part of the broader British strategy 
for disengaging from Iraq. On January 6th, 1921, the seeds of the Iraqi military were 
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planted when the Council of Ministers created the Iraqi General Staff.343 However, the 
key decisions about the development of the army were made by the British two months 
later when Winston Churchill, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, convened a 
conference in Cairo in 1921 in which the future of British policy in Iraq, including its 
defense, was decided. An important outcome of the conference was the determination 
that Iraq would need an indigenous army: one “staffed, run and funded by Iraqis.”344 
While the British continued to pay most of the cost for Iraqi defense forces, “the primary 
and constant goal of those in London was to reduce the costs of the Mandate by forcing 
the Iraqi government to take greater financial and strategic responsibility for its own 
defense as soon as it could.”345 The goals of the army reflected British concerns about 
maintaining influence at low cost to the British government. The army would be big 
enough to suppress internal unrest but small enough to prevent the state from revolting 
against the British.346 In 1922, 250 former Ottoman officers were inducted into the officer 
corps, with the army reaching an initial strength of 2,000 volunteer recruits.347 
The British sought to instill their military preferences in the Iraqi leadership in 
several ways. First, there was a British military advisory mission, which included at least 
46 military officers by 1930.348 In addition, the British helped set up an Iraqi Military 
College. The Royal Iraqi Military College opened in 1921 before closing for financial 
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reasons and reopening in 1924. The Director of the college and 15 out of 20 instructors 
were British.349 Instruction relied on English textbooks, and even experienced officers 
were required to redo their training along British lines.350 An additional Staff College for 
senior officers opened in 1928. 
Furthermore, the British retained ultimate authority for all Iraqi military matters. 
According to Marc Heller, “From 1920–1932 the army of Iraq was virtually a British 
appendage. During this period, it was directly financed by a British grant, and technical 
decisions about size, training, equipment, and so on were a British Monopoly.”351 The 
1922 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, ratified in 1924, secured the nature of this relationship, 
establishing that the United Kingdom would continue to be responsible for the external 
defense of Iraq. Moreover, a Military Agreement signed as subsidiary to the treaty 
maintained that Iraq could lose its British military assistance if it failed to follow the 
advice of the High Commissioner on military matters.352 This was no idle threat: The 
Bonar Law government—formed in 1922—seriously considered a complete evacuation 
of Iraq during its first few months, and a “fierce” campaign to “Quit Mesopotamia” filled 
the British press at the time.353 While the British were anxious to have the treaty ratified, 
doubts remained about the British role in Iraq should it not be ratified on favorable terms.  
Despite high levels of British influence in Iraq, Ottoman practices continued to 
dominate Iraqi military thinking. As al-Marashi and Salama write, citing recollections 
from a graduate of the Military College, the British attempted “to create officers in the 
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British mold, but Iraqis could not isolate themselves from the ideological currents in 
society.”354 This was also true of Iraqi policymakers. Shortly after independence the new 
government easily passed a bill calling for conscription.355 The next section details the 
failure of the British to inculcate Iraqi leaders with a preference for a volunteer military. 
 
III. Divergent Interests during the Mandate Era 
 Direct British influence in Iraqi military design ensured that the army would 
develop along British lines. However, without this British intervention, it is unlikely that 
the outcome for Iraqi military recruitment during the Mandatory period would have been 
the same. There were major disagreements between British and Iraqi policymakers 
throughout this period, explicitly over the form of military recruitment, that likely were 
resolved in Britain’s favor only due to its direct control over the military.  
 Iraqi leaders sought to implement conscription throughout the Mandatory period. 
In fact, conscription was one of the first proposals made by the government after Feisal 
became king in 1921.356 Iraqi policymakers wanted conscription because they viewed a 
strong army as increasing their chances for independence by demonstrating their ability 
to provide for their own defense.357 Al-Marashi and Salama note that one of the reasons 
                                                        
354 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 28. 
355 Simon, Iraq Between the Two World Wars, 111. Simon places the beginning of conscription in 
1933, while others describe somewhat different timelines, as late as 1935. Records at the British 
National Archives indicate that the National Service Law was read at the opening of Jamil Beg-
al-Madfai’s Parliament in 1933 and was passed early in 1934, though possibly not implemented 
until 1935 (TNA: FO 371/16903, “Iraq. Code 93 Files 85-105”; TNA: FO 371/20010, “Iraq. 
Code 93 Files 842-980”). All agree that support for conscription was high after independence and 
especially after the Assyrian uprising and subsequent government massacre of Assyrians in 
summer 1933. See Main, Iraq: From Mandate to Independence, 121 and Al-Marashi and Salama, 
Iraq’s Armed Forces, 33. 
356 Main, Iraq: From Mandate to Independence, 122. 
357 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 94, 183.  
 181 
 
 
 
Feisal was so eager to expand the army after independence was that “his kingdom could 
not ‘stand tall’ without a national army.”358 Feisal and his advisors viewed conscription 
as important not merely because they wanted a large army for military purposes, but also 
because they expected the military to serve as a unifying force for the nation. Toby 
Dodge, relying on British archival documents that cite Iraqi leaders’ views on 
conscription, describes how the “Hashemite vision of a mass conscripted army mirrored 
their conception of the state and nation. Conscription of the urban population into the 
army would forcibly create a homogenous and loyal nation through state action. The 
army was to be the primary tool of education and statebuilding.”359 According to Reeva 
Simon, who examines the background of Iraqi leaders, they “hoped to make the army a 
school for the nation, an extension of the educational system.”360 She cites Phebe Marr’s 
biography of Yasin al-Hashimi—a Prime Minister both before and after independence—
as evidence that it became “close to a dogma” that conscription could be used “to achieve 
national cohesion.”361 Iraqi leaders again tried to implement conscription in 1926 by 
presenting High Commissioner Henry Dobbs with a draft conscription law.362 In 
parliamentary debates over the issue, Iraq’s first Minister of Defense, Jafar al-Askari 
argued that conscription would not just aid defense but would “open the door of 
participation” and “be more inclusive of the racial qualities and national virtuies with 
which the Iraqi nation is graced than an army built on any other basis.”363 
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 This belief in the efficacy of conscription can be traced to the continued 
dominance of Ottoman thinking in the Iraqi military, which Simon argues was the 
intellectual foundation for much of the Iraqi army. For one, strong anti-British currents 
continued to run through the military. The majority of army officers had served in the 
Ottoman military, with dozens of Iraqi cadets having been accepted to the military 
academy in Istanbul.364 Even in September 1936, four years after independence, 50 out of 
84 officers had served in the Ottoman army.365 Exposure to Ottoman military education, 
argues Simon, was in effect indoctrination with the principle of “unification of diverse 
elements into a nation based on a common language and history.”366 Thus the Iraqi 
military viewed conscription as the appropriate solution to a domestic statebuilding 
problem: how to build support for a weak central government dominated by a minority 
group elite. Even mandatory British military training was insufficient to overcome these 
influences. Although most instructors were British, the ex-Ottoman instructors at the 
Military College still “conveyed to their students Arabism and anti-imperialist ideas.”367  
 Second, this Ottoman influence in the military was replicated in the ruling class. 
Indeed, the British choice for political leadership lay “among the city notables and the 
former Ottoman officials and officer class.”368 This was not least because many of the 
leaders of Iraq under the Mandate were former military officials, like Jafar al Askari and 
Nuri Said, both of whom served as prime minister during the Mandate. Paul Hemphill 
agrees that continued contact with Ottoman ideas via Ottoman-era military instructors 
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influenced policies: “Officers who had served in the Ottoman and Arab armies continued 
to mix with former comrades-in-arms….Cadets and junior officers, to whom teachers and 
instructors had conveyed the ideas of their elders, remained in touch with school friends 
and family acquaintances who had selected civilian careers.”369 Thus it is unsurprising 
that Ottoman thinking about the military and the role of conscription was common among 
Iraqi policymakers. A British report from the time also contends that “Iraqi politicians of 
all shades of opinions have long wished to change the system of recruiting for the army. 
They have inherited continental ideas on [conscription] through the Turks and believe 
that conscripts are better fighters than professional soldiers,” as well as because “they 
believe that it will strengthen national unity among the diverse peoples of Iraq and will 
enable the Government to organize a much larger army without seriously increasing the 
cost of maintenance.”370 
 It is important to recognize that the Ottoman influence on policymakers did not 
extend to all sectors of society. Many groups were deeply opposed to conscription. 
Indeed, one problem with cultural determinism explanations for military recruitment is 
that the history of opposition to conscription runs just as deep as the history of state 
enforcement of conscription. Under the Ottoman Empire, conscription disproportionately 
affected the Shi’a tribes and was “the most resented” of Ottoman institutions.371 
Similarly, the Iraqi leadership’s desire to implement conscription was a major point of 
contention with the British in part because of opposition from the Shi’a tribes, whose 
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support the British relied on to secure the countryside.372 These tribes continued to 
oppose vigorously efforts to conscript their members to the Iraqi national army after 
independence.373 
 Meanwhile, despite the preferences of Iraqi leaders, the British remained starkly 
opposed to the idea of a conscript-based Iraqi army. There are both pragmatic and 
cultural reasons for the United Kingdom’s interest in keeping the Iraqi army a volunteer 
force. For one, as Peter Sluglett demonstrates using British archival documents, the 
United Kingdom’s use of air power allowed them to justify keeping a small Iraqi army 
that was reliant on them.374 Dobbs feared that rapidly expanding the army would lead to 
major domestic unrest.375 Thus maintaining a small army perpetuated the United 
Kingdom’s position of dominance in Iraq. Ultimately, as the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies indicated in a letter to the High Commissioner in 1928, the United Kingdom 
was not prepared to allow Iraq to adopt policies that would make it independent on 
matters of defense.376 Preventing conscription, which the British perceived as enabling 
Iraq to recruit a much larger army, would keep it dependent on the British. Less 
cynically, the British were concerned that the adoption of conscription would alienate the 
Shi’a tribes and lead to internal disorder.377 Of course, it is difficult to separate these 
British attitudes toward conscription in Iraq from their own experience with military 
recruitment. Dobbs was opposed to conscription on the grounds that it was “A policy 
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which is against all our traditions.”378 It is telling that the British opposed conscription 
despite their belief that “speedy progress with the creation of the army [was] the most 
important and urgent problem” of the day.379 This reinforces the idea of a deep-seated 
British opposition to conscription, which led the British to oppose it despite having some 
advantages in achieving British goals. 
 Regardless of the reasons, it is clear that the United Kingdom actively opposed 
Iraqi leaders’ preference for conscription. Furthermore, it is this opposition that kept Iraq 
from adopting conscription before independence. As one British report notes, “Until 1932 
the Iraqi Government reluctantly gave way to British views.”380 There were some 
minority views among British advisors that conscription could be useful, and the issue 
was actively debated. A key example illustrating the importance of Iraqi military 
recruitment to the United Kingdom can be found in the debates that followed Iraqi 
attempts to introduce a conscription law in 1926. British advisors debated the merits of 
conscription and how it should be implemented. Kinahan Cornwallis, advisor to the Iraqi 
Minister of the Interior, for example, wrote to the High Commissioner suggesting 
conscription because there was “no virtue in the maintenance of a large voluntary army 
without a reserve.”381 Moreover, he noted the importance of determining whether “the 
forces of His Majesty’s Government will be available” to enforce conscription.382 This 
indicates that military recruitment was important not just to local officials but to the 
government of the United Kingdom as well.   
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However, this also underscores the fact that British support for conscription was 
contingent on British willingness to enforce a policy that they deemed would be 
unpopular in Iraq. Ultimately, the British determined that conscription was not a viable 
option and that they could not support it. Their concerns principally stemmed from the 
unpopularity of conscription across much of Iraq. Official correspondence shows that 
High Commissioner Dobbs feared that “conscription would arouse the intense hostility of 
the rural population across Iraq.”383 The result, he predicted, would be that conscription 
could not be applied to the tribal sections of the population, leading to “urban and 
suburban sections of society as the only source of possible recruits” and resulting in 
severe consequences for the available workforce.384 Worse still, efforts to enforce 
conscription “would be followed by a widespread tribal combination and rising which 
might easily bring about a return of the conditions of 1920”—precisely the conditions 
that the United Kingdom sought to avoid by permitting home rule.385 
 
IV. Iraqi Military Freedom after Independence 
 The British interest in Iraqi military design was strong while the United Kingdom 
remained formally responsible for Iraq’s stability. This situation changed after Iraq 
achieved independence. The United Kingdom was no longer willing to exert direct 
control over the Iraqi military. Moreover, it made this abundantly clear to Iraqis in the 
years leading up to independence. This, combined with a low perception of external 
threats that permitted Iraq to focus on internal security, allowed leaders to adopt a 
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military recruitment policy based on domestic preferences informed by their idiosyncratic 
socialization with Ottoman ideas about the role of the military in society. 
A. British Involvement After Independence 
 Many scholars have argued that Iraq continued to be dependent on the United 
Kingdom well after independence.386 The 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed after the 
British announced their intention to recommend the League of Nations recognize Iraq, 
ending the mandate establishing the post-independence relationship between Iraq and the 
United Kingdom. The treaty required Iraq to consult with the United Kingdom in all 
foreign policy matters. The British also maintained military instructors in Iraq until the 
1950s.387 
 While this may have been the case, the British chose not to exercise their 
influence in the sphere of military design. As Toby Dodge argues, the “power and role of 
British advisers changed dramatically” during the middle years of the Mandate, 
decreasing in influence from “exercising executive control to assisting Iraqi office 
holders.”388 He cites one British civil servant as describing the role of advisor as, 
“whether you call him an Under-Secretary or Inspector-General or a Director, is an 
Englishman.”389 Indeed, British policymakers did not perceive Iraq to constitute any vital 
interests. Mark Heller argues that, with no oil production until 1927, “at the end of World 
War I, British cultural and commercial interests in Iraq were of minor importance,” and 
that “Iraq was never deemed to be as vital to the imperial system as were, for example, 
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Egypt or Aden.”390 Although he maintains that British influence was preserved even after 
independence, he explains that this influence was insufficiently applied compared to 
Jordan, and he acknowledges that the British “relinquished direct control” in 1932.391 
Principal British interests were in the maintenance of their several air bases throughout 
the country. However, they were able to provide security for these using the Levies after 
independence, and so did not need to rely on Iraqi national forces.  
 The absence of major strategic interests in Iraq suggests little need for the United 
Kingdom to have extended the resources necessary to ensure that the Iraqi army 
continued to implement British-preferred policies after Iraq was granted independence. 
Dodge argues that from the very beginning, the British “were very aware of the 
temporary nature of their tutelage” and that “Britain’s primary policy goal from 1927 
onward was to unburden itself of its international responsibilities towards Iraq as quickly 
as possible.”392 Others have also argued that the Mandate was clearly not intended to be a 
long-term arrangement. Ernest Main, writing in 1935, describes how in the subsidiary 
Military Agreement, both parties agreed that “the Government of Iraq should at the 
earliest possible date accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and 
the defence of the country from foreign aggression: British military assistance was to be 
progressively reduced ‘with all possible expedition’ [emphasis added].”393 Similarly, the 
1924 Military Agreement provided that “Iraq should within four years become entirely 
self-defending, from both internal disorder and external assault.”394 This policy was 
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emphasized yet again during the renegotiations of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1930, with 
the High Commissioner declaring that a principle goal was the “acceleration of the 
assumption of the administrative responsibilities by the Iraq Government so far as 
consistent with treaty obligations.”395  
Given the contradiction between the British desire to exert influence and their 
preference for doing so with minimal commitment, it should come as no surprise that the 
efforts to instill British military education during the Mandate era were insufficient to 
change Iraqi beliefs about the utility of conscription. With no diffusion of British beliefs 
about military effectiveness, only a willingness to exert continued control over military 
affairs could have led Iraq to continue to use volunteer recruitment after independence. 
The discussion in this section shows that the British sought to minimize their 
involvement in Iraq after independence. However, they also made clear statements about 
their unwillingness to get involved in debates over conscription. As early as 1927, the 
Overseas Defence Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence determined that the 
United Kingdom “must leave the Iraq Government, if it thinks it wise to do so, to attempt 
to enforce [conscription] in sole reliance on its own military forces or police.”396 This 
became British policy and was communicated to the Iraqi government by mid-1927.397 In 
the context of the Mandate at a time when Britain had yet to formally propose Iraq’s 
independence, this could be perceived as an effort to coerce Iraq into maintaining 
Britain’s preferred policies—Iraqi leaders knew that they lacked the capacity to 
implement conscription effectively, and feared the consequences of attempting to govern 
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without British security assistance.398 After independence, though, when the United 
Kingdom had even less capacity to control Iraqi decision-making, this should be taken as 
evidence of the United Kingdom’s unwillingness to act as a military patron. This enabled 
Iraq to pursue its own policies after independence.  
B. Low Threat Environment After Independence   
 Given the control of local Iraqi policymakers over military design, it is next 
important to determine whether the external threat environment constrained their 
recruitment decisions. While there were several potential external threats to Iraq, none 
was particularly acute, especially when compared to the threat of internal unrest. For 
example, the border disputes with Turkey and Saudi Arabia had been settled in 1927 and 
1930, respectively. According to Sluglett, after these issues were settled, “there were few 
instances, or threats, of invasion from outside, and in any case the deterrent effect of the 
British connection was the main bulwark against such possibilities.”399 The League of 
Nations, for its part, determined that Iraq did not have sufficient military forces to protect 
its borders but that its League membership and alliance with Britain would suffice to 
provide external defense.400 With the 1930 Treaty of Alliance securing British 
responsibility for external defense, domestic security remained as the sole responsibility 
of the Iraqi army.  
 There is strong evidence that external threats were sufficiently low that the Iraqi 
military could focus on internal threats rather than external ones. The orientation of the 
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Iraqi army towards internal threats indicates that external threats were not a priority. 
Scholars are in agreement that the army was primarily designed with internal threats in 
mind. Eliezer Be’eri writes that that “Since the inception of the state, the main occupation 
of the Iraqi army has been internal policing and repression,” while Nadav Safran goes 
even further, arguing that “From the time of the creation of the modern Iraqi state after 
World War I, the Iraqi armed forces were designed exclusively to uphold the authority of 
the government internally and to keep the country together in the face of strong 
centrifugal tendencies.”401 Ernest Main assessed that interior threats were more likely to 
be severe enough to require British assistance than external ones—in particular, “the 
northern and eastern mountains and the middle Euphrates” where “there live tribes—
Kurds and Assyrians in the one case, in the other Arabs—impatient of all political 
control, raiders and looters by inclination and by tradition, and determined opponents of 
any regime of law and order. If they feel strong enough to resist it.”402 
Iraqi leaders were primarily concerned with internal threats, and in particular 
sought to use the army as a tool for statebuilding. They viewed conscription as an 
effective way of increasing the strength of the state vis-à-vis the tribes and of 
strengthening an Iraqi national identity over minority identities. It has already been 
shown that Iraqi leaders were influenced by Ottoman principles that emphasized the 
army’s ability to create a cohesive national identity. This remained the principal goal of 
the military after independence. In a 1932 paper, al-Askari emphasized that the priority 
for the military was addressing internal threats by arguing for the need for the state to 
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have a strong military “to protect its institutions.”403 This paper “stressed that the Iraqi 
Army’s priority should be devoted to dealing with internal security, enforcing the rule of 
law, and collecting weapons owned by civilians.”404  
Similarly, King Feisal was primarily concerned with the army’s weaknesses in 
relationship to the countryside, where 100,000 rifles were dispersed among the 
population in comparison to the army’s 15,000.405 He assessed that the first and second 
priorities in strengthening the country should be “to increase the numerical force of the 
army, so that it could suppress at least two simultaneous uprisings,” and to implement 
conscription.406 Thus the goals of the army according to two key Iraqi policymakers 
address internal rather than external threats. This emphasis on internal threats created 
more flexibility for Iraqi leaders to rely on their personal beliefs about military design. 
Notably, in this case, Iraqi leaders’ perceptions about military design were based on 
Ottoman beliefs about the necessity of using conscription to build a strong state and 
national identity—beliefs which resulted in the same outcome that likely would have 
occurred if Iraqi policymakers had focused on external threats, since Iraqi policymakers 
also emphasized conscription’s ability to rapidly expand the army.    
 
V. Conclusion 
 The story of the Iraqi army’s genesis resembles that of Jordan in many ways. Both 
countries had weak central administrations with limited public legitimacy. The 
individuals who constituted the military in both countries also had strong roots in and 
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familiarity with Ottoman era military policies. Finally, the United Kingdom played a 
major role in the redesign of each country’s military institutions in the pre-independence 
era, and maintained substantial influence in defense policies after independence. 
However, whereas the Jordanian military continued to develop along British lines, 
maintaining volunteer recruitment after independence, the Iraqi army quickly deviated 
from its colonial patron’s plans and instituted conscription once it was independent.  
 This chapter has argued that the principal difference between the two cases lies in 
the degree of the United Kingdom’s influence over each state’s military policies. 
Whereas in Jordan the United Kingdom continued to exert direct control over the military 
via the presence of British officers and in particular the command of former British 
officer John Bagot Glubb, there was no analog in Iraq. The British maintained advisors in 
Iraq, but not in positions in which they had command over troops. Instead, advisors’ roles 
were “surprisingly limited,” merely requiring Iraqi ministers to consider the advice of 
their advisors and to consult with them.407 In contrast, in Jordan British officers continued 
to lead troops, including during the Arab-Israeli war. The use of native officers with prior 
experience in a conscript army limited British ability to influence the shape of Iraq’s 
army. Moreover, the British adopted an explicit policy that distanced them from 
extensive intervention in Iraqi military and defense policy. Thus, whereas in Jordan the 
British continued to dominate military organizational decisions, Iraqi leaders were left 
with a relatively free hand to pursue their personal preferences. 
 Available resources do not establish explicitly why the British were more willing 
to engage in extensive military design efforts in Jordan than in Iraq. However, it can be 
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surmised that several factors were at play. One reason may simply be that the territories 
were considered redundant; if all that was necessary was a regional foothold with which 
to secure communications to India and establish stability in Palestine, the British may 
have decided that high levels of influence in both Iraq and Jordan were unnecessary.  
The decision to invest in control in Jordan but not Iraq was likely also influenced 
by the relative cost of intervention in each territory. Recall from Chapter 2 that the 
decision to establish or maintain patronage is essentially a cost-benefit analysis. If 
patronage is perceived as offering little benefit and requiring high costs, powerful states 
are likely to try to avoid become a patron. High costs can reduce the likelihood that 
patronage will develop even if there are substantial benefits to be gained. As discussed 
above, the 1920 rebellion in Iraq played a major role in convincing the British to 
minimize their interference in Iraq by revealing the degree of opposition to British rule 
and the costs associated with maintaining it. While there was some tribal opposition to 
British rule in Jordan, rebellion there never reached the level it did in Iraq in 1920.408 
Thus, the British may have evaluated that patronage in Jordan could be achieved at a 
lower cost. 
 Iraq’s path toward a conscript army also differed from that in Bosnia, which is 
discussed in the next chapter. Local policymakers in Bosnia were also able to set military 
policy for a similar reason—the abdication of control by a potential patron. However, 
whereas a high threat environment led Bosnian policymakers to rely on conscription for 
defensive reasons, there were no such constraints in Iraq. On the contrary, Iraqi leaders 
perceived a permissive external environment. As a result, they designed the military to 
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maximize their domestic, statebuilding goals. This meant that their ideas about military 
design were not constrained by external forces but rather were influenced by their prior 
understandings about the role of the military in society.  
 The development of the Iraqi military since independence is a paradigmatic 
example of the path dependency of military recruitment. The Iraqi decision to adopt 
conscription after independence can be traced to their leadership’s greater familiarity 
with conscription from their experience in the Ottoman military education system. As a 
result, they came to view conscription as the best way to achieve their military goals: the 
creation of a strong nationally unified state. These preferences held strong despite a 
period of British political domination, during which they could not be achieved. 
However, once military recruitment was autonomously decided, the same system was 
maintained for decades, through multiple political changes. Only when Iraq was once 
again dominated by a foreign power, seventy years after its initial military design, did its 
military recruitment system change. 
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CHAPTER 6: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
I. Introduction 
The Bosnian armed forces used conscription throughout the Bosnian war for 
independence, which began almost immediately upon international recognition of the 
new state in 1992 and lasted until the signing of the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace—more commonly referred to as the Dayton Agreement—in 1995. Far from merely 
being a peace treaty, the Dayton Agreement included a constitution for the new state and 
detailed descriptions of its new political institutions, drafted with extensive oversight 
from members of the international community—most notably, the United States. 
Conspicuously absent from this otherwise comprehensive blueprint for statebuilding, 
however, was any substantial effort to create a centralized military. Instead, each of the 
three formerly warring ethnic parties—Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs—
maintained de facto control over their own armies. The result was a classic ethnic 
security dilemma.409 Amidst an atmosphere of extreme mutual distrust, each ethnic army 
continued to use conscription—despite continually downsizing the number of their 
enlisted personnel—for a decade after the Dayton Agreement had established the first 
permanent instruments of government for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and made three 
ethnic communities partners in a single state.  
This institutional inertia, influenced by high levels of external threat, governed 
military design for all three communities in BiH until 2002, when the new High 
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated a process of defense reform. A first 
defense reform commission permitted conscription to continue when it issued its 
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recommendations in September 2003. However, the second Defense Reform Commission 
report required a full transition to an all-volunteer force on January 1, 2006, only a few 
months after issuing its recommendations. Bosnia remained a virtual international 
protectorate, which raised the question: what changed? What was different about the 
initial period of military design that led BiH to build a conscript army? 
This chapter compares the conditions in which military design choices were made 
to explain why policymakers considered a volunteer army both feasible and desirable in 
2005, but not in 1995. I also engage in a process-trace of the 2005 Defence Reform 
Commission’s decision to end conscription. This allows me to determine what actors 
were responsible for military recruitment decisions and what motivated their preferences 
at each point in time. By looking forward in time from the initial point of military design 
to examine a policy change, I can make inferences about the counterfactual: under what 
circumstances would actors have elected for volunteer forces after the Dayton Accords? 
In doing so, I am able to gain additional traction in identifying the actors and conditions 
that influenced the decision to use conscription in 1995. 
I find that the actors responsible for military design changed throughout this 
period. I argue that despite the international involvement in Bosnian independence and 
political development, external actors intentionally avoided influence over organizational 
aspects of the new state’s military design. In the absence of a strong, external patron 
willing to lead the way on these military matters, local preferences determined military 
design. Furthermore, these local preferences were defined by what the leaders of each 
ethnic community perceived as a highly threatening environment. A weak central 
government and continued ethnic mobilization meant conflict and ethnic cleansing could 
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easily re-erupt on short notice, making it too risky a proposition for any one party to 
unilaterally reduce its available manpower. Thus, this case of military design is 
representative of my third causal pathway: Domestic threat perceptions determined the 
initial recruitment practices in BiH in the context of major external security concerns.  
This chapter similarly provides evidence against several alternative explanations 
about the use of conscription. It suggests, contrary to many realist expectations, that 
many actors continue today to view conscription as the preferable form of military 
recruitment, despite advances in technology that have made volunteer militaries more 
accessible. Furthermore, while historical experiences, including colonial practices, may 
affect policymakers’ preferences for conscription, they are not determinative. 
Intervention by foreign actors can overpower these preferences, or even change them.  
To support my argument, I rely primarily on memoirs and original interviews 
with policymakers who were involved with defense reform in Bosnia throughout this 
period. Interviews, in particular, were important to capture the micro-level causal 
processes that my theory predicts.410 While much has been written on defense reform in 
Bosnia, the role of conscription takes a back seat in these studies to the more contentious 
issues of military and defense integration of former enemy forces. This makes it difficult 
to discern precisely how recruitment fit into broader debates over military organization 
and what factors weighed most heavily on the outcome. Indeed, a key goal in using 
interviews is to determine who made the key decisions about recruitment and why. 
Therefore, my interviews provided important information about the decision-makers and 
                                                        
410 Cathie Jo Martin, “Crafting Interviews to Capture Cause and Effect,” in Interview Research in 
Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 109–124 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): 
119. 
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their goals that is typical of studies engaging in process tracing.411 They provided causal 
process observations that were useful both for determining the values of my independent 
variables and to challenge arguments emphasizing a culturally deterministic mechanism 
of military diffusion.412  
 
II. Interview Methodology 
I began by contacting individuals who were directly involved in Bosnian defense 
reform processes, and used a snowball technique to identify additional interviewees. 
While snowball sampling risks biasing data by decreasing the representativeness of the 
sample, this is not a major concern in my study. My goal is to process-trace the creation 
of the BiH military. When process-tracing, “one cares less about getting a representative 
sample” than about learning “who is responsible for causing the particular action” or 
“how events unfold.”413 I am not studying responses themselves so much as I am using 
the interviewees as “expert sources of information.”414 Moreover, a snowball technique 
increased my ability to access important respondents.  
I spoke with 18 people who were intimately familiar with different aspects of the 
creation and development of the Bosnian army. This is a substantial portion of those who 
were influential on issues relating to conscription in Bosnia, and included all those who 
                                                        
411 Julia F. Lynch, “Aligning Sampling Strategies with Analytic Goals,” in Interview Research in 
Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 31–44 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): 36. 
412 James Mahoney, “After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research,” World 
Politics 62:1 (2010): 120–147. 
413 Martin, “Crafting Interviews,” 113; Lynch, “Aligning Sampling Strategies,” 40. 
414 Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, and David C. 
Kimball, “Lessons from the ‘Lobbying and Policy Change’ Project,” in Interview Research in 
Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 209–224 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): 
214. 
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were identified in existing literature and through my interviews as the most important. It 
quickly became clear that the community of defense policymakers for BiH is fairly small, 
and that those focusing on conscription constitute an even more specialized group. By 
around the fourteenth interview, interviewees were identifying the same set of people as 
influential or knowledgeable about recruitment decisions—many of whom were people to 
whom I had already spoken.  
Respondents included people working at all levels of policy formulation, from 
military officials and technical advisors, to ambassadors, civil servants, and Bosnian 
cabinet ministers. Most were associated with the international community in some form, 
most often as representatives or employees of NATO or the OSCE, rather than parties 
representing policymakers for BiH. Twelve interviewees were or are now American 
nationals, though only five of these represented American interests at the commissions. 
Indeed, most interviewees stressed their role as members of an organization or institution. 
They explicitly and preemptively distanced themselves from the preferences or actions of 
a government they did not represent. Furthermore, two of three Bosnians I interviewed 
were Defense Ministers, one of whom attained this position as a direct result of the 
Defense Reform Commissions. Twelve interviewees were directly involved in the 
Defense Reform commissions as full members of the secretariat or as part of working 
groups. Information about what periods of defense reform the respondents participated in 
is available in table 5.1.415 
                                                        
415 Appendix B has more information on my interview methodology. Most interviewees agreed to 
be identified. Some, however, requested anonymity because they were unsure about the continued 
confidentiality of some information. I have only used names or other identifying information 
when I was granted explicit permission to do so.  
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 Erich Bleich and Robert Pekkanen distill the array of critiques often levied at 
interview methods into three categories of potential concern: how representative are the 
interviewees of the broader sample population, was the interview of sufficient quality to 
reveal the right information, and how accurate is the researcher’s report of the interview 
content?416 I hope to have alleviated concerns about the representativeness and quality of 
my interviews by having described my methods in this section. However, it is important 
that I demonstrate that I am not cherry-picking quotes or hearing what I want to hear. To 
that end, I attempt to be clear about the extent to which the sentiments and facts reported 
by interviewees reflect responses from others who had similar knowledge.417 I also report 
responses suggestive of mechanisms other than those that I hypothesize. While some 
respondents attributed the choice of recruitment system to multiple factors, the weight of 
evidence from interviews, memoirs, and secondary literature suggests that military threats 
and international pressure were the most important factors.  
 
III. Military Design and the Dayton Agreement 
The military design agreed to during the Dayton Agreement reinforced the war-
time status quo. Bosnia’s constitution created a weak central state, with most powers 
belonging the two Entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) and 
                                                        
416 Erik Bleich and Robert Pekkanen, “How to Report Interview Data,” in Interview Research in 
Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 84–105 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
While several interviewees noted that their memory was a problem when answering some 
questions, this only led to the need to end an interview early in one instance. Moreover, many 
interviewees continued to work in Bosnian defense reform for years after the creation of the all-
volunteer army, while others have been interviewed on similar subjects repeatedly since then as 
well—facts that should decrease recall bias. 
417 I also contacted all interviewees to discuss how I was using quotes before publication. Most 
interviewees replied and continued our dialogue. 
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Republika Srpska (RS)—which represented the country’s Muslim and Croat population, 
and Bosnian Serbs, respectively. This allowed the Entities to assume control over military 
and defense decisions. While the constitution gave the central government control over 
foreign policy, its responsibility for preserving the country’s “sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, political independence, and international personality” was contingent on the 
“division of responsibilities between the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”418 The 
Entities also had explicit authority to take appropriate measures to “provide a safe and 
secure environment for all persons” in their territories, as well as residual powers not 
explicitly assigned to the institutions of the central government.419  
Most tellingly, the constitution makes several references to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s multiple armed forces, even establishing a Standing Committee on 
Military Matters (SCMM) to coordinate their activities. The SCMM was Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s sole defense institution in the years after Dayton. The Entities maintained 
complete autonomy to continue to administer their own armed forces. In fact, the 
Federation itself was so weak that even the Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces remained 
separate, meaning there were essentially three armies instead of two. All three continued 
their wartime practice of conscription.  
The international community invested little time and energy in redesigning the 
military institutions of the newly independent central state it helped to create. However, 
the United States and its allies devoted substantial efforts to downsizing and demobilizing 
wartime forces, which they perceived as necessary to reduce overall tension levels and 
                                                        
418 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), Annex 4, 
Article 3, Sections 1 and 5. November 21, 1995. Available at 
http://peacemaker.un.org/bosniadaytonagreement95. 
419 GFAP, Annex 4, Article 3, Sections 2 and 3. 
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the likelihood of renewed conflict. Annex 1-B of the Dayton accords established strict 
limits on arms importations, as well as a clear force ratio that would define final military 
sizes of each of the armies.420 However, the principal vehicle for achieving 
demobilization and downsizing was the “Train and Equip” program for the Federation 
army. This program was intended to recreate a balance of power between the Bosniaks 
and Bosnian Serbs by improving the capabilities of the Federation forces. By canceling 
out the RS advantage in equipment, Train and Equip was a major incentive convincing 
Bosniaks to sign the peace deal.421     
Unlike constitutional provisions such as the SCMM that established new chains of 
command and organizational procedures, Train and Equip could work within the existing 
institutional framework of the Federation army. It worked by helping Federation troops to 
learn new skills, not by redesigning the military and its relationship to society. 
Nonetheless, the existence of Train and Equip raises the question of why the United 
States was willing to exert influence in one realm of military policy—capabilities—but 
not in other realms that could arguably have a larger and longer lasting effect. Changes to 
organizational policies that would reinforce military power-sharing through unified 
recruitment mechanisms could potentially reduce the security dilemma, while eliminating 
conscription altogether would reduce each side’s ability to quickly mobilize large 
segments of the population.  
                                                        
420 GFAP, Annex 1-B, Article IV.  
421 Christopher J. Lamb, Sarah Arkin, and Sally Scudder, The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: 
A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 2014); See also Derek Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords: A 
Study of American Statecraft (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 164.  
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There are several reasons why this may have been the case. I argue in the next 
section that the international community viewed changes to military organization—which 
disrupt both existing domestic power structures and the external balance of power—as 
too threatening to the fragile peace. Train and Equip, on the other hand, contributed to 
peace by reinforcing a balance of power. The United States did not believe that a major 
change such as a transition to an all-volunteer force would reinforce peace, given the 
volatile security environment. Any effort to make such a drastic change carried too great 
a risk of backfiring. As a result, international policymakers spent little time thinking 
about how such organizational changes could even be implemented. While Bosnian 
leaders clearly also preferred to retain conscription, it was the fact that the international 
community had other priorities and so approached military change cautiously that led to 
recruitment continuity, not Bosnian intransigence.  
 
IV. International Interests and Domestic Military Design 
Upon first inspection, BiH appears to be a deviant case: its continued reliance on 
conscription would run in contrast to the expectations of all existing theories about when 
states should use compulsory recruitment policies.422 Bosnia gained independence at a 
time when military effectiveness-based arguments would expect the need for conscription 
to be at an all-time low. The end of the Cold War, coupled with advances in capital-
intensive technologies, was reducing the need for states to rely on costly, manpower-
intensive armies for defense. At the same time and for the same reasons, the international 
                                                        
422Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).  
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environment itself was less threatening, and therefore allowed states to be less concerned 
with traditional security and territorial defense. The presence of 60,000 NATO-led peace 
enforcement troops on the ground in BiH should also have eliminated the need for local 
forces to provide security.  
The United States, in particular, devoted time, money, reputation, and 
personnel—including 20,000 troops—to negotiating and enforcing the Dayton 
Agreement. One might expect, then, that the international community’s considerable 
effort to design political institutions in Bosnia would have also carried over to military 
reform. Cultural or organizational arguments would suggest that the extensive role of the 
United States in creating and enforcing the Dayton Agreement and training and equipping 
the new Bosnian army should produce emulation, resulting in the establishment of an 
American-style volunteer military. Similarly, the heavy-handed influence of foreign 
actors in completely rewriting the Bosnian constitution and administering political 
institutions reduces the likelihood that pre-independence practices would automatically 
be replicated in the new state. 
As this chapter will show, local threat perceptions determined military policies in 
the period of statebuilding that followed the Dayton Agreement. International actors were 
deeply invested in securing peace in Bosnia. Importantly, however, foreign intervention 
in the new state’s military design was actually intentionally minimized during the Dayton 
negotiations, and was essentially absent for years afterwards. The only state with the 
resources and interests to act as a military patron, the United States, viewed more overt 
intervention into military policies as too destabilizing to the fragile peace that had been 
achieved. As a result, it was domestic politicians’ preferences and beliefs about local 
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security that were most relevant to the continued use of conscription in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina after the war.  
 Evidence that Bosnia’s foreign benefactors wanted to distance themselves from 
military design emerged early in the negotiation process. While the European Union and 
the United States played active roles in negotiating and implementing the peace 
settlement, both actors viewed interference in the organization of the post-conflict 
militaries as a bridge too far. This is somewhat surprising given the extent of foreign 
military activities in Bosnia both before and after Dayton. This is particularly true for the 
United States. Ultimately, while Europeans contributed to the peacebuilding effort, it was 
the Americans who called the shots. As the first High Representative of BiH wrote, it is a 
“simple and fundamental fact that on key occasions the United States was the only player 
who possessed the ability to employ power as a political instrument and when forced into 
action was also willing to do so.”423 If any foreign power was able to expend further 
resources to reshape the Bosnian army, it was the United States. 
This was not something that interested the United States during the mid-1990s. 
Instead, elites driving Bosnia policy in the U.S. viewed Bosnia as a quagmire that had 
unfortunately engaged American reputation and its commitment to NATO.424 The best 
solution was to stabilize the region and get out, with as little commitment as that goal 
would allow. As one high ranking member of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) said, 
                                                        
423 Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld and 
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424 Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 13; Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of 
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“"Did we want to have 22,000 troops committed to the Balkans in Europe? No! We 
thought it was a European problem, but to make this work the US had to step up.”425 
This can be seen in part through the limited American efforts to influence military 
design during the war. The Americans indicated an initial willingness to engage in 
military design when it mediated a cease-fire and federation agreement between Bosnian 
Muslims and Croat forces in February 1994.426 U.S. policy intended to decrease Bosnian 
Serb bargaining leverage by ending the conflict between Muslims and Croats and 
strengthening their military forces. The Federation Agreement signed in Washington on 
March 1, 1994 called for the unification of their two armies, including the establishment 
of a joint command.427 Subsequently, a small advisory mission of 15 American officers, 
led by a retired U.S. major general, was dispatched at the end of 1994 to integrate the 
Muslim and Croat forces into a single federal army.428 However, divisions between the 
two sides proved insurmountable. As long as they continued to compete for territory 
against the Bosnian Serbs, there was no shared Federation military for Americans to help 
develop. Fighting continued to erupt between Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and military 
cooperation between them was virtually non-existent by the time planning for 
comprehensive peace negotiations at Dayton began in October 1995.429 This failure of 
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externally-driven military design may have been due to the absence of a strong American 
belief in its necessity or the existence of extremely high barriers—including animosity 
between combatants—to successful intervention. In either case, recruitment decisions 
remained in the hands of local actors throughout the war. 
 American goals for Bosnian military development at Dayton were even less 
ambitious. The primary goal of the United States was to end the conflict quickly with the 
minimal necessary long-term investment. It is easy to lose sight of this due to the broad 
scope of the Dayton Accords, of which large portions are dedicated to establishing 
civilian governmental institutions. Some participants, including the United States’ chief 
negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, preferred a more comprehensive, maximalist approach to 
the peace agreement.430 Negotiations at Dayton not only focused on military-security 
issues relating to the separation of forces and control of territory, but also on establishing 
and overseeing civilian institutions—including elections and ethnic representation in 
government—designed to create a lasting settlement in a stable state. As Derek Chollet 
wrote, “If Dayton’s first goal was to end the war, its second goal was to maintain Bosnia 
as a single state.”431 However, this very much remained a secondary goal—one that was a 
means to the end that was lasting peace.  
Wherever statebuilding threatened peace, Americans resolved this conflict of 
interest in favor of the latter. Although the Dayton Agreement included extensive 
provisions on new civilian institutions, efforts to enforce major changes to military 
design were viewed as potentially too destabilizing. The United States viewed the 
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military situation as the key to securing peace—and consequently this absorbed most of 
its attention.432 According to this logic, international efforts would be devoted to ending 
the war and preventing the resumption of hostilities. Furthermore, this could best be 
achieved not by forcibly integrating hostile forces into a new military, but by establishing 
an internal balance of power among the existing armed forces.433 This led to a hands-off 
approach to military design that left Bosnians in control of recruitment and other 
organizational decisions. The active American role in statebuilding did not extend to the 
realm of military design. 
A chief advantage of this minimalist approach was that it limited the American 
commitment to a process the Clinton administration had little desire to be a part of. The 
United States had few if any tangible security interests to protect in Bosnia. Its decision 
to intervene in 1995 was ultimately motivated by concerns over the credibility of 
American leadership and the future of the NATO alliance, both of which had been 
challenged by the intractability of the Bosnian conflict.434 As a result, American policy 
was very much constrained by domestic support and interest. Having already felt 
compelled to engage in Bosnia, “policy was driven by the need to get out” and avoid a 
long-term military presence.435 The administration thus had little interest in devoting the 
resources necessary for sweeping military change. American policymakers were unhappy 
with the need to deploy 20,000 troops to Bosnia and would have preferred to rely on a 
unified and effective Bosnian military for local security.436 However, that would have 
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required a longer period in which more American peacekeepers and military trainers 
would have needed to be present in Bosnia. The Clinton administration had even less of a 
desire to provide the more substantial commitment of military resources that would be 
necessary to reform the Bosnian military.437 It wanted solutions that would allow it to 
disengage as quickly as possible, with low costs and limited public attention. 
One of the most difficult and controversial examples of this is the debate over the 
length of the American-led peace enforcement force’s (IFOR) mission. Before 
participants even arrived at Dayton, the White House had decided and publicly 
announced that IFOR would complete its mission and withdraw within twelve months. 
The NSC Principals Committee made this decision after little debate, and with the goal of 
preventing “mission creep” and repeats of the disastrous 1993 intervention in Somalia.438 
According to Ivo Daalder, the NSC staffer responsible for formulating U.S. policy on 
Bosnia at the time, “just as IFOR’s narrow mission was framed around more limited 
objectives, so the one-year deadline was constructed on the basis of an exit strategy that 
had a more limited purpose than advocates of a durable peace in Bosnia had in mind.”439 
While the administration ultimately extended the deadline for withdrawal and 
transitioned IFOR into a “Stabilization Force” (SFOR), its initial deployment was only 
possible on the understanding that its authority was driven by a short-term mission 
designed to ensure a military balance, not nation-building.440  
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Another advantage to avoiding questions of military design at Dayton was that it 
set goals that seemed more feasible. Holbrooke would later lament not devoting more 
effort to insisting on greater military reform.441 However, my interviewees suggested that, 
with or without greater foreign assistance, not much more could have been accomplished 
in terms of post-war defense reform. Clifford Bond, the American ambassador to Bosnia 
during the first Defense Reform Commission, summarized this common sentiment: “It 
was a peace agreement. They did what could be done. The sides weren’t about to 
disarm.”442 The relationships between the three ethnic groups were not conducive to the 
level of cooperation needed in an integrated military. They were too fraught with hostility 
and distrust—“just what you would assess at the end of a war, with all of the emotions 
that were attached to that.”443 The perception was that this made compromise on military 
reform more difficult than compromise on other areas. The United States insisted that 
when it came to military reform, any more room for disagreements could potentially 
derail the entire peace process. American policymakers rejected military reform as too 
dangerous.444 Consequently, issues like military design were a lower priority than 
political compromises. As one interviewee who participated in the Dayton negotiations 
described the atmosphere there, “For most of the things at Dayton, we were like, ‘can we 
get this done now?’”445 For the United States, the answer to this question when it came to 
military reform was “no,” allowing for greater domestic control over recruitment issues.  
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These debates are important evidence in favor of the argument that Bosnian 
preferences were decisive. Military design was not at the top of the agenda for American 
policymakers during the Dayton Agreement negotiations. Given existing Bosnian 
military practices and the likelihood of renewed conflict, reforming the military in any 
way was considered a costly endeavor that few members of the international community 
desired to undertake. The threat environment made major military reform particularly 
risky. Thus, the main reason there was no push from the international community toward 
a volunteer army in 1995 was that such an effort had too high a probability of 
undermining peace.  
Conversely, it is less likely that Americans simply encountered too much 
resistance from Bosnians to enforce their agenda. For one, local actors were not 
inherently opposed to volunteer forces, but rather wanted to maintain a balance of 
capabilities. The main Bosniak goal was to maintain high levels of readiness with large 
reserve forces to prepare for potential conflict with an RS force that, with reinforcements 
from Serbia, would outnumber them. Bosniak leaders ideally preferred a single army for 
both Entities, which by virtue of their larger numbers within the country, they believed 
they could control.446 Conscription, then, was only viewed as necessary so long as an 
independent Serbian force continued to be a threat. Indeed, this was ultimately the 
compromise that was struck at the 2005 Defence Reform Commission. However, as the 
discussion earlier in this chapter shows, the United States clearly preferred to stay out of 
military design altogether, and was not interested in potentially disrupting the peace by 
forcing the dismantlement of the Entity armies.  
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Not only did the United States want to avoid excessive interference in Bosnian 
military affairs, but it is likely that the Bosnian army would have looked very different if 
the United States had viewed military reform there as a worthwhile investment. Many 
interviews noted that American preferences were to have a single, professional military in 
BiH. One high-ranking American military commander said, “The long term intent was to 
have a single entity that was capable of providing defense inside of Bosnia and that three 
warring factions were disarmed and contributing to a peaceful political unit.”447 Other 
interviewees stressed that Americans were uncomfortable with the idea of three armies in 
one state, but that more time would be needed to build support for such drastic change.448 
While negotiators do not appear to have debated the merits of interfering in Bosnian 
recruitment practices, there is little reason to expect that they would have, given their 
attitude toward making changes in other aspects of military design. Thus, it is difficult to 
speculate how American perceptions might have differently evaluated the role and 
purpose of conscription in an environment more conducive to reform. However, 
ultimately it is clear that a lack of willpower or resources led the United States to 
subordinate its preferences about military design to the more urgent goal of peace. 
Even though some members of the international community realized that the 
long-term stability of Bosnia depended on creating a unified and professional military, 
key international actors viewed such reform as too demanding and risky in the short-term. 
Instead, “ending the war, separating the armies, and preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were the driving motives of the negotiators, not necessarily building a sustainable 
                                                        
447 Gen. William Crouch, June 22, 2016, Interview #7 
448 Bosnia and Herzegovina Delegation Member at Dayton, May 17, 2016, Interview #3; Amb. 
Robert Beecroft, July 26, 2016, Interview #12; Defense Reform Commission Secretariat staff 
member, July 26, 2016, Interview #14 
 214 
 
 
 
peace.”449 For now, international actors cared most about establishing peace; ensuring it 
could be sustainable would only complicate matters. Military reform would have to be a 
problem for a later date.  
 
V. Local Threat Perceptions after Dayton 
The failure to integrate the wartime armed forces of the three ethnic groups had 
important consequences for their recruitment practices. It meant each group maintained 
the capacity to restart the war. This in turn incentivized both sides to stay armed and able 
to fend off renewed invasion on short notice, exacerbating an already unstable and 
tenuous peace. Thus, the most formative years for military design took place in a 
dangerous environment, in which both the Federation and the RS perceived that major 
territorial conflict still threatened their independent existence. Bosniaks continued to 
view conscription as vital for its role in creating a large reserve force that could be called 
upon for defense on short notice.  
The widespread perception that war could easily erupt again was reinforced by 
indicators of the international community’s shaky commitment, represented most clearly 
by the efforts to limit IFOR’s authority and deployment. As Roberto Belloni writes, 
“third parties’ passive, short-term and less than daring approach did little to help a 
population traumatized by years of war,” allowing nationalists to continue to engage in 
ethnic cleansing.450 Indeed, “no one had much confidence that peacekeeping forces 
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would easily deter another round of fighting.”451 Instead, the American approach to 
peacebuilding immediately after Dayton single-mindedly focused on creating a balance 
of military capabilities between the Bosniak and Bosnian Serb communities. The 
Americans’ preferred program for achieving this goal was the Train and Equip program. 
However, it was not intended to make structural changes to the army or its relationship to 
society. According to Jim Pardew, who led the Train and Equip program, recruitment 
“was their job, not mine. The military had to raise their army. They were in the position 
of needing to figure out how to raise their army and what kind of army they could 
afford.”452 
These decisions from the international community both reflected and reinforced a 
mutually threatening atmosphere within BiH and the expectation that peace would be 
temporary. Rohan Maxwell and John Andreas Olsen, both of whom served in advisory 
roles during various stages of post-Dayton Bosnian defense reform, argue that “high 
levels of mistrust…shaped the military structure of BiH,” causing both entities to 
maintain “relatively large, conscript-based forces that regarded each other as potential 
enemies.”453 The Train and Equip program was intended to create a military situation in 
which both sides could feel comfortable demobilizing troops, but was viewed as 
necessary precisely because the security environment was so precarious.454 While it 
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ultimately achieved its goal of permitting downsizing, tensions remained high. By 
February 1998 the Federation army included only 45,000 active duty troops, whereas this 
number was 100,000–200,000 higher less than a year earlier. However, conscription 
permitted all sides large numbers of reserves to be called up on short notice. If 
downsizing was to take place, Bosniaks would only allow this in a manner that would 
permit fast remobilization and immediate territorial defense. Although Pardew reported 
Bosnian politicians like Izetbegovic (the first president of BiH) preferred a smaller, better 
trained force, they felt constrained by popular demand to maintain a larger, war-ready 
force even in peacetime.455  
Even while the armies were demobilizing and the balance of power was shifting, 
wartime threat perceptions persisted.456 Responses during my interviews support 
Maxwell and Olsen’s view that local policymakers built the military with fears of 
renewed conflict in mind. Interviewees repeatedly emphasized the high level of tensions 
and mistrust immediately after the Dayton Agreement. They made statements like “The 
sides weren’t about to disarm,” and “they wanted to mobilize, not demobilize!” to explain 
why the Entities did not engage in more aggressive military reform in the mid-to-late 
1990s.457 One respondent who worked closely with entity army commanders for SFOR in 
the late 1990s as the Chief Inspector General for the entity armed forces said that 
Bosniaks resisted reform “because they always thought in the back of their mind that they 
would have to go back to war, so they wanted to sustain numerical and weapons and 
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equipment superiority.”458 The first BiH Defense Minister, Nikola Radovanovic, also 
argued that the precarious situation between the neighbors continued to dominate how the 
entities thought about the defense through the early 2000s, during the first Defense 
Reform Commission: “the argument was that following the experience in the ‘90s it was 
important to be able to defend.”459 He also suggested that major reforms that would 
reduce readiness were unlikely in this environment: “In 1995 there was civil war. Ten 
years after that we were talking about a single military. It was a surprise.”460 
 
VI. The Transition to an All-Volunteer Force 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the threat of invasion continued to loom, 
causing Bosnian politicians to want to maintain an army that had the capability to 
mobilize quickly. However, there was almost no overt discussion among policymakers 
about the use of conscription in these early years after independence. I argue that this is 
consistent with the advantages of maintaining conscription in such highly charged and 
uncertain security environments. If policymakers were preoccupied with security, one 
reason for an absence of debates about recruitment policies is that there was nearly 
universal agreement that it would be necessary for preparing an adequate defense against 
renewed Serbian aggression.  
It is particularly clear that this was the case once the international community 
began to urge greater defense reform.  The process leading to Bosnia’s abolition of 
conscription on January 1, 2006 offers a useful point of comparison for evaluating my 
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arguments. The same variables—international intervention and threat perception—can 
explain this change in recruitment practices. But, precisely because international actors 
began to pressure explicitly for the reduction and elimination of conscription, recruitment 
practices featured more prominently in debates among Bosnian policymakers. The 
explicit role of conscription during the process of defense reform that began in 2003 also 
demonstrates weaknesses in alternative explanations of conscription based on culture.   
Between the Dayton Agreement in 1995 and the first Defense Reform 
Commission in 2003, the international community ramped up not only its interest in 
affecting military practices in Bosnia, but also its institutional ability to enforce military 
reform. At a December 1997 meeting in Bonn, the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC)—the group of fifty-five countries and agencies that underwrite the peace process in 
Bosnia—enhanced the powers of the High Representative in BiH, the office established 
by the Dayton Agreement and appointed by the PIC to oversee civilian implementation of 
the peace treaty.461 These new “Bonn Powers,” as they became known, gave the High 
Representative broad powers to enact binding decisions in BiH and to remove public 
officials who violated the Dayton Agreement.  
As other scholars have noted, international influence was responsible for nearly 
all the outcomes of the defense reform process.462 This was also the case for the abolition 
of conscription. A public scandal in which it was discovered that an RS-owned firm had 
been selling weapons to Iraq—known as the Orao Affair—coupled with the investiture in 
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2002 of a new and activist High Representative—Lord Paddy Ashdown—led to renewed 
interest from the international community in using its influence to enact change in BiH 
military structures. This shifted control over BiH military structure back to the foreign 
powers, and in particular, to the United States. Europeans staffed many of the bodies that 
were influential in defense reform, including the Office of the High Representative, from 
which the impetus for reform initiated, and the OSCE, which had chief responsibility for 
assisting with military downsizing and parliamentary oversight.463 However, American 
influence in NATO, control of SFOR, and institutionalized responsibility for military 
aspects of the Dayton Agreements again gave the United States an outsized role. The 
OSCE representative at the first Defense Reform Commission was an American, 
Ambassador Richard Beecroft. Similarly, the United States insisted that an American 
lead the first Defense Reform Commission.464 As a result, while the broad goals of 
defense reform were set by Ashdown, many of the specific policy changes implemented 
by the commissions reflected American strategic thinking.  
Defense reform occurred in two main phases, arising out of two internationally-
initiated and -led Defense Reform Commissions that issued their reports in 2003 and 
2005.465 While these commissions ostensibly only made recommendations that then had 
to be enacted by the BiH Parliament, they were de facto binding. The American chairmen 
of each commission were careful to craft recommendations and agreements that they 
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knew would make it through Parliament. One said, “I made sure that members of the 
commission had political authority to make commitments on behalf of their parties or 
governments, so it was politically binding.”466 Furthermore, international actors were 
unified in their insistence on reform, and although Ashdown had publicly declared he 
would not use his Bonn powers, it was widely recognized that he was prepared to impose 
change if it was not forthcoming.467  
The international community was active at all levels of the Defense Reform 
Commissions. General policy level discussions and formal decisions were made by the 
full membership body, which included high-ranking representatives from the United 
States, each of the Entities, the SCMM, the OSCE, SFOR, and the EU, or else in informal 
meetings outside the commission. Much of the work to generate specific policy 
prescriptions and technical language was done by the Secretariat and various working 
groups, which were similarly made up of national representatives and technical advisors. 
The core team of the Defense Reform Secretariat was primarily made up of international 
actors.  
Working groups included representatives from each entity—as well as the 
Ministry of Defense once it was established—their lawyers and legal advisors, 
interpreters, and technical or military experts, often from the OSCE, depending on the 
group or issue being discussed. They met off-site every few weeks. Politically difficult 
                                                        
466 Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6. However, this does not mean gaining approval 
was always easy. Jim Locher noted that the first Defense Reform Commission’s 
recommendations had to be approved by the BiH, Federation, and RS governments, as well as by 
each parliament: “These were not easy tasks. Defence Reform was a highly emotional and 
controversial topic.” It is consistent with my argument (that the transition to conscription required 
high levels of international influence) that Locher seems to have found the process more 
contentious—see below.  
467 Haupt and Fitzgerald, “Negotiations on Defence Reform,” 167. 
 221 
 
 
 
issues tended to be hashed out in a top-down fashion before the working groups presented 
possible models to the commission. Members of each working group were present at all 
commission meetings, and some members of the working groups participated in both 
commissions. Details of legislation were often decided in working groups that adopted a 
technical and non-partisan approach to the issue.468  
The first Defense Reform Commission left conscription in place, though it cut the 
number of conscripts in half and reduced the service term for conscripts from six to four 
months.469 The second Defense Reform Commission, whose recommendations were 
issued only two years later, eliminated conscription altogether. At each commission, 
military recruitment was a contentious issue for representatives of the Federation and RS. 
Federation representatives continued to prefer conscription, which they viewed as vital to 
their security. The RS, meanwhile, was less prima facie opposed to a volunteer force, but 
was nonetheless wary of any measures that would further decrease its power and 
autonomy relative to the Federation.470 However, for the members of the international 
community who guided the defense reform process, it was only one among many aspects 
of the defense infrastructure that needed to be reformed. Only once the first Defense 
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Reform Commission made headway into unifying the Entity armies and reducing 
tensions between them did international actors demand a complete end to conscription.  
A. Foreign Actors’ Goals for Defense Reform.  
With foreign powers now choosing to intervene in Bosnian military design, it was 
their threat perceptions that would shape military recruitment practices. While members 
of the PIC did not necessarily concern themselves with whether BiH would use 
conscription, this did become an important issue for the bureaucrats and diplomats who 
implemented defense reform. These foreign actors were tasked with creating a unified 
and affordable peacetime BiH army that could participate in NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) program.  They knew that PfP was a particularly attractive goal for the 
Bosniaks, as full NATO membership would provide a firm security guarantee. 
Consequently, the international community focused heavily on this goal.471 The 
international actors designed the BiH defense reforms based on their own understandings 
of what an army with these goals should look like.  
Defense reform efforts began in late 2002, when then High Representative Paddy 
Ashdown seized upon the Orao scandal in RS to demand greater strides towards military 
professionalization and the strengthening of the civilian chain of command. The 
possibility of NATO membership was the principal carrot offered by the international 
community that motivated the reform process. During the 2003 Defence Reform 
Commission, the international committee focused on enhancing state-level controls and 
the affordability of the BiH armed forces as the main requirements for PfP membership. 
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While the international actors driving defense reform believed conscription was 
inefficient, they adopted a similar attitude as during and immediately after the Dayton 
Agreement: conscription took a back seat to operational reforms that were viewed as 
higher priority.472 According to Jim Locher, the Chairman of the first Defence Reform 
Commission,  
We thought that eliminating might be an outcome but we were pleased to 
secure a 50 percent reduction. There was only so much you could do in the 
first commission. Again, when the first Defence Reform Commission 
started, no one thought there was any possibility of defense reform. I 
remember a meeting with all of the ambassadors from European Union 
countries on my second day in Sarajevo, and each one of them told me 
defense reform would not happen.473 
Another interviewee intimately familiar with Bosnian defense reform during the entire 
period under examination expressed similar sentiments, noting that administrative 
unification was not achievable in 2003 and it was not clear whether this would change in 
the future.474 The reductions in conscription at the first Defence Reform Commission 
were not necessarily viewed as an intermediate step on the way to all-volunteer force. 
NATO would not concern itself with the state’s domestic recruitment policies as long as 
there was force reduction.475  
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This suggests that in 2003 the international community appears not to have been 
fully prepared to impose change for which Bosnians were not yet ready. While PfP 
membership was an established goal, the attitude to change remained cautious. These 
external reformers agreed conscription was bad for Bosnia, but still allowed local 
preferences to dominate military design. James Locher described conscription as “just not 
that important to me at the time.”476 The Bosniak fear of Serbian aggression remained 
high; this deterred members of the Defence Reform Commission from insisting on the 
elimination of conscription.477 Locher said that this was “not a case of the international 
community forcing its vision on everyone. For defence reform to be effectively 
implemented, the ideas needed to be owned and advanced by the Bosnians. This was their 
commission, and it had to be and be seen as their commission.”478 Rohan Maxwell 
similarly described the 2003 Defence Reform Commission as the best outcome 
achievable given Bosnian political opposition at the time: it was “a lowest common 
denominator thing” and “there was no appetite” for eliminating conscription.479 Another 
interviewee argued that conscription was left in place because “we wanted them to make 
their own decision based on financial logic.”480 While one interviewee who worked on 
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both Defence Reform Commissions characterized the changes to BiH military design as 
subject to enormous external pressure—to the extent that the parties “felt they had to 
come to those compromises,”—he concurred with others’ conclusions that agreements 
about conscription were limited by locals’ threat perceptions in 2003.481 This sufficiently 
raised the cost of enforcing a volunteer army on the unwilling Bosnians to lead an already 
skeptical international community to temper its goals.   
B. The Tipping Point 
This international attitude changed at the beginning of the 2005 Defence Reform 
Commission. The initial mandate of this second commission was to enforce the decisions 
made in 2003. It was not a given, after that commission, that a second round of reforms 
would be necessary. Rather, Ashdown called for a new Defence Reform Commission 
after another scandal highlighted the shortcomings of existing implementation efforts: 
evidence emerged that Bosnian Serb forces had been assisting in the protection of war 
criminal Ratko Mladic.482 As a result, there was no initial focus on transitioning to an all-
volunteer force.483 However, the international community was even more determined to 
enforce its desired reforms at this point in time: “The entire frame of reference had 
shifted….It was no longer a question of whether the state could assume complete control 
of all armed forces, but rather a question of how and when it would happen.”484 
Raffi Gregorian, the American choice to co-chair the second Defense Reform 
Commission, was a particularly powerful force behind the change in the international 
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community’s attitude toward conscription.485 While the international community’s 
perception by the First Defense Reform Commission was that conscription provided no 
benefit to BiH, its members were not prepared to eliminate it. According to Rohan 
Maxwell,  “2005 was the year we started thinking about it [conscription],” though there 
was “no mandate to do anything.”486 He added that one of the first things Gregorian did, 
before the commission even started its work, was to present a document to him that 
included ending conscription as a big picture goal.487 Gregorian himself acknowledged 
that ending conscription and reinforcing the professionalization of the armed forces was 
“not a requirement but we [members of the reform commission and Bosnian political 
leaders who signed it] went above and beyond,” to make the Armed Forces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina more efficient.488 The motivation was designing a military that was cost 
efficient and effective at its likely missions with NATO. Gregorian said the international 
community “did not see a continuing need for conscription because it doesn’t actually 
help [Bosnia]. You’re not actually facing invasion.”489 It was the greater power of the 
international community in 2005, and particularly how those goals were implemented by 
American policymakers, that allowed for the transition to an all-volunteer force at that 
time.  
 Therefore the reforms of the second Defence Reform Commission reflected the 
international community’s—especially the United States’s—perceptions of how the BiH 
armed forces should address the country’s most pressing threats. The international 
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architects of the new and unified Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegvoina (AFBiH) did 
not perceive renewed ethnic conflict to be particularly likely, and saw BiH as facing a 
low threat of major land conflict.  In sum, “The AFBiH [was] not designed to provide 
stand-alone territorial defense against regional neighbors.”490 As early as the 2003 
Defence Reform Commission, international actors had recognized that the Bosnian 
military’s force size and structure was inappropriate to the types of missions it would 
likely have to participate in: peacekeeping and support operations, not major land 
warfare.491 Even in the 1990s, according to the international community, “there was not a 
lot of military purpose” for the entity armies.492 SFOR was meeting all the country’s 
security requirements. Bosnian policymakers had little ability to withstand the redoubled 
efforts of the international community, which was now committed to military reform. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that there was substantial opposition within Bosnia, 
especially among Federation officials, to ending conscription. Gregorian argued that “the 
issue of conscription was a big deal. Right up to the last minute there were retired 
generals who were trying to push civil defense training in high schools, et cetera…”493 
Gregorian also cited the importance of providing for a reserve force of exactly half the 
strength of the active forces as part of the final deal that ended conscription, as this may 
have at least symbolically compensated for the loss of compulsory military training. 
Maxwell’s perception was that there were fewer obstacles to this reform. However, his 
                                                        
490 Rohan Mawell, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: From Three Armies to One,” in New Armies from Old: 
Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars, edited by Roy Licklider, 179–194 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014): 189. 
491 Maxwell and Olsen, Destination NATO, 35–6, Vetschera and Damian, “Security Sector 
Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina”; Lord Ashdown, October 6, 2016, Interview #18. 
492 James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15. 
493 Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6 
 228 
 
 
 
account of events also emphasized the importance of first convincing Bosniaks that they 
were not getting tangible benefits from conscription and that it was unaffordable in the 
long run.494 Similarly, some of the actors who were opposed by the time the commission 
issued its recommendation may have had less influence on policy outcomes by this time. 
The BiH Presidency—under possible international pressure—“had decided that all 
general officers would be retired” before the new commission.495 This indicates that 
Bosnia would not have eliminated conscription if not for the work and preferences of the 
international community. 
 As a result, there was a permissive environment in which the policymakers at the 
second Defence Reform Commission could recommend, and in fact enforce, the abolition 
of conscription—once they had decided this was an important goal. With no security 
logic underpinning support for conscription to prepare for extended land warfare, the 
particular preferences of the international reformers determined BiH recruit practices 
after 2005. The international actors who dominated Bosnia’s defense reform process 
came from countries where conscription was seen as a policy only necessary for high 
threat environments. Their preference for volunteer forces in low threat environments is 
evident in the arguments they emphasized during the Defence Reform Commission 
negotiations. Volunteer recruitment was widely touted by the international community as 
more economically efficient and appropriate for other military missions. Defense 
reformers emphasized in their conversations with Bosnians that conscription was not 
giving them the security value that they thought it did.496 They focused particularly on its 
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high cost but low yield, especially given limited training requirements.497 The high costs 
of conscription also failed to provide even basic amenities for recruits, who were often 
sent home on the weekend because the entity armies could not afford heating. 
Additionally, a member of the conscription working group of the first Defense Reform 
Commission noted that the advisors limited their analysis of potential recruitment 
policies to their implications for defense; they did not consider whether conscription 
would affect opportunities for nation-building or other consequences for society.498 
 These arguments are consistent with a process of military design that is heavily 
reliant on the professional experience and prior beliefs of those leading the reforms, who 
were from countries that favored volunteer systems and did not view military recruitment 
as a tool for reshaping society. Maxwell argued that the multilateral nature of the Defence 
Reform Commissions limited the “tendency on the part of some international actors to 
offer solutions that replicate those of their home countries.”499 Nonetheless, the beliefs of 
the reformers about the proper uses of conscription seem to have had an important effect 
on how they molded the Bosnian military. This is evident in the Conscription and 
Reserves Information Paper that prefaced the 2005 Defence Reform Commission’s 
report. It concluded, “Forces based on compulsory military service are mainly suited for 
territorial defence purposes, as a generally acknowledged internationally principle. No 
NATO country deploys conscripts abroad unless they have specifically volunteered for 
such service. Conscript forces would be almost useless for the most likely future missions 
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of the AFBiH….”500 This document reflected the beliefs of the American co-chairman of 
the second Defence Reform Commission, Raffi Gregorian, and guided his efforts when it 
began.501 Rather than a large, readily expandable military, Bosnian forces would need to 
be highly professional to prepare for peacekeeping missions and interoperability with 
NATO. This was the point of helping Bosnia join PfP. 
 The international community clearly entered the second Defence Reform 
Commission with the perception that BiH would not need a military capable of meeting 
major land warfare and renewed ethnic conflict. However, there is reason to believe that 
had the threat environment been different, the international community would not have 
been as concerned with transitioning BiH to a volunteer force. Ashdown, the principal 
driver and final arbiter of Bosnia’s defense reform, explicitly highlighted the 
pointlessness of conscription for BiH’s anticipated peacekeeping missions, and 
countered, “If the state was threatened like any other state then it [conscription] would 
have been reasonable.”502 Another interviewee who was influential throughout the 
defense reform process raised the similar points, referencing in particular his experience 
advising defense reform in other countries that did face such threats and maintained 
conscription.503 It was the international community’s emphasis on force reduction and 
affordability in light of a low threat environment that led to Bosnia’s transition to an all-
volunteer force.  
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C. Implications of Bosnian Resistance to Reform for Initial Recruitment Decisions 
Importantly for the theory, these reforms were implemented despite continued 
Bosnian perception of high threats that they believed would necessitate conscription. 
Americans had to work hard to enforce their version of a peacetime army over Bosnians’ 
“inherited wartime mentality.”504 The reasons interviewees gave for Bosnian resistance to 
these efforts reinforces the argument that local preferences for conscription were for 
military and security, rather than cultural, purposes. In the words of one interviewee, 
“Bosniaks wanted a large force and large reserve force because that’s the only army they 
had to defend themselves. Getting [them] to agree to dramatic reductions in reserve or 
overall force or reduce conscription was a tough sell.”505 As noted above, senior BiH 
official emphasized “the experience in the ‘90s” as placing a premium on the entities’ 
belief in defense, especially given the continued existence of war time units.506 Bosniak 
officials adamantly sought assurances at the first Defence Reform Commission that they 
would not be required to give up conscription until there was state-level control over all 
armed forces—in other words, until there was no longer a separate RS army that could 
threaten them.507  
Some people have argued that local elites recognized that the NATO presence 
eliminated threats to their security by the time defense reform began.508 However, the 
reluctance of entity actors, especially Bosniaks, to end conscription before the state 
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established a monopoly on force suggests that the local threat perceptions still saw war as 
likely. In addition, Bosniak acquiescence to ending conscription did not indicate a 
fundamental shift in their threat perceptions. As described above, “the enormous amount 
of external pressure” meant that “there’s no real buy-in from anyone.”509 This risk of 
backsliding has led to efforts to limit the size of the army altogether, as the only option 
for reducing the likelihood that the ethnic communities will once again view reignited 
conflict as a serious possibility. This offers further evidence that the international 
community’s willingness to enforce its preference for a volunteer military fit for a low 
threat environment has played a major role in BiH military design.  
 
VII. Alternative Hypotheses 
 Bosnian policymakers’ fear of renewed existential conflict is not the only factor 
that could have led them to adopt strong preferences for conscription after Dayton. There 
are two other ways they could have settled on a policy of conscription. First, pre-existing 
cultural norms or organizational practices could have led them to view conscription as the 
most effective military practice for establishing security given the severe threat 
environment. In other words, would other actors in the same position have also used 
conscription to defend against a potential Bosnian Serb threat, or might a volunteer force 
have served just as well? Such an explanation would stress the particular military heritage 
of policymakers within Bosnia. This account parallels the common argument that former 
British colonies use volunteers because of an internalized distaste for citizen armies or a 
respect for individual rights: did Bosnians prefer conscription not because it was the best 
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solution to a highly threatening environment, but because of a Yugoslav culture that 
perceived conscription as appropriate or effective?  
This counterfactual is impossible to test with certainty, but there are some 
indicators that Bosnians were constrained by the existing threat environment, not by 
historical experiences, when designing their army. On the one hand, many people have 
suggested that Bosnian defense planners were strongly influenced by their experience in 
the Yugoslav army, which in turn had adopted many Soviet-style traits. According to this 
view, Bosnian policymakers may have just wanted to continue using the recruitment 
practices with which they were most familiar. Indeed, “it was clear that conscription was 
something they were accustomed to,” and financial constraints on the Bosnian army 
meant that there was “no plan for the future of the Federation after the war.”510 Falling 
back on historical experience or perceived cultural tropes could be particularly tempting 
during periods of uncertainty and speedy potential mobilization, since adopting new 
recruitment practices would require many other changes to the way the military trains and 
functions.  
The Bosnian experience with conscription ran deep. Both the Bosniak and 
Bosnian Serb armies were offshoots of the Yugoslav People’s Army, “which was 
deliberately used as an integrative tool,” reinforced by conscript service—outside the 
recruit’s home region—that ensured “most males experienced a common rite of 
passage.”511 As one senior American participant in the second Defense Reform 
Commission said, “All of the Entity army people on both sides had ‘grown up’ in 
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Yugoslavia, where you had a core army but the entire population was armed and trained 
and after your service you joined the reserves and had huge stockpiles in anticipation of 
partisan warfare and invasion. And that’s the framework in which they all thought about 
this stuff.”512 A senior OSCE representative pointed to an even deeper historical basis for 
conscription: He recalled that the reason military recruitment policies weren’t addressed 
earlier was that “it was just assumed due to the cultural history of Yugoslavia, Austria-
Hungary, that we thought conscripts would have to be retained.”513 Radovanovic 
supported this view, arguing that “what is mentioned quite often here is not necessarily 
about culture and socialization, but is more to prepare young boys and maturation.”514 
However, Bosnians were also exposed to American military practices both during 
the war and after Dayton. Familiarity with certain military practices did not stop them 
from adopting reforms in other areas, or from wanting to adopt more NATO-esque 
policies.  The Train and Equip program made particular strides toward changing Bosnian 
perceptions about what military practices to emulate. The program was administered 
primarily by the private military contractor MPRI, which was comprised of former U.S. 
military personnel and “took pride in the facilitating the execution of U.S. foreign 
policy.”515 The aim of this policy was “to build a NATO-type military,” and was a rare 
point on which Bosniaks, Croats, and Americans agreed.516 Through the Train and Equip 
Program, according to Rohan Maxwell, the Federation “had largely bought into the 
notion that, ‘this is the US system, this is a better system.”517 According to Locher, 
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Bosnians were eager to adopt new military practices and it came down to the OSCE to 
adjust their advice given Bosnian history to facilitate this process: “You can’t just take 
US or German practices and apply them. What would work in a Bosnian context? But 
they said they want to look like a NATO military, so ‘what do we need to do to move in 
that direction?’ But we needed to modify it.”518 Thus, the post-Dayton period created an 
opportunity for Bosnia to deviate from historical military practices. Bosnian officials 
were clearly not constrained by or wedded to these past practices, and actively sought to 
emulate new models in many other, non-recruitment, areas. This is evident in their 
acceptance of the Train and Equip program, as well as in the fact that they wanted greater 
integration early in the reform process. As Clifford Bond said, “Bosniaks did not believe 
reforms went far enough....[Bosniaks] thought that ‘Everyone else is moving in the 
direction of Europe and do we want to be left out?’”519  
The fact that Bosnians prioritized effective defensive capabilities and still sought 
to retain conscription, despite efforts to emulate the United States in other ways, suggests 
that military circumstances created incentives for conscription. Interviewees repeatedly 
emphasized the threat environment as the major determinant of Bosnian preferences. One 
Defense Reform Commission working group member said “Bosniaks believed that 
Croats and Serbs could rely on Croatia and Serbia for protection, while they did not have 
a protector. They felt that if they got rid of conscription they wouldn’t be able to defend 
themselves.”520 Without these threat perceptions, there would have been less commitment 
to maintaining conscription.  
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Second, might conscription have served some purpose other than territorial 
defense that was more important to those responsible for Bosnia’s military design? If this 
was the case, the threat of renewed conflict merely may have been useful rhetoric 
designed to justify a potentially unpopular policy that would serve other interests of the 
political elite. This is a particularly important possibility to evaluate because NATO’s 
security guarantee could have reduced the need for the Entities to optimize their 
militaries for conflict. One recurring concern in security sector reform and disarmament 
programs is unemployment: if there are not enough economic opportunities in post-
conflict situations, a surplus of ex-soldiers can be destabilizing.521 Thus, it may be the 
case that states that are already in the process of demobilizing and weakening the military 
may nonetheless choose to conscript to reduce unemployment and maintain control of 
armed individuals. A participant at the Dayton Agreement negotiations said that 
participants wanted to make sure that enough former combatants had career paths into the 
army or police, while an observer at the first Defense Reform Commission noted that a 
fear of what newly unemployed soldiers would do in civilian society characterized many 
of the debates at that time.522 However, these concerns ran up against the broader 
emphasis on demobilization and cost-saving.  
The more common non-military argument in favor of conscription was that it had 
cultural value as a vehicle for socializing youth, especially young men. All entity actors 
viewed mandatory military service as an important mechanism, if not for active political 
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indoctrination, at least for turning boys into men: “There was this perception in Bosnia 
that it was part of becoming a man.”523 While this likely meant Bosnian politicians had an 
emotional or cultural attachment to conscription that made them more reluctant to 
abandon it, ultimately these arguments served a more fundamental military logic, and 
were not intended to support state-level integration. As one interviewee involved in 
defense reform in Bosnia for more than a decade noted, “all the reasons for conscription 
were to keep the communities divided.”524 This meant that conscription took on added 
significance for Bosniaks, who viewed conscription’s “stamp on young men” as 
providing additional cohesion and reserves that were necessary given the fact that they 
were the only ethnic community with “no big brother to come to their aid.”525 Thus, 
conscript socialization focused on the ethnic communities, and no one ever suggested 
expanding this logic in service of integration or unification across the communities.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 Conventional wisdom would attribute the Bosnian preference for conscription to 
the institutional legacy of the country’s Yugoslav heritage or other aspects of its domestic 
culture. Such arguments, while consistent with some actors’ preferences, obscures the 
real preferences that motivated conscription, and the possibilities for broader reform, 
within Bosnia. Local security concerns and territorial defense, not domestic statebuilding, 
dominated debates over military design in the years following the Dayton Agreement. 
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The threat of major, renewed land warfare was so high that the peace treaty’s 
international guarantors largely intentionally avoided the issue of military design, leaving 
multiple armed forces in place that continued to view each other as enemies. While the 
resolve and interest of the international community—in this case, essentially the High 
Representative and the United States—in creating a more effective and efficient BiH 
military increased with time, it was not until 2005 that it enforced its recruitment 
preferences. This was particularly challenging because Bosnian and American 
perceptions of the threats facing BiH and the purpose its army should serve differed so 
dramatically. International policymakers did not see a need for a Bosnian military 
capable of fighting a major war, and worked hard to extract concessions that would 
support their preferred deference reform policies. Without this external pressure, which 
overcame the institutional inertia of entrenched defense attitudes within the country, there 
is no indication that Bosnia would have adopted an all-volunteer force.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Reestablishing effective national security forces was among the most important 
priorities after the American-led invasion of Iraq and ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003. 
American military commanders and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) began 
planning what the new Iraq armed forces would look like even before President Bush’s 
famed “Mission Accomplished” speech.526 The army that they decided to build was 
remarkably different from that of the pre-Occupation era. Hussein’s army—like every 
previous Iraqi army since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1932—was a 
large, conscript-based force, characterized by heavy rank inflation and ethno-religious 
divisions. The new force was configured to focus primarily on border defense.527 It was 
reduced from 350,000 to 40,000 personnel, organized in three divisions equipped with 
limited heavy weapons, and lacked the capacity to function effectively away from 
bases.528 The CPA was particularly concerned that the new army would reflect the ethnic 
and religious makeup of society.529  
These decisions were based on American understandings of the post-war regional 
security environment and how to dampen sectarian grievances. However, these were not 
the only ways to design the new military in Iraq. While the decision to disband all Iraqi 
security forces, including the Ministry of Defense, forced the CPA to build the armed 
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forces from the ground up, the pre-war plan had been to recall and retrain demobilized 
and surrendered soldiers.530 Iraqi nationalists, too, viewed the large existing army as an 
important symbol of sovereignty and national identity.531 Despite continued debates 
about recruitment and organization in the new Iraqi army, the CPA held fast to ideal of a 
small, heavily-vetted, and Ba’athist-free volunteer force. 
The story of Iraq’s recent experiences with military recruitment is a familiar one. 
As this dissertation shows, similar dynamics occurred in Iraq during the Mandate era, in 
Bosnia in the mid-2000s, and in Jordan in the years surrounding its independence. This 
dissertation demonstrates that this kind of foreign influence on military recruitment is 
surprisingly common. There are countless examples of powerful states frequently using 
military advisors, troops deployments, and even direct control to ensure new states adopt 
their preferred military policies. Pakistan and India were both led by British generals in 
the years after independence, and British officers remained in both places to assist with 
training.532 Many post-Soviet states continued to be dependent on Russian assistance after 
their independence, including a large Russian military presence or Russian command 
over troops.533 France played a similar role in many of its former African colonies.534 
                                                        
530 Dobbins et al., After the War, 120.  
531 Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2008); Bensahel et al, After Saddam.  
532 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, D.C: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2005): 26, 33; Steven I. Wilkinson, Army and Nation: The 
Military and Indian Democracy since Independence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2015): 102. 
533 Erica Marat, The Military and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to Independence 
(New York: Routledge, 2010); Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, Civil-Military 
Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). 
534 Edward Kolodziej and Bokanga Lokulutu, “Security Interests and French Arms-Transfer 
Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the 
Developing World, edited by Bruce E. Arlinghaus, 125–152 (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1983): 129; Claude E. Welch, Jr., “The Roots and Implications of Military 
Intervention,” in Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and 
 241 
 
 
 
I examine these patron-client relationships and describe their effect on important 
military policies, focusing particularly on the use of conscription. The military is an 
important actor in international relations. However, it is undertheorized in political 
science literature, often treated as invariant across states. Similarly, political science has 
traditionally emphasized the way militaries are similar, without in-depth analysis of the 
many ways in which they differ. The challenges associated with collecting data on 
militaries around the world has further inhibited large-n studies of the military. This has 
limited analysis to comparative case studies that often make no effort to provide a 
generalizable account of military organization beyond the cases at hand. Therefore, my 
dissertation provides a notable foray into large-n statistical comparisons of different types 
of militaries. 
I chose to focus on an understudied but particularly important military policy, the 
method of recruitment. There has been little research into why some states use 
conscription while others use volunteers, especially compared to the volume of work on 
other aspects of military organization, such as the development of specific doctrine or the 
advent of the standing army. This dissertation is situated in a similar vein to both this 
literature and more recent work on variation in military policies, for example, the 
adoption of female integration into armed forces.535 Like this other work, this dissertation 
explains why not all militaries adopt the same policies.  
My approach to this puzzle differs substantially from traditional political science 
explanations for variation in military policies. Existing research explains military design 
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as either a product of threat environments or domestic politics. However, I emphasize the 
need to look to beyond these factors. I demonstrate the important role of outside actors in 
influencing how states design their militaries. Military design is an important realm in 
which international hierarchy—or shared sovereignty—plays out. As a result, we should 
understand militaries not simply as the product of the environments in which they 
develop, but as affected by powerful forces often outside their control. Other studies of 
different military policies would also benefit from consideration of the powerful states 
that influence how states and their militaries develop. 
 
I. Summary of Arguments 
In chapter 1, I introduced my goal of developing a theory of military design. I 
established the importance of conscription as a military policy and justified my focus on 
conscription over other possible policies. The method by which a state will recruit its 
military personnel is one of the first decisions it must make when designing its military, 
as it has important implications for training, length of service, and military 
administration. Existing research also shows that the decision to use conscription has 
implications for an array of social and political outcomes. At the interstate level, 
conscription can affect military effectiveness and the frequency of conflict initiation, 
while domestically it has been linked to national identity, state formation, and political 
participation.536 Lastly, conscription has important social consequences given the 
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different quantity and portion of the population that it exposes to military service, even 
when it is not universal.537 Even ignoring the consequences for states and militaries, 
conscription certainly has drastic implications for the young men—and occasionally, 
women—who are called upon for military service.  
While the decision to use conscription is a particularly notable component of 
military design, it is also a useful focus from the perspective of testing the theory of 
military design I developed in chapter 2. My theory explains why militaries are designed 
in different ways and predicts differences in their military recruitment policies. The 
argument I developed in chapter 2 describes military design as a product of patron-client 
relationships. Strong states with security interests in weaker states use their military 
influence to ensure that the weaker state adopts their preferred policies. This results in the 
emulation of patron state practices by their clients, either through direct control by the 
patron or the diffusion of patron-held values in training. Patron states are particularly able 
to affect recruitment policies during periods in which their clients’ military institutions 
are in flux—what I call “new states”—for example, after independence, after social 
revolutions, or during period of post-conflict reconstruction.  
For example, negotiations with West Germany to end its post-World War II 
occupation provided an opportunity for NATO, led by the United States, to influence its 
recruitment policies. As the return to full West German sovereignty neared, it became 
increasingly urgent to settle on a process of German rearmament that was deemed 
necessary for Western Europe’s security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. While the United 
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States had ultimately decided that the question of conscription or voluntary enlistment 
was one for German authorities, NATO security requirements left Germany with little 
option.538 More specifically, the United States “demanded West German rearmament as a 
price for American reinforcements to Europe.”539 At the London and Paris Conferences 
on West German sovereignty and rearmament, West Germany had agreed to contribute 
five hundred thousand men to NATO and the European defense.540 However, with few 
volunteers forthcoming, the “quantitative logic” was paramount in the West German 
decision to introduce conscription.541 Similar dynamics were at play in Jordan at the 
moment that it gained independence, when the British used direct control over military 
decision-making as well as command over the military’s budget to ensure that it adopted 
particular recruitment practices.  
The adoption of conscription is a particularly useful test of this theory because 
conscription’s implementation is so often attributed in the literature to domestic culture or 
ideology. Thus, conscription constitutes a hard test of the theory: if conscription is 
actually determined by foreign actors, then my theory should be at least as likely to apply 
to other types of military policies, less associated with a state’s domestic attributes, as 
well. Thus, as described above, the United States did not only determine the post-2003 
Iraqi army’s recruitment practices, but also how big it would be, how mechanized it 
would be, and what units it would be organized around. Similarly, the Defense Reform 
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Commissions in Bosnia addressed additional issues, including changes to command and 
control, size of active and reserve forces, ethnic balance, and the number and type of 
brigades that constituted the army. 
I theorize several mechanisms that lead client states to adopt the patron’s military 
recruitment practices. These include direct control by the patron as well as normative 
emulation and learning by the client. Sometimes patrons actively intervene in the 
recruitment policy of their clients, as in the case of Jordan; other times, clients elect to 
adopt the patron’s policies on their own or with less overt interference, as in the case of 
West Germany. 
In addition, my theory makes predictions about recruitment in the absence of a 
foreign patron. When there is no foreign patron, I argue that threat perceptions determine 
military recruitment. States that fear major territorial invasions from other states are more 
likely to use conscription to safeguard their security. States that perceive that they face 
low threat environments, on the other hand, are unconstrained in the choices they make 
about military recruitment. Under these conditions—no foreign patron and no interstate 
threat—leaders’ personal preferences and beliefs or domestic political factors will 
determine recruitment outcomes in idiosyncratic ways. 
Chapter 3 provided a quantitative test of my theory. The findings provided 
powerful support for my initial hypotheses. First, they demonstrated that states are more 
likely to use conscription if they are influenced by a patron state that uses conscription 
after independence. There was also somewhat weaker evidence that there is a similar 
emulation effect for states influenced by patrons that use volunteers. These findings take 
into consideration and control for alternative arguments, including threat environment 
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and colonial recruitment legacy—which is most often associated with domestic political 
culture—of the client.  
The most common of these counter-arguments is the claim that British colonies 
adopted volunteer militaries because they internalized a British cultural antipathy towards 
conscription.542 As Victor Asal et al. write, “an anticonscription precedent set during the 
English Civil War….defined state power and individual rights in the English context, and 
England passed it on to its many colonies through the institutions of colonial 
governance.”543 This argument is unsatisfying for several reasons, which I laid out in 
chapter 2, including that it ignores powerful incentives for dissociation from prior 
regimes and the importance of independence as a critical juncture.  
My results in chapter 3 confirm that there is unlikely to be a causal chain from 
British volunteerism to volunteerism in former British colonies. For one, I found that 
there is a more consistent effect across different model specifications of conscript patron 
states. This indicates that new states are less likely to use volunteers simply because their 
patron does, which likewise should weaken the connection between volunteerism in the 
United Kingdom and its former colonies. Furthermore, in regressions that include my 
patron state variables and a dichotomous measure of whether a state was a former British 
colony, the latter was not found to be a statistically significant predictor of military 
recruitment. In other words, there is no evidence, once my explanatory variables are 
taken into consideration, that being a former British colony is associated with volunteer 
military recruitment.  
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Second, I find that the effect of having a patron state does not change with 
different threat environments; whether clients face a dangerous or stable external threat 
environment, patrons tend to lead clients toward adopting their own recruitment policies. 
Third, when there is no foreign patron, major external threats lead states to use 
conscription. This is important evidence that helps adjudicate conflicting theoretical 
predictions in the literature on military recruitment: while some theories argue that 
modern technology makes conscription obsolete, leading states to use volunteers to cope 
with threats, others argue that increasing volunteerism in Europe is a product of the 
declining threat environment of the post-Cold War period.544 My findings suggest that 
states still view conscription as their best option when they face major territorial threats. 
To establish these findings, I built a dataset of cases in which states have the 
opportunity and interest in redesigning military institutions, including instances of 
military design after independence, after social revolution, and after civil wars that ended 
in negotiated settlements or rebel victory. These are the most likely instances in which 
foreign actors should be able to influence military design. I also collected original data to 
measure whether a military patron is present in a given case. These variables identify 
who the patron state is, whether it used conscription or volunteers, and whether it used 
military deployments, advisors, or seconded or contract officers to influence the client 
state.  
Chapters 4 through 6 presented case studies that represent each of the causal 
pathways described by my theory. The first of these three chapters examines the 
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formation of Jordan’s military. This chapter shows the way military recruitment policies 
can result from the emulation of a foreign military patron. Jordan’s army was strongly 
influenced by British military preferences. British officers commanded Jordanian units, 
and the army was led by a former British officer, John Bagot Glubb. Local preferences 
and historical practices would have prejudiced Jordan towards adopting conscription. 
However, these factors could not overpower the efforts of British officers to design the 
Jordanian military as a volunteer force after its independence. In fact, there is strong 
evidence that in the absence of this British influence, Jordan would have adopted 
conscription, like its previous colonial power, the Ottoman Empire, or its next most likely 
patron, Iraq. Instead, Glubb implemented the volunteer system with which he was most 
familiar. He explicitly resisted requests to use conscription, limiting any compulsory 
policies to the supplementary National Guard reserve force.  
Chapter 5 told the story of military recruitment in the absence of either a military 
patron or major external threats. This chapter analyzed the creation of Iraq’s army after 
its independence in 1932. While Iraq had a military patron during the Mandate era in the 
form of the Mandatory power, the United Kingdom, it had no patron after independence. 
While the United Kingdom fought vigorously against Iraqi efforts to adopt conscription 
during the Mandatory period, it made it clear that it had no desire to assist in Iraqi 
military design after the latter’s independence. Consequently, domestic preferences could 
determine Iraqi military design. Moreover, Iraqi leaders did not perceive there to be 
major external threats after independence. Instead, Iraq’s Minister of Defense, Jafar Al-
Askari, believed the army’s priority should be internal security, and that a strong army 
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was the precondition for other strong institutions.545 Iraqi leaders sought to create a 
military that could aid with internal pressures by integrating the country’s diverse 
populations and tying them to the regime. In particular, they were strongly influenced by 
their education in the Ottoman military system, which convinced them that conscription 
was the best system for meeting this goal. Thus, Iraq had no military patron, faced no 
external constraints on its military design in the form of major external threats, and as a 
result was unconstrained in the recruitment policies that it could adopt. 
Finally, chapter 6 demonstrated the importance of threat perceptions when there is 
no foreign patron that dominates military design but when there is major external threat. 
It applied my theory to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite an extensive 
international presence in Bosnia at the end of the civil war that established its 
independence, no single power emerged to guide military design. In fact, the United 
States, which led the statebuilding process in Bosnia, intentionally avoided questions of 
military design in the 1990s, preferring to allow the Bosnian Entities to make their own 
decisions. This resulted in the perpetuation of the status quo, which was the adoption of 
conscription by each of the Entities to prepare for renewed hostilities that were perceived 
as inevitable. Once the United States took a more active role in military design, spurred 
by the High Commissioner’s introduction of the defense reform process in 2002, Bosnian 
recruitment practices shifted to implement the volunteer practices of its new military 
patrons. By illustrating a change in military recruitment practices after an initial period of 
military design, this chapter also demonstrates the potential for my theory to explain 
military recruitment policies beyond cases of new states. 
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Overall, this dissertation contributions to political science literature by providing 
a new theory of institutional design, focused specifically on militaries. It demonstrates 
that military design is subject to forces often outside the control of the state, indicating 
limitations to state sovereignty and emphasizing the hierarchical nature of the 
international system. The remainder of this chapter details the contributions this 
dissertation makes to important debates in political science and insights it provides into 
relevant policy debates. It concludes with a discussion of avenues for further research.  
 
II. Implications for Scholarly Literature and Policy 
While this dissertation was intended to identify the factors that determine whether 
a country develops a military that relies on conscripts or volunteers, its findings speak to 
broader academic and policy communities. More specifically, it adds to a growing body 
of work urging scholars to “see” hierarchy in international relations.546 In addition, it 
implies relevant policy prescriptions for security force assistance and cooperation, 
especially in post-conflict and weak state settings.  
A. Hierarchy in International Relations 
In arguing for the role of outside actors in affecting military design decisions, this 
dissertation also bolsters the view that hierarchy constitutes an important component of 
international order. Viewing the international system as characterized by hierarchy means 
recognizing the ways state sovereignty can be limited or overlap with that of other states. 
As a result, states can have different roles within the international system. Militaries in 
subordinate or client states may serve very different functions from those in dominant or 
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patron states, or from any state that can make a more independent defense policy. 
Hierarchy implies that some states may not need to provide for their own defense, but can 
rely on others to guarantee their security for them.547 Others have shown that interstate 
relations are often characterized by hierarchy. As Paul Macdonald wrote, “unequal 
imperial relations in which great powers seize sovereignty from less powerful states are 
here to stay.”548 This dissertation shows that hierarchy often plays out in the realm of 
military affairs. Traditionally, developing and controlling national militaries has been 
viewed as a chief response to the constraints imposed by anarchy. I show that in many 
states it is an institution characterized by shared sovereignty, not one that arose solely or 
primarily out of the requirements of self-help.  
This emphasis on hierarchy and patron-client relations also has relevance for 
research into the security sector in weak states. While I developed my theory by thinking 
about newly independent states and the process of military formation, my theory applies 
beyond these circumstances to conditions that states are likely to continue to experience 
today. The universe of cases I examined in Chapter 3 included not only states after they 
became independent, but also the comparable circumstances of social revolution and 
post-conflict reconstruction. These latter two conditions capture the broader phenomenon 
of weak or fragile states. I found that 65% of the states in my universe of cases exhibit 
some form of foreign military patronage, indicating that weak states are very likely to 
lack full control over the design of their military institutions. Moreover, my results show 
that emulation is a common result of this influence. This means that foreign sponsors of 
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security sector reform have the ability to affect military design in weak states in a lasting 
way, especially given how rarely recruitment practices change.  
B. Policy Implications 
This relevance to security sector reform means that my findings have implications 
for policymakers. Decisions about military recruitment are but one example of the many 
decisions states need to make when they design or reform militaries. Thus, this 
dissertation demonstrates the importance of foreign actors during the security sector 
reform process. In particular, foreign governments can play an important role by 
controlling security practices in or modeling practices to states they target for security 
sector reform. For example, the United States has a long history of attempting to build 
militaries in other states, and it appears that it will continue to attempt to do this for the 
foreseeable future.549 However, its record of building successful militaries is, at best, 
mixed. As Biddle et al., point out, many U.S.-assisted militaries have failed in the 
missions they have been assigned; the Iraqi army collapsed in the face of the Islamic 
State offensive in 2014, while the Afghan army has been unable to prevent the resurgence 
of the Taliban.550 Therefore security force assistance, they argue, has not led to the 
emulation of successful warfighting practices.   
However, this dissertation indicates that security force assistance can lead to 
successful emulation with sufficient engagement from the foreign patron. The Afghan 
and Iraq armies, after all, adopted many of the formal design policies that the United 
States preferred. This of course does not necessarily mean that patron states will always 
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pursue the right, or most militarily effective, policies for their clients; patrons will base 
their military design decisions on their own experiences and biases rooted in their own 
history and strategic culture. Regardless of whether this external influence is good for the 
new state, though, when patron states are committed to providing assistance, new states 
are more likely to emulate their practices. Indeed, this is consistent with a forthcoming 
argument by Mara Karlin, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy 
and Force Development in the U.S. Defense Department.551 Karlin argues that one of the 
necessary conditions for successfully building a foreign military is deep engagement, 
which includes selecting personnel for senior military leadership in the new state. One of 
the key goals of military advisory missions and seconding officers is to train the next 
generation of military leaders in the new military. Thus, if sufficient attention is paid to 
training and selecting military leaders that have been exposed to the practices of the 
patron state, security force assistance is especially likely to be successful.  
In particular, recruitment policies can contribute to conflict resolution and 
security in war-torn and divided societies through integration with efforts to support 
human rights, power-sharing in the military, and broader security sector reform and 
training efforts. Thus, my research highlights an important role for external actors in 
helping states design or restructure their military after major regime change or conflict. 
For example, military training and power-sharing was integral to the peace process in 
Bosnia. Military recruitment policies are an important feature of military power-sharing 
that have implications for other aspects of post-conflict security sector reform 
agreements. My dissertation contributes to efforts to design such post-conflict militaries 
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to support peace and domestic reconstruction. In short, my dissertation addresses an 
important, recurring problem for policymakers: how to assist other states in the design of 
militaries that support domestic stability and international peace.  
There is another potential challenge for policymakers. I show that when states do 
not have a foreign patron, they prefer to respond to highly threatening environments 
using conscription. This demonstrates that, despite technological advances that appear to 
favor capital-intensive military strategies, many states perceive conscription—a labor-
intensive strategy—as still their best bet in the event of major foreign threats. Therefore, 
this dissertation says something about how states respond to threats. Capital-intensive, 
volunteer militaries may appear to be the best practice in the international system because 
of the success of the system’s most powerful actor—the United States—in using these 
techniques. However, we should not necessarily expect states to adopt capital-intensive 
militaries to address external defense in the international system without direct military 
influence from a patron who already follows those practices. New states in particular may 
prefer to pursue other goals, such as promoting a national identity, or may perceive their 
capabilities as better suited to labor-intensive military organization. In reality, we should 
still expect states to try to maximize their military effectiveness in the face of threats 
using conscription. Indeed, there is some evidence that this is happening around the 
world today, with several countries apparently implementing conscription in response to 
rising threats from regional rivals. This has happened, for example, in countries as 
diverse as Sweden and the United Arab Emirates, responding to a resurgent Russia and 
Iran, respectively.552 As a result, foreign patrons who use volunteers may have a 
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particularly challenging time affecting military policies in states that perceive they face 
major foreign threats. This may change however, if states perceive there to be a decline in 
the likelihood of land-based territorial wars. As these conflicts become less common and 
threats to invade countries become less credible, fewer states may design their militaries 
around conscription. 
This is important because military policies determine the extent to which the 
United States can rely on allies to contribute effectively to foreign deployments and 
collective security: conscript and volunteer armies have different levels of effectiveness, 
or rather, may be better in different types of conflicts.553 If volunteer militaries are more 
effective in long counterinsurgency campaigns—as Cohen suggests—or in any type of 
conflict—as Horowitz et al. argue—then the United States should want its allies to adopt 
volunteer recruitment policies. The U.S. has an interest in whether coalition or alliance 
partners use either conscription or volunteers. Military design and recruitment policies 
can also foster domestic stability, which in turn facilitates more predictable long-term 
relations, when they support democratic and civilian-controlled regimes. Understanding 
what conditions make a preferred recruitment system more or less likely is useful for 
policymakers designing foreign aid to affect these policy outcomes. For example, if 
Afghan leaders consider reinstituting conscription—as they recently have—but US 
policymakers prefer a volunteer Afghan army, my research identifies feasible ways to 
achieve that goal. For example, maintaining an Afghan army that is consistent with 
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American perceptions of military organization may require a heavy U.S. security 
presence, either with local advisors that have some degree of control over the Afghan 
military, or with sufficient numbers of trainers to teach their Afghan counterparts about 
American military practices. Whether for advising allies or assisting security sector 
reform, it is important to know what conditions make it easier for a country to adopt a 
recruitment system successfully. 
Similarly, this dissertation provides insight into how states define their security 
interests. It is often assumed that militaries are designed primarily to be experts in 
violence. However, my research demonstrates that there are cases where states sacrifice 
military effectiveness to pursue other goals, such as social integration. My research 
suggests in what conditions states may be freer to sacrifice military effectiveness for 
other goals. When states have patrons, domestic preferences will have little effect on how 
they design their military. Instead, the patron will dominate military design with its own 
perceptions of military effectiveness in mind. Conversely, states with no patrons but 
which face major external threats are also constrained, but by the international security 
environment—they have no choice but to rely on themselves for military defense. Only 
when there is no foreign patron or external threat are states relatively free to design their 
militaries based on their own preferences. When there are no constraints from patrons or 
external threats, states have more freedom to use the military to address less strictly 
military goals. In these cases, some states facing high levels of domestic threat use loyal 
volunteers to suppress rebellion violently, while others seek to tie the population to the 
regime through a conscript system that treats the army like a “school for the nation.” 
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However, my dissertation shows that the circumstances in which states can make military 
decisions based on these factors are relatively rare.    
 
III. Extensions for Future Research 
The argument and findings of this dissertation offer several possible extensions 
for future research. In addition, there are also several aspects of my theory that are 
amenable to additional empirical testing. 
 First, I only focused on the broadest level of recruitment policy—whether states 
used conscription or not at the national level. However, other aspects of recruitment 
policies are also worth studying, and may in fact be related to the decision to use 
conscription. For example, length of service, exemptions, and recruitment criteria are all 
additional ways that states affect who serves in their militaries. Personnel policies that 
make the military more or less open to diverse societal groups, especially policies relating 
to gender or LGBT equality, is a particular area that is likely to be important for many 
armies around in the world in the near future. It is reasonable to believe that if the 
decision to conscript or not is determined by foreign influence, so might these other, 
related policies. Thus, we could expect gender-inclusive military policies to occur in new 
or post-conflict states whose security sector reform processes are being overseen by 
patrons that have adopted similar policies. Similarly, my theory could also be extended to 
test policies that are less directly related to recruitment. Any aspect of military 
organization that is subject to variation across states, such as the main organizational unit 
or level of mechanization, could be equally affected by patron-client relations or, in their 
absence, by threat perceptions. 
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Second, my theory could also apply to the timing of recruitment system changes. 
In this dissertation I focused primarily on initial military design decisions based on the 
empirical finding that recruitment changes are rare and self-reinforcing. Thus, it is 
particularly useful to understand the contexts in which states initially design their 
militaries. However, it is also important to study military reform by addressing when or 
why states change their recruitment system. It may be that foreign patrons can affect 
military design even after the initial period of military design. Thus, when a state loses a 
foreign patron and regains control over its military design, my theory would imply that 
threat perceptions should determine how it will choose to recruit. This is consistent with 
the findings of my case study chapters on Jordan and Bosnia, which examined the 
trajectory of these countries’ armies after the initial period of military design. In addition, 
when a state switches between foreign patrons that use different recruitment methods, we 
should also observe the state adopting the new patron’s recruitment method. Indeed, in 
related work, I find that countries that participate in the American IMET program are 
more likely to change their recruitment system to use volunteers, and are less likely to 
change to conscript service if they already use volunteers.554 Thus, my theory may be 
equally applicable to cases of recruitment change as to cases of design.  
Third, my dissertation reveals additional avenues of exploration in terms of how 
foreign patrons can affect military design. I argue that emulation is the effect of having a 
patron state, but emulation can come about either via direct intervention or through more 
indirect pressure, or exposure to successful techniques. Additional research could 
determine which of these mechanisms happens under what conditions. 
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Fourth, there is similar room for additional research on the nature of recruitment 
decisions that are defined by my second causal pathway. While I argue that recruitment 
under conditions of no patronage and no major foreign threat is fundamentally 
determined by leaders’ idiosyncratic preferences, it may be possible to theorize factors 
that further constrain their decisions. For example, some types of domestic threats may 
more closely resemble the kinds of foreign territorial threats that create pressures toward 
conscription. This may have been the case in Iraq for much of its history: a Sunni Muslim 
minority ruled over a Shi’a majority, which may have created incentives to attempt to use 
military conscription to create a national identity. In fact, there is some support for the 
argument that ethnic representativeness may affect leaders’ strategic calculus regarding 
conscription; Chapter 3 indicated that states with larger politically excluded populations 
may be less likely to use conscription when they have no patron. Similarly, this is also 
likely to be the pathway followed by many powerful states with more developed 
militaries, particularly in an age when nuclear weapons have decreased the probability of 
major territorial invasions. Thus, the foreign patronage portion of my theory applies best 
to weaker, developing states, though one could imagine that a similar emulation argument 
could explain military design in stronger states as well.  
Fifth, my dissertation advances a theory of military design that can equally apply 
to non-state actors. Great powers around the world have been involved in creating or 
supporting rebel group proxies, often to avoid contributing troops of their own. Most 
recently, the United States announced that it would create a new Kurdish-led and 
 260 
 
 
 
“professionally well trained” force in Syria.555 While other American-backed Kurdish 
forces have reportedly relied on conscription, it appears that their regular forces—as 
opposed to border and civil police—are comprised of volunteers.556 Whether non-state 
actors tend to adopt the same recruitment practices—or other military practices—of their 
sponsors remains to be seen.  
Finally, it is only worthwhile to understand the determinants of military 
recruitment strategies if this variation affects other important characteristics of the state 
or aspects of state behavior. While existing research, as described in Chapter 1, 
establishes that conscription has important effects on interstate relations, including 
conflict onset and outcomes, there is much room for additional research on the 
consequences of conscription. In particular, there is little research on how conscription 
affects domestic political outcomes at the state level. Given its broad effects on military 
design and its relationship to civilian society, conscription can be expected to affect many 
domestic outcomes, including coup propensity, responses to mass demonstrations, state 
capacity, and individual political participation. While conscription is often cited as a 
factor that could affect these outcomes, there is little cross-national research to support 
these arguments.557  
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Similarly, the merits of conscription are still frequently debated in the United 
States.558 It is rare for a Veteran’s Day or Memorial Day to pass without at least one op-
ed in a major US news publication asking whether the United States should reinstate the 
draft.559 Typical arguments in favor of such a policy state that a draft would lead to 
greater cross-cultural understanding and would create better civil-military relations, in 
part by ensuring more Americans are connected to the military and thus have “skin in the 
game” when it comes to foreign policy decision-making. However, these arguments have 
not been tested empirically. Additional research on the domestic consequences of 
conscription would provide important information about how countries should design 
their militaries in the future.  
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APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING DATA FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Table A.1: Universe of Cases 
COW 
Code Name Year Criterion for Entering Dataset 
305 Austria 1918 ICOW 
315 Czechoslovakia 1918 ICOW 
366 Estonia 1918 ICOW 
310 Hungary 1918 ICOW 
367 Latvia 1918 ICOW 
368 Lithuania 1918 ICOW 
290 Poland 1918 ICOW 
678 Yemen Arab Rep. (Sanaa/North) 1918 ICOW 
700 Afghanistan 1919 ICOW 
712 Mongolia 1921 ICOW 
651 Egypt 1922 COW Interruption 
205 Ireland 1922 ICOW 
42 Dominican Republic 1924 COW Interruption 
91 Honduras 1924 COW Civil War 
670 Saudi Arabia 1926 ICOW 
710 China 1928 COW Civil War 
70 Mexico 1929 COW Civil War 
645 Iraq 1932 ICOW 
41 Haiti 1934 COW Interruption 
230 Spain 1939 COW Civil War 
530 Ethiopia 1941 COW Interruption 
660 Lebanon 1943 ICOW 
339 Albania 1944 COW Interruption 
220 France 1944 COW Interruption 
350 Greece 1944 COW Interruption 
395 Iceland 1944 ICOW 
212 Luxembourg 1944 COW Interruption 
345 Yugoslavia 1944 COW Interruption and Goodwin 
211 Belgium 1945 COW Interruption 
315 Czechoslovakia 1945 COW Interruption 
210 Netherlands 1945 COW Interruption 
385 Norway 1945 COW Interruption 
290 Poland 1945 COW Interruption 
663 Jordan 1946 ICOW 
840 Philippines 1946 ICOW 
652 Syria 1946 ICOW 
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760 Bhutan 1947 ICOW 
750 India 1947 ICOW 
770 Pakistan 1947 ICOW 
94 Costa Rica 1948 COW Civil War 
666 Israel 1948 ICOW 
775 Myanmar (Burma) 1948 ICOW 
731 North Korea (DPRK) 1948 ICOW 
732 South Korea (ROK) 1948 ICOW 
780 Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 1948 ICOW 
710 China 1949 Goodwin Revolution 
850 Indonesia 1949 ICOW 
713 Taiwan (ROC) 1949 ICOW 
620 Libya 1951 ICOW 
145 Bolivia 1952 Goodwin Revolution 
740 Japan 1952 COW Interruption 
811 Cambodia 1953 ICOW 
812 Laos 1953 ICOW 
265 German Dem. Rep. (East) 1954 ICOW 
817 Rep. of Vietnam (South) 1954 ICOW 
816 Vietnam/Dem.Rep.Vietnam (North) 1954 ICOW and Goodwin 
160 Argentina 1955 COW Civil War 
305 Austria 1955 COW Interruption 
260 German Fed. Rep. (West) 1955 ICOW 
600 Morocco 1956 COW Interruption 
625 Sudan 1956 ICOW 
616 Tunisia 1956 COW Interruption 
452 Ghana 1957 ICOW 
820 Malaysia 1957 ICOW 
438 Guinea 1958 ICOW 
40 Cuba 1959 Goodwin Revolution 
434 Benin (Dahomey) 1960 ICOW 
439 Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) 1960 ICOW 
471 Cameroon 1960 ICOW 
482 Central African Republic 1960 ICOW 
483 Chad 1960 ICOW 
484 Congo (Brazzaville) 1960 ICOW 
437 Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 1960 ICOW 
352 Cyprus 1960 ICOW 
490 Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaire; Kinshasa) 1960 ICOW 
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481 Gabon 1960 ICOW 
580 Madagascar (Malagasy Rep.) 1960 ICOW 
432 Mali 1960 ICOW 
435 Mauritania 1960 ICOW 
436 Niger 1960 ICOW 
475 Nigeria 1960 ICOW 
433 Senegal 1960 ICOW 
520 Somalia 1960 ICOW 
461 Togo 1960 ICOW 
690 Kuwait 1961 ICOW 
451 Sierra Leone 1961 ICOW 
510 Tanzania (Tanganyika) 1961 ICOW 
615 Algeria 1962 ICOW and Goodwin 
516 Burundi 1962 ICOW 
51 Jamaica 1962 ICOW 
812 Laos 1962 COW Civil War 
517 Rwanda 1962 ICOW 
990 Samoa (Western Samoa) 1962 ICOW 
52 Trinidad and Tobago 1962 ICOW 
500 Uganda 1962 ICOW 
501 Kenya 1963 ICOW 
511 Zanzibar 1963 ICOW 
553 Malawi 1964 ICOW 
338 Malta 1964 ICOW 
551 Zambia 1964 ICOW 
420 Gambia 1965 ICOW 
781 Maldive Islands 1965 ICOW 
830 Singapore 1965 ICOW 
552 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1965 ICOW 
53 Barbados 1966 ICOW 
571 Botswana 1966 ICOW 
110 Guyana 1966 ICOW 
645 Iraq 1966 COW Civil War 
570 Lesotho 1966 ICOW 
680 Yemen People's Rep. (Aden/South) 1967 ICOW 
411 Equatorial Guinea 1968 ICOW 
590 Mauritius 1968 ICOW 
970 Nauru 1968 ICOW 
572 Swaziland 1968 ICOW 
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950 Fiji 1970 ICOW 
645 Iraq 1970 COW Civil War 
955 Tonga 1970 ICOW 
692 Bahrain 1971 ICOW 
771 Bangladesh 1971 ICOW 
694 Qatar 1971 ICOW 
696 United Arab Emirates 1971 ICOW 
625 Sudan 1972 COW Civil War 
31 Bahamas 1973 ICOW 
155 Chile 1973 COW Civil War 
530 Ethiopia 1974 Goodwin Revolution 
55 Grenada 1974 ICOW 
404 Guinea-Bissau 1974 ICOW 
540 Angola 1975 ICOW and Goodwin 
811 Cambodia 1975 Goodwin Revolution 
402 Cape Verde 1975 ICOW 
581 Comoros 1975 ICOW 
541 Mozambique 1975 ICOW 
910 Papua New Guinea 1975 ICOW 
403 Sao Tome and Principe 1975 ICOW 
115 Suriname 1975 ICOW 
591 Seychelles 1976 ICOW 
522 Djibouti 1977 ICOW 
700 Afghanistan 1978 COW Civil War 
54 Dominica 1978 ICOW 
940 Solomon Islands 1978 ICOW 
947 Tuvalu 1978 ICOW 
630 Iran 1979 Goodwin Revolution 
946 Kiribati 1979 ICOW 
93 Nicaragua 1979 Goodwin Revolution 
56 St. Lucia 1979 ICOW 
57 St. Vincent and Grenadines 1979 ICOW 
552 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1979 COW Civil War 
935 Vanuatu 1980 ICOW 
58 Antigua and Barbuda 1981 ICOW 
80 Belize 1981 ICOW 
60 St. Kitts and Nevis 1983 ICOW 
835 Brunei 1984 ICOW 
483 Chad 1984 COW Civil War 
660 Lebanon 1984 COW Civil War 
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987 Fed. States of Micronesia 1986 ICOW 
983 Marshall Islands 1986 ICOW 
500 Uganda 1986 COW Civil War 
680 Yemen People's Republic 1986 COW Civil War 
339 Albania 1989 Goodwin Revolution 
355 Bulgaria 1989 Goodwin Revolution 
310 Hungary 1989 Goodwin Revolution 
290 Poland 1989 Goodwin Revolution 
360 Romania 1989 Goodwin Revolution 
483 Chad 1990 COW Civil War 
255 Germany 1990 COW Interruption 
660 Lebanon 1990 COW Civil War 
565 Namibia 1990 ICOW 
679 Yemen 1990 ICOW 
540 Angola 1991 COW Civil War 
371 Armenia 1991 ICOW 
373 Azerbaijan 1991 ICOW 
370 Belarus 1991 ICOW 
811 Cambodia 1991 COW Civil War 
344 Croatia 1991 ICOW 
366 Estonia 1991 COW Interruption 
530 Ethiopia 1991 COW Civil War 
372 Georgia 1991 ICOW 
705 Kazakhstan 1991 ICOW 
703 Kyrgyzstan 1991 ICOW 
367 Latvia 1991 COW Interruption 
368 Lithuania 1991 COW Interruption 
343 Macedonia 1991 ICOW 
359 Moldova 1991 ICOW 
349 Slovenia 1991 ICOW 
702 Tajikistan 1991 ICOW 
701 Turkmenistan 1991 ICOW 
369 Ukraine 1991 ICOW 
704 Uzbekistan 1991 ICOW 
346 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 ICOW 
92 El Salvador 1992 COW Civil War 
359 Moldova 1992 COW Civil War 
316 Czech Republic 1993 ICOW and Goodwin 
531 Eritrea 1993 ICOW 
317 Slovakia 1993 ICOW and Goodwin 
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540 Angola 1994 COW Civil War 
372 Georgia 1994 COW Civil War 
986 Palau 1994 ICOW 
517 Rwanda 1994 COW Civil War 
450 Liberia 1995 COW Civil War 
450 Liberia 1996 COW Civil War 
365 Russia 1996 COW Civil War 
484 Congo (Brazzaville) 1997 COW Civil War 
490 Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaire; Kinshasa) 1997 COW Civil War 
520 Somalia 1997 COW Civil War 
702 Tajikistan 1997 COW Civil War 
615 Algeria 1999 COW Civil War 
404 Guinea-Bissau 1999 COW Civil War 
451 Sierra Leone 2000 COW Civil War 
700 Afghanistan 2001 Author Addition 
840 Philippines 2001 COW Civil War 
490 Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaire; Kinshasa) 2002 COW Civil War 
860 East Timor (Timor-Leste) 2002 ICOW 
850 Indonesia 2002 COW Civil War 
780 Sri Lanka 2002 COW Civil War 
516 Burundi 2003 COW Civil War 
645 Iraq 2003 Author addition 
450 Liberia 2003 COW Civil War 
437 Cote d'Ivoire 2004 COW Civil War 
625 Sudan 2005 COW Civil War 
341 Montenegro 2006 ICOW 
790 Nepal 2006 COW Civil War 
770 Pakistan 2006 COW Civil War 
347 Kosovo 2008 ICOW 
626 South Sudan 2011 ICOW 
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Table A.2: Missing Observations on the Dependent Variable 
Country Year 
Yemen Arab Republic 1918 
Lebanon 1943 
Bhutan 1947 
Benin 1960 
Samoa 1962 
Maldive Islands 1965 
Barbados 1966 
Equatorial Guinea 1968 
Nauru 1968 
Tonga 1970 
Guinea-Bissau 1974 
Tuvalu 1978 
St. Vincent and Grenadines 1979 
Kiribati 1979 
Vanuatu 1980 
Marshall Islands 1986 
Palau 1994 
South Sudan 2011 
 
 
Table A.3: Frequency of Threat Environment by Foreign Influence 
 No Influence Volunteer Patron Conscript Patron 
Any Land Borders 65 (87%) 25 (64%) 80 (87%) 
Any MIDs 30 (41%) 11 (28%) 40 (43%) 
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Table A.4: OLS Results for Table 3.9, The Effect of Patron Influence on the 
Probability of Conscription in New States 
Variables OLS Model 8 
OLS 
Model 9 
OLS 
Model 
10 
OLS 
Model 
11 
OLS 
Model 12 
OLS 
Model 
13 
OLS 
Model 
14 
Volunteer Patron -0.144* -0.0962 -0.143* -0.142* -0.115 -0.140* -0.137* 
(0.0791) (0.0828) (0.0796) (0.0799) (0.0824) (0.0806) (0.0821) 
Conscript Patron 0.150* 0.158** 0.150* 0.150* 0.158** 0.159** 0.158** (0.0793) (0.0772) (0.0794) (0.0795) (0.0765) (0.0802) (0.0788) 
Volunteer 
Legacy 
-0.345*** -0.314*** -0.342*** -0.343*** -0.289*** -0.334*** -0.330*** 
(0.0918) (0.0934) (0.0943) (0.0931) (0.0959) (0.0949) (0.0932) 
Any Land 
Borders 
 0.227***      
 (0.0832)      
Any MIDs   0.0150       (0.0709)     
Any Forceful 
MIDs 
   0.0220    
   (0.0753)    
Total Land 
Borders 
    0.0470***   
    (0.0139)   
Total MIDs      0.0194       (0.0218)  
Total Forceful 
MIDs 
      0.0506** 
      (0.0253) 
        
Constant 0.582*** 0.368*** 0.575*** 0.574*** 0.413*** 0.556*** 0.542*** (0.0676) (0.0996) (0.0735) (0.0715) (0.0867) (0.0749) (0.0709) 
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
R-squared 0.214 0.238 0.214 0.214 0.254 0.217 0.226 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5: OLS Results for Table 3.11, The Effect of Influence and Threat on the 
Probability of Conscription in New States 
Variables OLS Model 15 
OLS  
Model 16 
OLS 
Model 17 
OLS 
Model 18 
OLS 
Model 19 
OLS 
Model 20 
Any Land Borders 0.486***      (0.0819)      
Any MIDs  0.132      (0.112)     
Any Forceful MIDs   0.172      (0.114)    
Total Land Borders    0.0643***      (0.0184)   
Total MIDs     0.0614**      (0.0255)  
Total Forceful 
MIDs 
     0.112*** 
     (0.0294) 
Volunteer Patron 0.206** -0.106 -0.0481 0.0133 -0.0454 -0.0504 (0.0951) (0.0917) (0.0938) (0.110) (0.0933) (0.0950) 
Conscript Patron 0.459** 0.244** 0.219** 0.225 0.237** 0.221** 0.206** (0.103) (0.0943) (0.136) (0.0938) (0.0901) 
Volunteer 
Patron*Threat 
-0.367*** -0.0967 -0.351* -0.0488 -0.103** -0.158 
(0.118) (0.194) (0.199) (0.0297) (0.0508) (0.0954) 
Conscript 
Patron*Threat 
-0.336 -0.215 -0.206 -0.0209 -0.0791* -0.0945** 
(0.205) (0.142) (0.147) (0.0330) (0.0428) (0.0455) 
Volunteer Legacy -0.315*** -0.330*** -0.346*** -0.301*** -0.338*** -0.331*** (0.0937) (0.0961) (0.0958) (0.0984) (0.0994) (0.0969) 
       
Constant 0.135* 0.522*** 0.525*** 0.360*** 0.508*** 0.499*** (0.0722) (0.0835) (0.0780) (0.0923) (0.0790) (0.0768) 
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199 
R-squared 0.250 0.223 0.228 0.260 0.235 0.243 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.6: The Determinants of Military Recruitment on Recently Independent 
States Only 
Variables (1) (2) dvdummy dvdummy 
Total Land Borders 0.249** 0.498** (0.116) (0.215) 
Volunteer Patron -1.312 -1.192 (0.896) (1.072) 
Conscript Patron 0.491 1.627* (0.465) (0.843) 
Volunteer Legacy -1.020* -0.954 (0.603) (0.597) 
Volunteer Influence*Borders  0.00346  (0.327) 
Conscript Influence*Borders  -0.397  (0.258) 
   
Constant -0.577 -1.287* (0.502) (0.675) 
Observations 118 118 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A.7: Determinants of Military Recruitment when foreign influence is based 
on tradition, rather than contemporary system 
Variables (1) (2) dvdummy dvdummy 
Total Land Borders 0.234*** 0.354*** (0.0819) (0.127) 
Volunteer Patron -0.164 0.490 (0.364) (0.595) 
Conscript Patron 0.870** 1.218* (0.418) (0.719) 
Volunteer Patron*Borders -1.571*** -1.561*** (0.442) (0.476) 
Conscript Patron*Borders  -0.336**  (0.165) 
Volunteer Legacy  -0.109  (0.189) 
   
Constant -0.416 -0.798* (0.385) (0.466) 
Observations 199 199 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.8: The Effect of Recoding Cases of UN Influence 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) dvdummy dvdummy dvdummy dvdummy 
Total Land Borders 0.254*** 0.370*** 0.262*** 0.440*** (0.0840) (0.130) (0.0800) (0.131) 
Volunteer Patron (including influence of US 
if it is involved in multilateral missions) 
-0.498 0.316   
(0.439) (0.712)   
Conscript Patron (including influence of US 
if it is involved in multilateral missions) 
0.760** 1.221*   
(0.370) (0.716)   
Volunteer Legacy -1.453*** -1.533*** -1.289*** -1.395*** (0.476) (0.516) (0.488) (0.539) 
Volunteer Patron*Borders  -0.266    (0.174)   
Conscript Patron*Borders  -0.149    (0.204)   
Volunteer Patron (including influence of UN 
lead nations in multilateral missions) 
  -1.179** -0.0260 
  (0.508) (0.779) 
Conscript Patron (including influence of UN 
lead nations in multilateral missions) 
  0.675* 1.325* 
  (0.377) (0.697) 
Volunteer Patron*Borders    -0.359*    (0.216) 
Conscript Patron*Borders    -0.218    (0.204) 
     
Constant -0.538 -0.889* -0.456 -0.971** (0.402) (0.483) (0.419) (0.493) 
Observations 199 199 199 199 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.9: The Effect of Longer Threat Time Horizons on Military Recruitment 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) dvdummy dvdummy dvdummy dvdummy 
Total Forceful MIDs (within 3 years of 
independence) 
0.147* 0.289**   
(0.0851) (0.133)   
Volunteer Patron -0.784* -0.392 -0.770* -0.287 (0.454) (0.655) (0.458) (0.619) 
Conscript Patron 0.728** 1.047** 0.735** 1.154*** (0.365) (0.432) (0.364) (0.440) 
Volunteer Legacy -1.546*** -1.546*** -1.529*** -1.508*** (0.465) (0.504) (0.465) (0.489) 
Volunteer Patron*MIDs  -0.359    (0.453)   
Conscript Patron*MIDs  -0.282*    (0.170)   
Total Forceful MIDs (within 5 years of 
independence) 
  0.123** 0.267** 
  (0.0577) (0.105) 
Volunteer Patron*MIDs    -0.309    (0.284) 
Conscript Patron*MIDs    -0.249**    (0.118) 
     
Constant 0.137 -0.0368 0.0833 -0.173 (0.308) (0.332) (0.307) (0.347) 
Observations 199 199 199 199 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.10: The Effect of Foreign Influence and Threat on Recruitment at 
Different Times 
Variables Recruitment at Independence 
Recruitment at 
Independence 
Recruitment at 
Year 5 
Recruitment at 
Year 5 
Total Land Borders 0.198** 0.359*** 0.191** 0.284** (0.0827) (0.124) (0.0782) (0.116) 
Volunteer Patron -0.649 0.138 -0.727 -0.0694 (0.467) (0.771) (0.503) (0.758) 
Conscript Patron 0.622* 1.500** 0.704** 1.125 (0.359) (0.750) (0.352) (0.716) 
Volunteer Legacy -1.414*** -1.488*** -1.586*** -1.651*** (0.482) (0.526) (0.456) (0.480) 
Volunteer Patron*Borders  -0.245  -0.213  (0.179)  (0.167) 
Conscript Patron*Borders  -0.277  -0.135  (0.204)  (0.190) 
     
Constant -0.463 -0.970** -0.274 -0.561 (0.397) (0.472) (0.395) (0.468) 
Observations 199 199 199 199 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A.11: The Effect of Technological Era on Recruitment 
Variables (1) (2) dvdummy dvdummy 
Post-1973 0.341 0.353 (0.3468) (0.3446) 
Total Land Borders 0.234*** 0.335*** (0.0852) (0.1272) 
Volunteer Patron -0.789 0.420 (0.5016) (0.7746) 
Conscript Patron 0.797** 1.208* (0.3648) (0.7031) 
Volunteer Patron*Borders  -0242  (0.1789) 
Conscript Patron*Borders  -0.132  (0.1960) 
Volunteer Legacy -1.384*** -1.451*** (0.4837) (0.5188) 
   
Constant -0.639 -0.952** (0.4101) (0.4754) 
Observations 199 199 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEWS 
On average, interviews lasted 30–40 minutes, with only one interview lasting less 
than 20 minutes. One interview was in-person and lasted several hours, while the rest 
were conducted either over the phone or via Skype. Interviews were semi-structured: I 
went into them with a list of questions to ask or topics to cover, but the tone was 
generally conversational and sought “to retain sufficient indeterminacy in the interview to 
allow for unanticipated insights.”560 I began most interviews with an open-ended question 
asking the interviewee to tell me about his or her role in Bosnian defense reform, 
focusing on a specific episode or institution when applicable. Following Matthew 
Beckmann and Richard Hall’s advice about interviews with policy elites, I focused my 
efforts on “extract[ing] systematic information about [their] actual behaviors on specific 
issues….”561 I asked them to recall their goals in initiating certain decisions, whether 
those goals changed, and about any obstacles to their implementation. Often, one of the 
most useful questions I asked was toward the end, when I would inquire about who else 
was involved in specific decisions or whom else I should talk to. This allowed me to 
identify the pivotal figures in recruitment decisions and to triangulate key information 
about the actions and attitudes of other important policymakers.562 
 
 
                                                        
560 Martin, “Crafting Interviews,” 110. 
561 Matthew N. Beckmann and Richard L. Hall, “Elite Interviewing in Washington, DC,” in 
Interview Research in Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 196–208 (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 2013): 198, emphasis in original.  
562 Layna Mosley, “Introduction. ‘Just Talk to People’? Interviews in Contemporary Political 
Science,” in Interview Research in Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 1–28 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2013): 6–7; Lynch, “Aligning Sampling Strategies,” 36. 
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Table C.1: Interviewee Experience 
 Military Reform Participation 
Inter
-
view 
# 
Name Level of 
Policy563 
Dayton 
Agreemen
t or Prior 
(1995) 
Post-
Conflict 
Stabilizatio
n 
(1996–
2001) 
 
First 
Defense 
Reform 
Commissio
n (May 
2003 
Second 
Defense 
Reform 
Commissio
n 
(2004–
2005) 
Ongoin
g 
Reform  
Efforts 
(2006–
Present) 
1 Clifford 
Bond 
US 
Ambassador 
to Bosnia 
No No Yes No No 
2 Robert 
Tomasovic 
Inspector 
General for 
Entity Armed 
Forces 
No Yes No No No 
3 Anonymous Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Delegation 
Member at 
Dayton 
Yes No No No No 
4 Marshall 
Harris 
President of 
Acquisition 
Support 
Institute 
Yes Yes No No No 
5 Jim Pardew Negotiator at 
Dayton; Head 
of Train and 
Equip 
Yes Yes No No No 
6 Raffi 
Gregorian 
Director of 
Bosnia Policy 
at U.S. State 
Dept; Co-
chair of 
Second DRC 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7 William 
Crouch 
Commanding 
General, 
SFOR 
No Yes No No No 
8 Lejla Gelo Legal Advisor 
for DRC 
Secretariat 
No No No Yes No 
9 Lena 
Andersson 
OSCE 
Advisor; 
DRC 
Working 
Group 
Member 
No Yes Yes No No 
                                                        
563 Note that many interviewees were involved in policy at different levels at different times. The 
information here refers to their position during the most important period on which my interviews 
focused. 
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10 Vanja 
Matic 
OSCE 
Interpreter 
and DRC 
Working 
Group 
Member 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
11 Rohan 
Maxwell 
Senior 
Political-
Military 
Advisor & 
Chief, 
Politico-
Military 
Advisory 
Section, 
NATO HQ 
Sarajevo 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
12 Robert 
Beecroft 
Special Envoy 
for 
Federation, 
OSCE 
Representativ
e 
No Yes Yes No No 
13 Selmo 
Cikotic 
Negotiating 
Team for 
Bosniaks at 
Dayton, 
Defense 
Minister of 
BiH 
Yes Yes No No Yes 
14 Ric Bainter Legal Advisor 
and Chief of 
Staff at DRC 
No No Yes Yes No 
15 James 
Locher III 
Former Under 
Secretary of 
Defense for 
Policy, DRC 
Chairman 
No No Yes No No 
16 John 
Drewien-
kiewicz 
Military 
Advisor to 
High 
Representativ
e, 2005 DRC 
Vice-
Chairman  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
17 Nikola 
Radovanovi
c 
Defense 
Minister of 
BiH 
No No Yes Yes No 
18 Lord Paddy 
Ashdown 
High 
Representativ
e, 2002–2006  
No Yes Yes Yes No 
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